Western Balkans

SecuriMeter 2025

Public Opinion Survey On:

ATTITUDES TOWARDS SECURITY: PERCEPTIONS OF SECURITY AND THREATS

in Western Balkans

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INTRODUCTION

The SecuriMeter 2025 is the fifth edition of the Regional Cooperation Council's (RCC) annual public opinion survey on security and related socio-economic issues in the Western Balkans Six (WB6). Building on a successful series of reports since 2021, SecuriMeter has provided policymakers, practitioners, and the broader public with valuable insights into the attitudes, perceptions, and experiences of citizens regarding the evolving security landscape. The survey's findings complement other key regional initiatives, such as the RCC's Balkan Barometer, and have become an essential resource for monitoring trends, informing public debate, and supporting evidence-based policymaking.

The 2025 edition continues this mission, deepening the exploration of traditional and non-traditional security challenges. While citizens' concerns about general security situation, organised crime, corruption, gun ownership, and governance volatility remain central, the survey also addresses emerging issues, including cyber threats, misuse of personal data, impact of artificial intelligence, misinformation, and consequences of ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. At the same time, the survey places a stronger emphasis on human security and resilience, examining how socio-economic conditions, institutional trust, and perceptions of fairness influence citizens' sense of safety in their daily lives.

Fieldwork was conducted between 30 May and 18 June 2025 across the Western Balkans Six: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo* , Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia. A total of 6007 respondents aged 18 and above were interviewed through computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI), with a minimum of 1000 interviews per each WB6. The questionnaire included 46 thematic and 20 demographic questions, allowing for both regional comparability and in-depth individual WB6 insights.

Throughout the report, some figures may not sum to exactly 100%. Minor discrepancies are the result of standard rounding practices.

To reflect the broad scope of security in the 21st century, the SecuriMeter 2025 report is organised into the following chapters:

- **Chapter A: General Security Perceptions**, which examines citizens' satisfaction with developments in their economy, their sense of safety at domestic and regional levels, fears of war, terrorism, or civil unrest, and expectations for how security will evolve in the next 12 months.
- **Chapter B: Personal Security Perceptions**, which measures individual safety in everyday life, experiences of disorder and crime in local neighbourhoods, exposure to harassment or violence, and public evaluation of security measures such as police presence, surveillance cameras, street lighting, and emergency services.
- **Chapter C: Categories of Problems in Economy** that explores key socio-economic concerns, including the cost of living, unemployment, corruption, and depopulation. It also considers broader societal issues such as erosion of democratic and human rights, ethnic tensions, and climate change. The chapter further investigates the balance that citizens strike between freedom and security, exposure to radicalising content online, and perceptions of gun ownership and the misuse of small arms.

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence

- **Chapter D: Immigration** that analyses public attitudes towards immigration, including its perceived economic, cultural, and security effects, as well as levels of support for different policy approaches to foreign workers and asylum seekers.
- **Chapter E: Emigration Intentions, Human Security and Resilience** that investigates citizens' intentions to emigrate and preferred destinations, while also assessing household resilience through indicators of financial capacity, access to essential goods and services, and satisfaction with healthcare, education, housing, and infrastructure. It further explores vulnerability to health-related expenses and the role of insurance in ensuring resilience.
- **Chapter F: Personal Trust and Trust in Institutions**, which evaluates interpersonal trust within communities and confidence in institutions such as government, courts, police, religious organisations, universities, and international bodies. The chapter also covers perceptions of equality before institutions, political engagement, and expectations of leadership.
- **Chapter G: Corruption**, which assesses the perceived prevalence of corruption, trends over recent years, and direct experiences of bribery across a wide range of sectors, including healthcare, education, courts, police, and public administration, offering an in-depth view of one of the region's most persistent challenges.
- **Chapter H: Emerging Security Threats** that focuses on the public views of new and evolving risks. It examines the perceived impact of the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, the importance of regional and international cooperation, expectations regarding artificial intelligence, and concerns related to cybercrime, misuse of personal data, misinformation, and biased media.

Taken together, the findings of **SecuriMeter 2025** provide a detailed and many-sided account of how security, trust, and resilience are understood across the WB6. The purpose of this report is not merely to present data, but to offer insights that can shape policy and improve public understanding. By shedding light on citizens' diverse security concerns, the SecuriMeter 2025 aims to support more effective and responsive governance, ultimately contributing to a more stable and secure WB6.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

SecuriMeter is a regional public opinion survey designed to provide relevant data on citizens' attitudes, perceptions, and experiences regarding security and other related socio-economic issues in the WB6. The findings from this research serve as a resource for monitoring trends, informing public debates, and supporting evidence-based policymaking.

The survey covers several interrelated aspects of security: trust in institutions and economic stability as the foundation for citizens' well-being and public progress; corruption as a key factor undermining governance and democratic processes; migration as both a reflection of societal conditions and a factor influencing them; and personal security as a core responsibility of public institutions. Additionally, the survey captures perceptions of emerging threats, from regional conflicts to technological risks, that shape citizens' sense of safety and their confidence in the stability of society.

According to the SecuriMeter 2025 findings, citizens in the WB6 are increasingly concerned about "the way things are going" in their economy. Across the region, only one quarter (24.7%) is satisfied with the trajectory of their economy, a decline from 2021 (32.5%). Satisfaction is highest in Albania (31.8%) and Kosovo* (29.1%), followed by Montenegro (27.9%) and North Macedonia (25.3%), and lowest in Serbia (22.5%) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (11.8%). Several factors appear to contribute to this growing discontent, with economic stability being the primary concern. On a scale from 1 to 10, where 10 represents the highest level of concern, citizens ranked the cost of living (8.19) and inflation (8.12) as the most pressing issues, followed by pensions (7.97), wages (7.86), and taxes (7.50). Inflation in the region is primarily driven by import dependence and structural weaknesses, rendering households particularly vulnerable to global disruptions.

When asked whether the region or their own economy is a safe place to live, citizens expressed a generally more positive perception. At the regional level, 38.4% of respondents view the Western Balkans as a safe place to live, while 48.6% feel secure within their own economy. Feeling secure in one's own environment significantly enhances trust, increasing confidence in local institutions by around 6%. This connection suggests that public safety policies are not only vital for reducing crime but also for strengthening institutional credibility.

Trust in institutions plays a central role in shaping public perceptions of security. While citizens generally express high levels of confidence in religious organisations (62.0%), universities (53.4%), the armed forces (57.9%), the police (52.4%) and international organisations: EU (52.1%) and NATO (52.0%), distrust is notably higher towards political parties (76.6%), the parliament (69.1%), and the courts (65.1%). This disparity in trust reflects deeper underlying factors that influence how people evaluate institutions. One of the most significant factors is institutional performance. Citizens who see institutions improving are about 10% more likely to express trust in them, while those who perceive less corruption report 9% higher trust. However, the SecuriMeter 2025 data reveals that one-third of citizens (32%) believe the quality of public institutions has deteriorated over the past five years, highlighting a gap between expectations and actual performance.

Another factor influencing trust is the perceived level of institutional costs. People assess the balance between their contributions, whether in the form of taxes or service fees, and the quality of services they receive in return. When citizens feel they are investing more than they are getting back in value or outcomes, trust begins to erode.

Younger citizens show the highest levels of institutional confidence, particularly in relation to the EU, while older adults report lower levels of trust. This pattern suggests that working-age population may be more sceptical, possibly due to everyday experience with institutions and their service delivery. In addition, trust in local institutions is also highly correlated with trust in EU institutions. Citizens who trust their local institutions are 37% more likely to also trust EU bodies. This interdependence demonstrates that strengthening domestic governance also strengthens European credibility. When local institutions deliver visible results, they enhance not only domestic legitimacy but also regional optimism towards European integration.

Corruption, meanwhile, remains one of the most significant barriers to trust. According to the survey, 81% of citizens consider corruption to be "very" or "fairly widespread", with nearly half (45.5%) believing it has increased over the past three years. Many citizens also report direct experiences with corruption in key sectors like healthcare, education, the judiciary, and public administration, where informal payments, nepotism, and discretionary practices continue to hinder access to essential services and degrade their quality.

Demographic factors provide further insight into the patterns of institutional trust. Younger respondents generally display higher levels of trust in both local and EU institutions, while urban residents tend to be more sceptical. The data shows that factors such as education, income, gender, employment status, and political preferences appear to have little impact on trust levels. This suggests that trust is more strongly influenced by institutional credibility and transparency than by social background. However, beyond institutional factors, demographic trends also play a significant role in shaping citizens' sense of security. One of the most pressing issues is depopulation, driven by continuous emigration and demographic decline, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. SecuriMeter 2025 data show that over 27% of respondents across the region have a more or less developed plan to emigrate abroad, with Germany and Austria being the top destinations.

Personal security is another key dimension of economy-level security, shaped by citizens' sense of safety in their immediate environment (family, neighbourhood, society) and their confidence in being protected from natural disasters, external threats, and similar risks. SecuriMeter 2025 data indicate a decline in perceptions of personal safety across the region: 53.5% of respondents feel "quite safe" or "very safe", down 3% from 2024. Confidence is highest in Kosovo* (64%), North Macedonia (59%), and Montenegro (58%), and lowest in Serbia (46%) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (43%).

For many in the WB6, immigration is perceived as a threat, associated with rising unemployment among the local population (41%), increasing crime rates (43%), and the risk of terrorism (42%). Public attitudes towards immigrants vary across the WB6. Albania and Kosovo* exhibit greater understanding and openness towards immigrants. By contrast, scepticism is more pronounced in Serbia, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and, to a lesser extent, Montenegro, which, being along the *Balkan Route* during the 2015–2016 refugee crisis, faced the challenge of managing hundreds of thousands of immigrants within a short period.

An additional sense of insecurity is fuelled by the information citizens receive about distant conflicts, as well as risks related to the use of artificial intelligence, personal data protection, and the spread of disinformation. In the WB6, 46% of citizens report feeling unsafe due to the war in Ukraine, while 43% attribute this feeling to the war in the Middle East. Opinions on the impact of AI are divided: 37% believe that over the next 20 years, AI will mainly cause harm in their economy, while 22% think it will mostly be helpful. Distrust in AI prevails across all age groups of respondents, except among those aged 18–25, the majority of whom perceive more benefits than risks in its use.

In conclusion, there is an apparent decline in confidence and a rise in pessimism across nearly all dimensions of security, including concerns about safety on regional and economy levels, weakening economic stability, declining trust in institutions, migration-driven demographic changes, a reduced sense of personal security, and heightened awareness of emerging threats. The survey findings emphasize that enhancing institutional performance, addressing economic pressures, and ensuring public safety are mutually reinforcing goals. Progress in these areas is therefore central to strengthening public trust, enhancing stability, and advancing the Western Balkans' European integration agenda.

CHAPTER A: GENERAL SECURITY PERCEPTIONS

Public perceptions of security in the Western Balkans Six have far-reaching implications for social cohesion, governance, and regional stability. How citizens judge the likelihood of conflict, economic disruption, or terrorist threats shapes their behaviour, trust in institutions, and confidence in the future. Exploring these perceptions provides a window into the challenges and the resilience of societies.

Contemporary scholars Berry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap de Wilde have expanded the concept of security beyond the traditional focus on protecting states from external military threats[2]. It now encompasses economic, social, and environmental dimensions, acknowledging that risks to social stability, economic well-being, and community cohesion are just as crucial for ensuring safety and resilience in modern societies (Buzan, 1991). This broader understanding helps explain why economic conditions and everyday livelihoods are central to citizens' sense of security.

The following section details the SecuriMeter 2025 survey findings on security perceptions and provides a comparative analysis across the Western Balkans Six.

LEVEL OF SATISFACTION WITH THE CURRENT STATE OF THE ECONOMY

This analysis examines public satisfaction with the overall direction of their respective economy in the WB6, based on the 2025 survey results presented in Figure 1 and comparative data from the 2021-2025 surveys provided in Table 1 in Annex 1.

While economic indicators such as real GDP growth, inflation, and unemployment are an important component of this perception, satisfaction with the "way things are going" is also influenced by a broader range of factors, including political stability, social trust, and future prospects. The findings reveal a general trend of public dissatisfaction across the region, with significant variations among WB6.

Results show that majority of Western Balkan citizens remain dissatisfied with the direction of their economy, with 45.5% reporting they are completely or mostly dissatisfied.

The combined percentage of those who are completely or mostly dissatisfied rose from 36% in 2021 to a peak of 45.5% in 2025. Conversely, satisfaction levels, which were at their highest in 2021 at 32.5%, have declined, reaching a low of 23.9% in 2023 and ending at 24.7% in 2025. The percentage of citizens who remain neutral, "neither satisfied nor dissatisfied", has stayed consistent throughout the period, hovering around 30%.

Public satisfaction with the current state of affairs in Albania has fluctuated over the past five years. Following a sharp increase in dissatisfaction in 2022, when a combined 58.1% of people were dissatisfied, sentiment recovered significantly. By 2025, the number of dissatisfied citizens had fallen to 44.7%, while those who were satisfied or completely satisfied rose to 31.8%, reflecting a partial rebound from the 2022 low point.

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[2] Buzan, B. (1991). People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era (2nd ed.). Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Figure 1. The level of satisfaction with the current state of the economy
Q1. How satisfied are you with the way things are going in your economy?
(All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



Bosnia and Herzegovina saw a notable shift in public sentiment, with dissatisfaction peaking in 2022 at a combined 59.3%. After a brief improvement in 2024, 2025 marks a renewed rise in pessimism, as the proportion of dissatisfied citizens reached 56.6%. The percentage of satisfied citizens has concurrently fallen to its lowest point in five years, at 11.8%, indicating growing public discontent.

Kosovo* stands out as the only example that demonstrates an increase in satisfaction over the period, with a majority of citizens reporting satisfaction. The proportion of satisfied or completely satisfied citizens more than tripled from 12.2% in 2021 to 48.1% in 2022, maintaining a high level through 2023 and 2024. While satisfaction dipped slightly in 2025 to 29.1%, the overall trend over the five-year period reflects an improvement in public sentiment.

Gradual dissatisfaction is evident in Montenegro, starting in 2021 with exceptionally high satisfaction (over 62% combined, mostly and completely satisfied). However, satisfaction fell sharply from 2022 onward, stabilising at around 27% (mostly satisfied and completely satisfied) in 2024 and 2025.

North Macedonia's public perception improved from 2021, when dissatisfaction exceeded 52%, to 2025, when dissatisfaction fell to around 46% and satisfaction rose above 25%.

Serbia experienced a significant and rapid decline in public satisfaction between 2022 and 2023, with the combined satisfaction rate falling from 43.9% to 21.7%. Following a brief rebound in 2024, sentiment deteriorated sharply in 2025, with the dissatisfaction rate surging to a new high of 52.2%, marking the steepest single-year decline in satisfaction across WB6 analysed.

The previous analysis has established a trend of public dissatisfaction across the Western Balkans Six, with significant variations between WB6 over the past five years. Citizens' sentiments are influenced by a complex mix of social and political factors, as well as macroeconomic shifts. The recent slowdown in economic growth, coupled with persistent challenges like inflation, provides a context for understanding the public pessimistic outlook. Aside from the economic parameters, corruption and trust in public institutions are a significant factor that determines satisfaction with the way things are going in the economy. The data from the survey strongly support the conclusion that people who are more dissatisfied with the overall direction in which the economy is going are more likely to believe corruption is widespread.

SECURITY IN THE WESTERN BALKANS SIX

Based on the survey data, perceptions of security in the Western Balkans Six are mixed. Overall, 38.4% of people agree that the region is secure, while 31.1% disagree and a significant 28.0% are neutral. This indicates that while more people feel secure than insecure, there is no strong consensus.

Figure 2. Security in the Western Balkans
Q2. Do you agree that the Western Balkans is a secure region to live in?
(All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



When comparing results over time, it is important to note that until 2023, respondents were not offered a neutral option (“Neither agree nor disagree”). As a result, the data from 2021–2023 differ in structure from those collected in 2024 and 2025. Comparative data is presented in Table 2 in Annex 1.

While the overall trends provide a regional overview, a closer look at the WB6 reveals diverse and sometimes contrasting perceptions of security.

In Albania, the majority of citizens view the region as a secure place to live. Before the introduction of a neutral response option, agreement levels ranged from 50.8% in 2022 to 68.4% in 2023. However, with the addition of the neutral option in 2024 and 2025, around 20% of respondents selected it, resulting in a drop in agreement to 34.4% and 42.5%, respectively.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the proportion of citizens who agree that the region is a secure place to live has steadily declined, from 56.2% in 2021 to just 25.1% in 2025. By 2025, nearly 40% of respondents disagreed with the statement, while 34.1% chose the neutral option.

Perceptions of security in Kosovo* have fluctuated over the years. In 2021 and 2022, a majority of citizens agreed the region was a secure place (66.5% and 80.6% respectively), while in 2023 the percentage of people who agreed declined to 44.4%. The introduction of neutral option in 2024 and 2025 contributed to a more balanced distribution of views. By 2025, a large number of citizens remained neutral (33.3%), while agreement (43.0%) outweighed disagreement (21.9%).

In Montenegro, agreement that the Western Balkans Six is a secure region has decreased steadily, though it still exceeds disagreement. Between 2021 and 2023, a majority of citizens (80.2%, 60.1% and 55.9%) agreed that the WB6 was secure. The introduction of neutral option in 2024 and 2025 captured a large portion of respondents, however the percentage of people who agreed in 2024 (41.3%) and 2025 (37.0%) was still higher than those who disagreed.

In North Macedonia, perceptions of regional security have shifted moderately over the five-year period. Agreement that the region is a secure place to live declined from 61.0% in 2021 to 43.2% in 2024, before rising slightly to 46.1% in 2025. Disagreement peaked at 44.6% in 2023, then dropped to 28.7% in both 2024 and 2025 following the introduction of a neutral response option.

In Serbia, the feeling of security has been declining in the period between 2021 and 2023, with 65.1% of people in 2021 agreeing that WB6 is a secure place to live and dropping to 50.7% in 2023. The introduction of neutral option in 2024 and 2025 significantly altered the distribution of responses, with a large group of citizens (25.1%) choosing this option. By 2025, the responses were relatively balanced: 33.1% disagreed, 27.2% were neutral, and 36.7% agreed.

SECURITY IN YOUR ECONOMY

The WB6 are building a common market without customs protection in trade. This is seen as a positive trend towards a better economy and, consequently, a safer place to live in.

This was reinforced at the Skopje Summit (1-2 July 2025), where WB6 leaders pledged to speed up reforms, align with the EU's Growth Plan, and advance towards a Common Regional Market integrated with the EU Single Market. They also expressed hopes that *EU-Western Balkans Six free roaming* could begin as early as January 2026, building on the region's existing WB6 roaming-free regime.[3]. Montenegro, Albania, North Macedonia, and Serbia have joined SEPA, enabling faster and cheaper euro transactions. Meanwhile, the EU, TC, and the RCC supported Green Lanes initiative is being implemented at 11 key crossings, with the European Commission supporting infrastructure upgrades through the Safe and Sustainable Transport Programme.

Despite the ambitious regional and EU-led efforts to foster economic growth and stability, public opinion remains a key indicator of progress. In this context, the survey data provides valuable insight into whether these positive trends in policy and cooperation are translating into a tangible sense of security among the citizens.

The majority of WB6 citizens feel their economy is a secure place to live in, with 48.6% of the region expressing agreement. However, there are significant differences in perception across the region. Kosovo*, Montenegro and North Macedonia have more positive outlook, compared to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Albania.

Comparative data for the period 2021–2025 are presented in Table 3, Annex 1. A key factor in interpreting this data is the change in the survey's methodology starting in 2024, which introduced a new neutral response option: "neither agree nor disagree".

A strong positive sentiment was evident from 2021 to 2023, with the combined "agree" category remaining above 60% of all responses. The introduction of a neutral option significantly altered the distribution, as a substantial portion of the population (23.8% in 2024 and 22.9% in 2025) chose this middle ground. Despite this change, the combined "agree" category (52.3% in 2024 and 48.6% in 2025) continued to be the largest single group, consistently outweighing the "disagree" category.

This suggests that while a majority of citizens still hold a favourable view, the emergence of a large neutral segment points to a more cautious or nuanced public sentiment that was not captured in the earlier years, indicating that the feeling of security is not a simple "yes" or "no" for many.

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[3] European Commission, Directorate-General for Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood, "Western Balkans Leaders' Meeting in Skopje Reaffirms Commitment for Swift Delivery of the Growth Plan." European Commission, 1 July 2025, https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/western-balkans-leaders-meeting-skopje-reaffirms-commitment-swift-delivery-growth-plan-2025-07-01_en

Figure 3. Security in your economy
Q3. Do you agree that your economy is a secure place to live in?
(All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



Public perception in Albania regarding the security has been predominantly positive. Between 2021 and 2023, a substantial majority of citizens agreed that their economy was a secure place to live, with combined agreement percentages of 65.9%, 53.1%, and 67.2%, respectively. In 2024 and 2025, despite the introduction of a neutral option, a general positive sentiment prevailed. In 2025, a combined 50.1% of respondents agreed with the statement, outweighing 33.5% of those who disagreed and 16.3% of neutral, indicating a strong positive sentiment.

The public sentiment in Bosnia and Herzegovina shows a more divided public opinion, with a slight preference for agreement. In 2021, 53.6% of citizens agreed that their economy was secure, compared to 44.7% who disagreed. This trend shifted in 2022, when a majority (52.4%) disagreed, before swinging back to a majority in agreement (53.5%) in 2023. Following the introduction of neutral option, a substantial portion of the population chose this middle ground (31.2% in 2024 and 32.9% in 2025).

Kosovo* consistently shows a high level of agreement that its economy is a secure place to live in. A large majority of respondents agreed with this statement from 2021 to 2023, at 69.9%, 85.9%, and 58.1%, respectively. The introduction of neutral option in 2024 and 2025 did not significantly impact this trend, as the combined agreement percentages of 57.1% and 58.4% remained a clear majority. The neutral category accounted for 26.3% in 2024 and 23.8% in 2025, while the disagreement percentage remained very low, 16.4% for 2024 and 16.8% for 2025.

Citizens in Montenegro consistently report a high sense of security. From 2021 to 2023, a large majority of respondents agreed that the economy was a secure place to live in. This trend continued into 2024 and 2025, where the combined agreement percentage remained high at 57.5% and 54.9%, respectively. The disagreement rate remained low throughout the entire period, indicating a widespread positive outlook.

In North Macedonia, the perception of security has remained largely positive over the 2021–2025 period. In 2021, almost 65% of respondents agreed that North Macedonia is a secure place to live in. Even with the introduction of a neutral response option, agreement stayed relatively high, reaching 54.5% in 2025.

Serbia's data shows a predominantly positive sentiment towards the security of its economy. In 2021 and 2022, a clear majority of citizens agreed that their economy was secure, with agreement rates at 76.4% and 77.5%, respectively. This positive trend was interrupted in 2023, when agreement fell to 55% and the disagreement doubled from 20% in 2022 to 43.2% in 2023. In 2025, the combined agreement rate was 41.2% while disagreement was 33.7%, with a significant portion of population (23.2%) choosing the neutral option.

FUTURE SECURITY IN THE WESTERN BALKANS SIX

Global security has shifted considerably since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. At the June 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague, Secretary-General Mark Rutte emphasized that NATO faces one of its most challenging security moments but remains firmly engaged in the WB6 through membership, KFOR in Kosovo*, and cooperation with EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The evolving regional and global security environment plays a role in shaping public perceptions of the Western Balkans Six future stability.

The SecuriMeter 2025 data on future security situation in the WB6 reveals a varied but predominantly neutral to negative outlook. For the region as a whole, a significant portion of the population holds a balanced view, with 33.6% feeling the situation will be "neither negative nor positive".

Figure 4. Future security in the Western Balkans
Q4. If you consider all the current international and regional developments, in your opinion, what will the security situation in the Western Balkans be in the next 12 months?
(All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



Among those who do have a strong opinion, the positive perspective slightly outweighs the negative one, as 28.8% of respondents anticipate a "completely" or "mostly negative" future, compared to 31.3% who expect a "completely" or "mostly positive" one. In the WB6 most pessimistic outlooks are presented in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, while Kosovo* stands out with its optimistic view.

The comparative results for 2024-2025 are available in Table 4, Annex 1.

Public sentiment in Albania shows a clear positive shift from 2024 to 2025. The combined negative outlook dropped from 36.4% in 2024 to 26.7% in 2025. Conversely, the combined positive outlook increased from 25.3% to 34.6% during the same period. The percentage of citizens with a neutral outlook remained stable at around 30%, which is a significant portion of respondents.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, public opinion is slightly more negative. The combined negative outlook increased from 33.6% in 2024 to 41.2% in 2025, while the positive outlook decreased from 22.4% to 19.8%. The neutral category, although the largest in both years, also saw a decrease from 41.1% to 36.5%, suggesting that a larger portion of the public is beginning to take a more defined stance on the security situation.

Citizens in Kosovo* have a predominantly positive or neutral outlook. The combined positive outlook increased from 34.5% in 2024 to 36.9% in 2025, while the combined negative outlook remained very low at around 16%. The neutral category was the most significant response in both years, accounting for 44.3% in 2024 and 45.1% in 2025, indicating that a considerable portion of the population is taking a non-committal stance.

Montenegro's public opinion shows a slight negative shift, although the overall sentiment remains primarily positive. The combined positive outlook decreased slightly from 40.4% in 2024 to 35.5% in 2025. At the same time, the combined negative outlook increased from 25.0% to 27.4%. The neutral category was a consistent second-largest category in both years, remaining steady at around 28-29%.

In North Macedonia, public sentiment remained largely unchanged during the 2024–2025 period. The combined negative outlook increased from 24.6% in 2024 to 24.9% in 2025, while the combined positive outlook increased from 32.8% to 35.6%. The neutral category accounted for a large portion of responses, 34.9% in 2024 and 31.6% in 2025, suggesting that a significant share of the population was undecided during this period.

Sentiment in Serbia shows a notable shift towards a more negative outlook. The combined negative outlook grew from 30.0% in 2024 to 37.1% in 2025. Concurrently, the positive outlook dropped from 31.6% to 25.2%. The neutral category also declined from 35.0% to 30.8%, suggesting a move away from the middle ground towards a more negative view of the future security situation in the WB6.

Overall, public sentiment in the WB6 remains divided and uncertain, with neutrality still dominant but negative views slightly increasing, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. In contrast, Albania, Kosovo*, and North Macedonia show more positive or stable outlooks, highlighting how local contexts shape differing perceptions of regional security.

FUTURE SECURITY IN YOUR ECONOMY

The results from the 2025 survey reveal a more nuanced outlook than the regional-level perspective. While a significant portion of the population in the Western Balkans Six holds a neutral stance (35.5%), opinions are more polarised.

The WB6 with the most pessimistic outlooks are Serbia (42.7% combined negative responses) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (40.1%), where a large share of the population anticipates a negative impact on their respective economy. Conversely, Kosovo* and Albania demonstrate the most optimistic views, with 45.0% and 44.1% of citizens expecting a positive effect on their own economy, respectively.

In Macedonia, 31,4% of the citizens believe that the impact on their economy will be positive, while 29,9% believe it will be negative. Similarly, in Montenegro, 27,6% of the citizens believe the impact will be positive, while slightly less, 25,6% believe the impact will be negative.

Figure 5. Impact of international development on your economy's security
Q5. How do you think the same international and regional developments will affect the security situation in your economy in the next 12 months?
(All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



The comparative data for 2024 and 2025 by WB6 is presented in Table 5, Annex 1.

In Albania, public sentiment in 2024 and 2025 has been largely positive. The share of citizens with a positive outlook, 38.4% in 2024 and 44.1% in 2025, consistently exceeded that with a negative outlook, which stood at 25.6% and 21%, respectively.

In both 2024 and 2025, citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina expressed a predominantly negative outlook on the future security situation. The share of those with a positive view was low, 15.1% in 2024 and 15.4% in 2025, compared to the higher percentages of those with a negative outlook (41.3% and 40.1%) and those who took a neutral stance (39.1% in 2024 and 41.8% in 2025).

In Kosovo*, public sentiment reflected a generally positive outlook in both 2024 and 2025. In each year, around 45% of citizens expressed a positive view, substantially higher than the roughly 16% who held a negative outlook.

In Montenegro, the situation has remained relatively stable. The share of citizens with a negative outlook was unchanged at 25.6% in both 2024 and 2025. However, the percentage of those with a positive view declined from 33.7% to 27.6%, leading to a rise in neutral responses during the same period.

In North Macedonia, both the share of citizens with a positive and a negative outlook increased slightly between 2024 and 2025, while the proportion of those with a neutral stance declined from 36.8% to 32.4%.

In Serbia, most citizens held a negative outlook in both 2024 and 2025, with 39.7% and 42.7% expressing pessimism, respectively. This contrasts with a significantly smaller share who reported a positive outlook, 18.4% in 2024 and 17% in 2025. This indicates a growing sense of concern and pessimism among the citizens of Serbia regarding regional and international developments.

In conclusion, between 2024 and 2025, public sentiment in the WB6 was mixed: optimism grew in Albania and remained strong in Kosovo*, while Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia stayed largely pessimistic.

PUBLIC CONCERN OVER POTENTIAL CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY

The following section includes several statements that measure the degree to which respondents are concerned about various situations, including fear of civil war and terrorist attacks. The results from 2025 show that the population in the WB6 is most concerned about a war involving their economy, followed by concern of war among WB6. There is slightly less concern about terrorist attacks and civil war within their economy.

Figure 6. Public concern over potential conflict and instability
Q6. To what degree are you worried or not about the following situations?
(All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



Degree of concern regarding a war involving my economy

According to the survey results, public concern about the risk of war varies: in 2025, 51.0% of citizens expressed low concern, while 46.1% reported high concern. However, public sentiment differs significantly across the Western Balkans Six. The comparative data for 2024 and 2025 by WB6 is presented in Table 6, Annex 1.

Public sentiment in Albania indicates a low level of concern about the potential for war. In both 2024 and 2025, the vast majority of citizens expressed a low level of concern, with 66.8% and 62.8% of respondents, respectively, indicating they were "not at all" or "not much" concerned. While concern levels are low, there was a slight increase in the "high concern" categories ("a good deal" or "very much") from 30.3% in 2024 to 34.9% in 2025.

Bosnia and Herzegovina stands out as the economy with the highest level of concern. In both years, a majority of citizens expressed high concern, with a combined 59.3% in 2024 and 58.9% in 2025. The percentage of those expressing low concern remained consistent at around 39%. These figures indicate that a majority of population views the risk of a war involving their economy with a significant degree of worry.

Kosovo* shows the lowest levels of public concern among all WB6. In 2024, a combined 74.5% of respondents expressed low concern, a number that remained high at 71.1% in 2025. Correspondingly, the percentage of citizens expressing high concern was the lowest in the region, at 23.4% in 2024 and 27.8% in 2025. This indicates a high level of confidence in the security situation.

Public concern in Montenegro is relatively high, with a slight increase from 2024 to 2025. In both years, the combined percentage of citizens with high concern was over 49%, slightly outpacing those with low concern. The "very much" concerned category also remained high at over 21% in both years, suggesting that a significant portion of the population is worried about the risk of war.

In North Macedonia, public sentiment is divided but leans towards lower concern. In 2024, 50.9% of citizens expressed low concern compared to 46.4% with high concern. This trend solidified in 2025, as the low concern category grew to 53.6%, while the high concern dropped to 43.9%. This suggests a growing sense of stability and a decreasing fear of military conflict.

Serbia has a high level of public concern about a war that could impact its economy. In both 2024 and 2025, a majority of respondents expressed high concern (58.2% and 59.7% respectively). The percentage of citizens with low concern stood at 38.5% in 2024 and 35.2% in 2025. This trend shows a stable and significant level of anxiety among public in Serbia.

Degree of concern regarding a war among WB6

Survey data on citizens' perceptions of the possibility of war between WB6 indicate a slight decline in fear of regional conflict from 2024 to 2025. In 2024, high concern slightly outweighed low concern (48.1% vs. 47.5%), but by 2025, this trend had reversed, 49.9% of respondents expressed low concern, compared to 45.0% who remained highly concerned. The comparative data for 2024 and 2025 by WB6 is presented in Table 7, Annex 1.

This regional trend, however, conceals significant economy-specific differences. In Albania, public concern about the possibility of war between WB6 has shifted noticeably. In 2024, 53.6% of citizens expressed high concern, but this dropped to 44.5% in 2025. Meanwhile, the share of those with low concern rose from 43.1% to 50.0%, suggesting growing confidence that a regional conflict is unlikely.

Bosnia and Herzegovina shows the highest level of concern in the region about a war between WB6. In both 2024 and 2025, a majority of citizens expressed a high degree of concern, with combined percentages of 57.8% and 54.2%, respectively.

Kosovo* maintains the lowest level of concern in the region. In both 2024 and 2025, a large majority of citizens expressed low concern, with the combined percentage at 69.5% and 72.5%, respectively. The high concern category remained consistently low, at around 22-24% for both years. This data suggests a strong and growing sense of security in Kosovo* regarding the possibility of internal conflict in the region.

In Montenegro, public opinion leans slightly towards high concern, but views are fairly balanced. In 2024, 50.1% of citizens expressed high concern, compared to 44.3% with low concern. This pattern continued in 2025, with 50.8% showing high concern, suggesting that about half of the population remains worried about a possible conflict in the region.

North Macedonia's public opinion has shifted from a balanced view to a more reassuring one. In 2024, low concern (49.0%) and high concern (46.2%) were nearly equal. By 2025, the low concern category grew to 51.8%, while the high concern category dropped to 43.9%. This indicates a growing sense of stability among the population.

In Serbia, a majority of citizens remain concerned about a potential war between the WB6. In 2024 and 2025, the combined high concern category stood at 56.4% and 53.8%, respectively, significantly outpacing the low concern category (39.5% and 40.3%).

Degree of concern regarding a terrorist attack

The Western Balkans Six have not experienced major organised terrorist attacks in the past decade, and this is reflected in public sentiment. In 2025, a majority of respondents, 53%, expressed low concern about the possibility of a terrorist attack, compared to 42.7% who reported high concern. However, this regional average masks a mix of opinions at the individual WB6 level. The comparative data for 2024 and 2025 by WB6 is presented in Table 8, Annex 1.

Public concern about a terrorist attack in Albania is relatively low, with the majority of citizens expressing a low level of worry. In 2024, a combined 63.7% of respondents had low concern, which remained stable at 62.6% in 2025. However, while low concern is the dominant sentiment, there was a noticeable increase in high concern, which grew from 29.3% in 2024 to 35.7% in 2025.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, public opinion is almost evenly split between low and high concern. The percentage of citizens with low concern (a combined 51.7% in 2024 and 50.8% in 2025) and high concern (45.9% in 2024 and 45.2% in 2025) remained very stable across both years. This indicates a consistent division within the population regarding the risk of a terrorist attack.

Kosovo* exhibits the lowest level of concern about a terrorist attack in the region. In both 2024 and 2025, a substantial majority of citizens expressed low concern, with a combined 69.6% and 67.5%, respectively. The high concern category remained low, at around 27% in both years. This suggests that the population feels largely secure regarding this specific threat.

Public sentiment in Montenegro shows a relatively balanced but slightly growing concern about a terrorist attack. In 2024, the low concern category (49.7%) and the high concern category (45.4%) were very close. By 2025, high concern slightly surpassed low concern (47.7% vs. 45.8%), indicating a minor shift towards a more worried outlook.

North Macedonia’s public opinion is nearly balanced on the issue, but shows a slight shift towards lower concern. In 2024, high concern (49.4%) was higher than low concern (46.4%). This trend reversed in 2025, with low concern rising to 50.5% and high concern dropping to 46.1%. This suggests a growing sense of security among the population.

Serbia is the only WB6 where high concern about a terrorist attack is the dominant sentiment. While in 2024 low concern (46.8%) and high concern (48.9%) were nearly equal, high concern became a majority in 2025, rising to 53.5%. The low concern category dropped to 40.8%, indicating a growing sense of anxiety among Serbia’s public.

Degree of concern regarding a civil war within my economy

When it comes to the possibility of civil war within their own economy, citizens across the Western Balkans Six generally express low levels of concern.

The survey data, however, reveal a divided public sentiment regarding this risk. The comparative data for 2024 and 2025 by WB6 is presented in Table 9, Annex 1.

Public concern about a civil war in Albania is very low and has become even less of a worry in 2025. In 2024, a combined 72.3% of citizens expressed low concern, a number that grew to 75.2% in 2025. The high concern category remained consistently low at just over 20% in both years. This data indicates that the population feels highly secure regarding the risk of an internal conflict.

In 2024 and 2025, a majority of citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina expressed a high degree of worry, with combined percentages of 56.2% and 55.1%, respectively. The low concern category remained notably lower at around 42% for both years, indicating that the population is concerned regarding a potential internal conflict.

In Kosovo*, concern about a civil war is among the lowest in the region. In 2024, a combined 71.1% of citizens expressed low concern, while only 23.1% had high concern. This trend remained stable in 2025, with low concern still dominant at 68.4%.

Public opinion in Montenegro is relatively balanced, but it has shifted slightly towards less concern in 2025. In 2024, the low concern (50.3%) and the high concern categories (45.4%) were closely aligned. By 2025, the low concern category had increased slightly to 52.7%, while the high concern dropped to 41.3%. This indicates a more reassuring outlook among the population regarding the risk of a civil war.

North Macedonia's public sentiment on the risk of civil war is divided, but it is trending towards a more positive outlook. In 2024, low concern (48.7%) and high concern (48.2%) were nearly equal. By

2025, low concern had become the dominant sentiment at 53.3%, while high concern dropped to 43.7%. This shift suggests a growing sense of stability among the population.

Serbia is the only WB6 where public opinion on the risk of civil war shifted notably towards higher concern. In 2024, more citizens expressed low concern (50.7%) than high concern (44.7%). By 2025, this trend reversed, with 60.1% reporting high concern and 34.5% expressing low concern. This suggests a significant rise in public unease over the issue.



CHAPTER B: PERCEPTIONS OF PERSONAL SECURITY

Traditionally, security was viewed mainly through a state-centred or territorial lens, emphasizing border/boundary protection. However, today, this concept has expanded to include the human dimension of security, focusing on how safe people feel in their homes, communities, and societies. The concept of human security introduced in 1994 (UN Human Development Report) is people-centred, and it encompasses both protection from chronic threats like hunger, disease, and repression, and from sudden disruptions to daily life, such as loss of safety, jobs, or stability within communities.[4]

Understanding perceptions of personal security offers insight into public trust and behaviour. According to Routine Activity Theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979)[5], crime occurs when a motivated offender meets a suitable target without a capable guardian. Thus, lack of visible guardianship (e.g. police, surveillance, lighting) or signs of disorder can increase fear and prompt defensive behaviours, influencing daily life as much as actual crime rates.

Perceptions of safety also serve as a barometer of institutional trust. The theory of legitimacy (Tyler 2006)[6] states that people are more likely to obey laws and feel protected when they view authorities such as the police as fair, respectful, and unbiased, and are less inclined to adopt protective behaviours, relying instead on the institutions to ensure their safety. However, if the legitimacy is low, individuals may retreat from public life or take safety into their own hands, reflecting a breakdown of the social contract between citizens and the government.

Against this backdrop, the SecuriMeter 2025 survey offers insight into how people across the WB6 perceive their personal safety, and the data portray a region faced with declining confidence despite some objective improvements in security infrastructure.

The following section presents the comparative findings on current perceptions of personal security and specific developments across the WB6 in more detail.

CURRENT SENSE OF SECURITY

Several impactful events in the WB6, such as the collapse of the Novi Sad railway station canopy in Serbia (2024) and the Kochani nightclub fire in North Macedonia (2025), have influenced public perceptions of safety across the region. In 2025, the overall sense of security among citizens in the Western Balkans remains moderate, with most feeling “quite” or “very secure”, though a noticeable share of the population continues to experience a sense of insecurity.

To better understand the regional trends, the following section examines personal security perceptions and key influencing events in each WB6, including a comparative analysis with data from 2024. The comparative data for 2024 and 2025 by WB6 is presented in Table 10, Annex 1.

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[4] United Nations Development Programme. Human Development Report 1994. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994. https://hdr.undp.org/system/files/documents/hdr1994encompletenostats.pdf

[5] Cohen, Lawrence E., and Marcus Felson. “Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine Activity Approach.” American Sociological Review 44, no. 4 (1979): 588–608. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2094589

[6] Tyler, Tom R. “Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation.” Annual Review of Psychology 57 (2006): 375–400. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.57.102904.190038

Figure 7. Current sense of security
Q7. Could you tell me how secure do you feel these days?
(All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



Across the WB6, 2025 survey data show that a majority of respondents feel "quite secure" in their everyday lives. However, overall levels of security perception slightly declined compared to 2024. In 2025, on average, 53.5% of respondents across WB6 report feeling "quite secure" or "very secure", which marks a drop from 58.5% in 2024, indicating a decline in the positive perceptions of safety. Those who do not feel secure at all rose from 3.1% in 2024 to 4.1% in 2025, and not very secure increased from 11.8% in 2024 to 15.9% in 2025.

Kosovo* remains one with the highest sense of personal security, with 64.4% of respondents reporting feeling "quite secure" or "very secure" in 2025, a slight decline from 65.1% in 2024. Despite this strong baseline, the share of those feeling very secure dropped from 20.8% to 14.5%, signalling increased unease among even the most confident.

North Macedonia follows closely behind Kosovo* in overall perceptions of security, with 59.0% of respondents feeling secure in 2025. However, this represents a decline of 5.7 p.p. from 2024 (64.7%), marking one of the notable annual drops in the region. The tragic Kochani nightclub fire, which claimed the lives of over 60 people, stands out as a likely driver of this shift, as one of the deadliest civilian incidents in the economy's recent history.

Serbia experienced the most pronounced drop in personal security sentiment across the WB6. In 2025, only 46.1% of respondents felt secure, reflecting an 11.3% decline from 57.4% in 2024.

Montenegro, along with Serbia, experienced a significant negative shift. Even though 58.0% of respondents feel secure, which is relatively high compared to other WB6, it is down 7.7% compared to last year (65.7%), with a sharp drop in the "very secure" responses (from 21.8% to 13.0%).

Albania also experienced a decline in public perceptions of security in 2025, with the share of people feeling insecure rising to 26.6%, up from 19.3% in 2024. This 7.3% increase suggests growing unease among the population, accompanied by a decrease in neutral responses, indicating a shift towards more polarised views.

Bosnia and Herzegovina exhibits one of the lowest levels of public confidence in personal security across the WB6, with only 8.4% of respondents feeling very secure in 2025, a decline of 2.4 p.p. from

2024. The largest share, 38.3%, reported feeling neutral, signalling ambivalence rather than clear confidence or fear. Meanwhile, perceptions of insecurity remain stable, with 17.4% combined feeling "not secure at all" or "not very secure".

FREQUENCY OF NEIGHBOURHOOD EVENTS IN THE WESTERN BALKANS SIX

To gain deeper insight into the everyday experiences that shape perceptions of personal security, the survey collected data on the frequency of various neighbourhood events, which include perceived instances of crime, harassment, and visible disorder, which vary across the Western Balkans Six and provide important context for understanding local safety concerns and community dynamics.

Figure 8. Frequency of neighbourhood events in the Western Balkans Six
Q8. How frequently do you hear about or see the following things occur in your neighbourhood?
(All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



Across the region, most people report that problems like robberies, police interference, and sexual harassment occur infrequently. However, specific issues like street violence, drug sales, domestic violence, alcohol consumption and street begging show moderate to high concern in several WB6. Albania and Kosovo* generally report better perceptions, while Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia consistently show higher perceived frequency of problems. The comparative data for 2024 and 2025 by WB6 is presented in Table 11, Annex 1.

Across the Western Balkans Six, the three most frequently reported social problems are people begging in the street (59%), alcohol consumption in public spaces (42%), and domestic violence (33%).

Event: People begging in the street

Nearly 59% of respondents said that begging in the street happens quite or very frequently, making it the most commonly perceived issue. The frequency of people begging in the streets remains a visible and persistent phenomenon across much of the WB6, with particularly high rates of "quite frequently" and "very frequently" reported in Bosnia and Herzegovina (73.6%), Montenegro (61.7%), and Serbia

(57.7%). Kosovo*, on the other hand, reports the lowest share of respondents (49.6%) who see begging as very or quite frequent.

Compared to the previous year, only Albania has perception of increased frequency of street begging at 3.6%, followed by a marginal increase in Serbia (0.5%). All other WB6 registered a decline in this perception, with the most significant drop observed in North Macedonia, where 49.6% of respondents in 2025 reported frequent begging, down from 58.2% in 2024.

Event: Alcohol consumption in the streets

Public alcohol consumption remains a visible and persistent feature of social life in many Western Balkans Six, with nearly 42% of citizens across the region reporting it as a quite or very frequent occurrence. The issue is most pronounced in Serbia (58.3%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (55.7%), and Montenegro (52.4%). By contrast, Kosovo* (20.6%) and Albania (29.8%) report the lowest levels of visible public drinking.

Compared to the previous year, North Macedonia is the only one where perceptions of public alcohol consumption have declined significantly, by nearly 11 p.p. In contrast, all other WB6 record a rise in alcohol consumption in public spaces, with the most notable increase observed in Montenegro (+5.7%).

Event: Domestic violence

Domestic violence ranks the third most frequently reported issue in the SecuriMeter 2025 survey, with nearly one-third of respondents across the WB6 identifying it as a common problem. The highest levels of perceived frequency are reported in Montenegro (42.7%), Serbia (37.8%), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (37.5%).

In contrast, Albania (20.8%) and Kosovo* (31.1%) report the lowest perceived rates of domestic violence; however, these figures might be underreported. According to the OSCE-led survey on the Well-being and Safety of Women (2019), nearly half of women in the region believe that domestic violence is a private matter that should remain within the family, and only a small fraction report incidents to the police (2%) or social services (3%).[7]

In comparison with 2024, perceptions of frequent domestic violence rose sharply in Kosovo* (+15.3%), followed by Montenegro (+9.4%) and Serbia (+3.3%), while Bosnia and Herzegovina (-5.1%), North Macedonia (-3.7%), and Albania (-1.9%) recorded declines.

Event: Robberies

Robbery is not widely perceived as a frequent issue across the WB6, with an average of 25.4% of respondents describing it as either “quite frequent” or “very frequent”. Still, notable concerns persist in North Macedonia (32.4%), Kosovo* (29.7%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (27.3%), Montenegro (27.2%), where a significant portion of the population reports robbery as a visible neighbourhood problem.

In Serbia, 22.8% of the population considers robberies a frequent thing in their neighbourhood. Albania stands out for its low level of concern, with only 12.9% of respondents stating robberies are frequent, the highest sense of safety on this indicator in the region.

Event: Police or paramilitary interfere with people’s private life

Perceived interference by police or paramilitary forces varies significantly across the region. Serbia (24.5%) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (18.1%) report the highest levels of quite frequent or very frequent interference, suggesting lingering public sensitivity to public authority and potentially

[7] Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Survey on the Well-being and Safety of Women in Kosovo. OSCE Mission in Kosovo, 21 November 2019. https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/d/c/439781.pdf

heavy-handed policing practices in specific contexts. On the other end of the spectrum, Albania (9.5%) and Kosovo* (16.5%) show strong perceptions that such interference is infrequent.

Event: Discriminatory behaviour or verbal harassment targeting ethnic and religious identity or personal orientation

Discrimination and harassment in public spaces based on ethnic or religious identity, or personal orientation, are most frequently perceived in Montenegro (28.1%), followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Kosovo*, where roughly one in five respondents considers such incidents to be common.

Compared to the other WB6, Albania reports significantly lower level of perceived discrimination (5.0%).

Event: Drug sale in the streets

The sale of drugs in public areas is perceived as a persistent issue in Montenegro where 37.9% described this event as quite frequent or very frequent, followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina (32.7%), Serbia (30.2%), and North Macedonia (29.6%). Albania and Kosovo* report the lowest frequencies, with only 22.5% and 23.3% of respondents, respectively, viewing drug sales as common.

Findings from the European Web Survey on Drugs 2024[8], which gathered responses from more than 4,400 adult drug users in the WB6, show that most drug use takes place in private settings, with the home being the most common location in the past 12 months, and that treatment uptake remains very limited, fewer than 3% of users reported receiving any form of treatment during that period.

Event: Street violence and fights

Survey findings reveal that public altercations, such as street fights and visible violence, are most frequently perceived in Montenegro (38.4%), Serbia (35.4%), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (34.7%), indicating persistent public concerns about disorder and aggression. In contrast, Albania (12.5%) and Kosovo* (24.8%) report significantly lower levels of perceived violence.

There is often a gap between how the public perceives violence and what is reflected in official crime statistics. Visible but low-level violence, such as street fights or public disputes, often leaves a strong emotional impact, yet may not be reported or classified as criminal.

Additionally, the media, particularly social media, plays a role by frequently sensationalising violent events, which can distort the public's sense of the prevalence of crime, making isolated incidents appear more widespread.

Event: Sexual harassment

Sexual harassment in public spaces is reported most frequently in Kosovo* (25.9%), Montenegro (25.0%), and Serbia (21.3%), pointing to the persistent vulnerability of women and girls in urban areas. Cultural stigma and limited institutional support may discourage formal reporting, but the data reveal recognition of the issue. Albania reports the lowest frequency (14.1%).

In summary, the analysis shows a modest overall decline in perceived safety across the WB6 in 2025 compared to 2024. At the regional level, most indicators increased slightly, robberies (+1.1%), police interference (+1.9%), discriminatory behaviour (+2.8%), drug sale (+2.6%), street violence (+2.0%), sexual harassment (+1.8%), and domestic violence (+2.9%) and alcohol consumption in the streets

[8] European Union Drugs Agency. 2024. European Web Survey on Drugs: Top-Level Findings for the Western Balkans. https://www.euda.europa.eu/publications/data-factsheet/european-web-survey-drugs-2024-top-level-findings-western-balkans_en

(+0.7%), while the number of people begging declined overall (-1.9%). The aggregate picture suggests a modest deterioration in perceived safety across the region, with notable exceptions at the individual WB6 level.

SECURITY MEASURES TAKEN BY CITIZENS

The data collected in 2025 across the WB6 highlight both passive and active behaviours aimed at minimising exposure to crime or social threats. The results regarding personal security measures taken by citizens reveal a clear hierarchy of actions taken by the public, with the most common precautionary measure being "Didn't carry much money", which was practiced by 54.4% of respondents, while the second most frequent action is "Preferred not to go out at night", at 36.2%.

These two measures, which involve limiting risk in a financial and social context, are significantly more common than others.

Figure 9. Security measures taken by citizens
Q9. Which of the following things have you done for reasons of security?
(All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



On the opposite side, actions that are more invasive or related to identity are less frequent. "Installed video surveillance or burglar alarm" was a security measure taken by 20.6% of people, while a very small minority (6.4%) reported "Disguising my ethnic, religious identity or personal orientation". The least common measure, at just 3.2%, was "Carried a knife, gun or other weapon", indicating that this type of action is rare among the surveyed population. These results suggest that people are more inclined to take simple, passive measures to ensure their safety, while more confrontational or identity-altering actions are far less common. The comparative data for 2024 and 2025 by WB6 is presented in Table 12, Annex 1.

Security measure: Didn't carry much money

The results from 2025 show that the majority of respondents across the region (54.4%) said they avoided carrying much cash, essentially unchanged from 2024 (54.3%). Albania (60.9%), North Macedonia (60.4%), and Serbia (59.3%) lead in this precautionary habit, while Kosovo* (44.4%) remains the lowest. This consistent behaviour suggests that for many limiting cash on hand is a stable and ingrained form of everyday risk management.

Security measure: Preferred not to go out at night

Reluctance to venture out after dark rose modestly across the WB6 to 36.2% in 2025 compared to 34.6% in 2024. Albania stands out with the highest proportion (47.3%), followed by Serbia (40.2%) and

Bosnia and Herzegovina (38.7%). North Macedonia, at 21.5%, reports the lowest concern about night time safety.

Security measure: Carried a knife, gun, or other weapon

Carrying a knife, gun, or other weapon is rare. On average, 3.2% of citizens across the WB6 reported doing so in 2025. Bosnia and Herzegovina (4.6%), North Macedonia (5.2%), and Montenegro (3.2%) were above or at the average. Albania, by contrast, had just 0.9% of respondents reporting carrying a weapon, while Kosovo* reported 1.7%. The regional decline to 3.2% from 4.4% in 2024 suggests some overall improvement in fear-driven responses.

Security measure: Installed video surveillance or a burglar alarm in your place of living

A clear upward trend is evident in household security investments across the region, particularly in the installation of video surveillance and burglar alarms. In 2025, 20.6% of respondents reported having such systems in place, marking a +3.1% increase compared to 2024. The largest increase was recorded in Kosovo* (+6.8%, reaching 19.4% in 2025) and Montenegro (+6.5%, reaching 22.3%). Serbia continues to lead with 23.4% in 2025, while most other WB6 hover around the 20% mark. In Albania, only 16.4% reported having installed surveillance or alarm systems. These figures highlight a growing preference for passive, technology-driven forms of protection.

Complementing these findings, Eurostat data for 2024 indicate that about 6% of the Western Balkan population uses internet-connected home security or safety systems (such as smart alarms, smoke detectors, security cameras, or smart door locks). The highest shares were observed in Bosnia and Herzegovina (7.28%), followed by North Macedonia (6.67%), Albania (6.32%), Serbia (5.81%), and Montenegro (4.69%)[9]. While these figures are lower than those for general surveillance and alarm installation in the EU, they suggest that smart connected systems are slowly gaining ground alongside traditional security measures.

Security measure: Disguising my ethnic, religious identity, or personal orientation

In regard to the disguise of ethnic/religious identity or personal orientation, the overall levels remain relatively low (6.4% in 2025). This behaviour is more common in Bosnia and Herzegovina (9.0%), Montenegro (8.7%), Serbia (6.8%) and North Macedonia (6.4%), while Albania (3.4%) and Kosovo* (4.2%) report the lowest incidence. While not widespread, the persistence of this protective behaviour highlights the ongoing significance of identity-related risks in certain communities.

In conclusion, the data reveals a varied landscape of public safety concerns and protective behaviours across the WB6. While Albania and Kosovo* show relatively low levels of defensive actions, reflecting higher public trust and perceived safety, others like Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia exhibit heightened caution. The increasing adoption of technology-driven security measures, such as surveillance systems, suggests a shift towards more passive forms of protection across the region.

SATISFACTION WITH PUBLIC SECURITY MEASURES

Public trust in security infrastructure, such as police presence, surveillance, emergency services, and street lighting, plays an important role in shaping citizens' sense of safety.

Figure 10. Satisfaction with public security measures in 2025
Q10. How satisfied or not are you with the following public security measures in your area?
(All respondents, N=6007 (2025), single answer, share of total, %)

[9] Internet of Things – Use (ISOC_IIOT_USE). European Commission, 2025.
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/isoc_iiot_use/default/table?lang=en&category=isoc.isoc_i.isoc_iiot



According to SecuriMeter 2025 data, most respondents across the region express satisfaction with public security measures. More than half (52.3%) are satisfied with street lighting, followed by 43.5% who are satisfied with the response efficiency of emergency services. Slightly under 40% report satisfaction with the visibility of police and the presence of surveillance cameras in public spaces, while 35.1% are satisfied with regular police patrols. The highest level of dissatisfaction (29.8%) is recorded for regular police patrols. One forth to one third of the respondents remain neutral.

The public security measures in the region show varying degrees of satisfaction, with some trends emerging across the WB6. Street lighting consistently receives the highest satisfaction ratings, likely because its direct impact on daily life is easily perceived and evaluated. In contrast, police-related measures, such as regular patrols and visibility, receive more mixed reviews. The comparative data for 2024 and 2025 by WB6 is presented in Table 13, Annex 1.

Public security measure: Regular police patrols and visibility of police in public spaces

Satisfaction with regular police patrols is moderate. Roughly 35% of respondents across the region express satisfaction (29.1% mostly satisfied, 5.9% completely satisfied), while 29.8% are dissatisfied to some degree. Kosovo* shows the highest satisfaction (45.1%), followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina (36.3%), Serbia (33.4%) and North Macedonia (33.2%) while Montenegro (25.4%) exhibits lower satisfaction level.

Responses for police visibility in public spaces follow a similar trend. On average, 39.5% of respondents are satisfied with police visibility, while 28.1% are dissatisfied. Kosovo* again leads with a combined satisfaction rate of 48.2%, followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina (44.9%) and North Macedonia (37.6%). Montenegro has the highest dissatisfaction rate (37.2%). Public trust in the visibility of law enforcement appears relatively higher than in patrol frequency, likely due to differences in perceived presence versus actual engagement.

Public security measure: Surveillance cameras in public areas

Public attitudes towards surveillance technology are mixed. 39.4% of people across the region are satisfied with the presence of surveillance cameras, while 28.0% are dissatisfied. Bosnia and Herzegovina (49.6%) and Serbia (42.3%) express the highest satisfaction, while North Macedonia has the lowest satisfaction (30.8%) and highest dissatisfaction (41.5%). Albania (38.0%) and Montenegro (33.0%) also show lower satisfaction, while neutrality is high in Serbia (37.1%) and Montenegro (36.9%), suggesting awareness but uncertainty about benefits.

Public security measure: Street lighting

Satisfaction with street lighting is relatively high across the region. Nearly 52.3% of respondents in the region report being satisfied, with consistently lower dissatisfaction, as it directly impacts daily safety perceptions. Albania has the highest satisfaction (56.7%), followed closely by Kosovo* (55.3%) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (54.6%). Montenegro is lowest (45.1%), but still above 40%, with higher dissatisfaction (30.7%). Neutrality is lower overall (around 20-30%), which indicates a clearer opinion, unlike other measures, most likely because street lighting is more tangible and less controversial than police-related measures.

Public security measure: Response efficiency of emergency services (ambulance/fire/police)

Emergency response services received moderately positive evaluations, with 43.5% of respondents expressing satisfaction, 25.3% are dissatisfied, and 31.2% neutral or don't have an opinion. Kosovo* and Bosnia and Herzegovina report the highest satisfaction (49.0% and 48.5% respectively), followed by Montenegro (44.2%) and Serbia (43.6%). The lowest level of satisfaction was expressed in North Macedonia (38.8%) and Albania (37.0%).

Response efficiency appears to be more positively rated than police patrols, suggesting stronger performance or visibility of emergency services.

In conclusion, the data analysis demonstrates that public perceptions of safety across the WB6 are shaped by a combination of infrastructure quality, law enforcement presence, and emergency response efficiency, with noticeable variation between WB6. Kosovo* stands out for its consistently high satisfaction rates across all security measures. On the other hand, Montenegro and North Macedonia show areas of concern, particularly regarding the visibility and effectiveness of police patrols, which contributes to lower overall satisfaction.



CHAPTER C: CATEGORIES OF PROBLEMS IN ECONOMY

Economic security has increasingly come to be recognised as a central dimension of human and public security, particularly in post-transition and developing contexts such as the WB6. David A. Baldwin (1997) conceptualises security as "a low probability of damage to acquired values", highlighting that it extends beyond the absence of military threats to include the safeguarding of essential economic and social goods people depend on for their well-being. This broadened perspective underscores that insecurity may just as easily stem from inflation, wage stagnation, and labour market volatility as from geopolitical risks. In societies where economic fragility is persistent, public anxieties about security are thus closely tied to material conditions and citizens' capacity to maintain stability in their daily lives.

Over the past two decades, the Western Balkans Six have made modest progress in narrowing the economic gap with the European Union. According to a new report by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)[10], the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in the WB6, measured by purchasing power parity, stood at just under 40% of the EU average in 2023, around 13% higher than in 2003. Nevertheless, economic convergence with the EU remains a necessity for the Western Balkans Six. Beyond improving living standards, a more competitive and sustainable region is key to boosting trade, attracting investment, and deepening integration into EU single market.

Beyond economic concerns, the survey reveals growing anxiety around demographic change, migration, and environmental risks, as well as rising concerns about online radicalisation and private gun ownership.

LEVEL OF CONCERN REGARDING MAJOR ISSUES AFFECTING THE ECONOMY

For the first time this year's SecuriMeter includes data analysis derived from the question *"How concerned are you about each of the following in your economy?"*. Respondents rated their level of concern on a scale from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest). A total of 18 items were analysed: cost of living, inflation, unemployment, job availability, wages, pensions, taxes, political leadership, immigration, depopulation, terrorism, organised crime, foreign influence, climate change, democratic rights, ethnic tensions, corruption, and traffic safety.

To provide a clearer and more meaningful interpretation, the 18 issues surveyed are grouped into four thematic clusters:

- **Basic Economic Conditions** encompass living costs, wages, pensions, taxes, and job availability, reflecting everyday financial security;
- **Governance and Political Climate** covers corruption, political leadership, democratic rights, foreign influence, and organised crime, highlighting trust in institutions and leadership;
- **Demographic and Social Pressures** address migration, population decline, and social cohesion, showing long-term development challenges;
- **Environment and Safety** include climate change, pollution, traffic safety, and terrorism, capturing broader threats to daily life and stability.

[10] Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2025). Economic convergence scoreboard for the Western Balkans. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/eurasia/competitiveness-programme/economic-convergence-scoreboard-for-the-western-balkans.htm

This approach to grouping concerns transforms a lengthy and diverse list into a clear and concise framework, making it easier to identify which types of issues stand out in public discussions across WB6.

Degree of concern for basic economic conditions

The greatest concerns across the WB6 in 2025 are related to the basic economic conditions. The high cost of living (8.19) and inflation (8.12) top the regional rankings, reflecting citizens' struggles with rapidly rising prices. These are followed by concerns over wages (7.86), pensions (7.97), and tax levels (7.50), all of which signal pressure on household incomes.

Table 1. Degree of concern for basic economic conditions, by WB6
Q11. How concerned are you about each of the following in your economy? Base: All, N=6007

	High cost of living	Inflation	Unemployment	Availability of jobs	Level of wages	Level of pensions	Level of taxes
Albania	8.79	8.45	6.73	6.48	8.30	9.11	7.70
Bosnia and Herzegovina	8.31	8.46	7.40	7.06	8.27	8.49	7.87
Kosovo*	7.49	7.39	6.54	6.65	7.09	7.00	6.59
Montenegro	7.68	7.85	7.12	6.74	7.29	7.30	7.39
North Macedonia	8.81	8.67	7.30	7.37	8.41	8.18	7.82
Serbia	8.06	7.96	7.00	6.82	7.80	7.77	7.68
Western Balkans Six	8.19	8.12	7.01	6.85	7.86	7.97	7.50

In Albania and North Macedonia, these concerns are especially acute. Albania's citizens report the highest concern for pensions (9.11), while North Macedonia's citizens express the highest concern for inflation (8.67) and cost of living (8.81). These findings show how macroeconomic instability directly translates into public anxiety.

A key driver of inflation and high living costs in the WB6 is the region's dependence on imports, especially for food, fuel, and energy. Global price shocks, intensified by geopolitical events such as the war in Ukraine, have led to sharp increases in energy and transport costs, which are passed on directly to consumers. Structural weaknesses, like a fragile domestic production base and limited diversification, further deepen the region's vulnerability. As the World Bank notes, "the WB6 vulnerability to inflation is rooted in structural weaknesses and high exposure to international energy and food markets" (World Bank, 2023)[11].

While concerns about unemployment (7.01) and job availability (6.85) are somewhat lower than those related to inflation and cost of living, they remain significant across the WB6. The persistent worry about job opportunities reflects ongoing challenges in labour markets, including underemployment and limited prospects for stable well-paying work. In Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia, unemployment concerns are notably higher (7.40 and 7.30, respectively), pointing to more acute labour market difficulties in these WB6. Kosovo*, meanwhile, reports relatively lower concerns on both unemployment (6.54) and job availability (6.65), though these levels still indicate that job security remains an important issue for many citizens.

In response to widespread concerns about the high cost of living across the WB6, the European Union has launched a new **Growth Plan for the region**, which directly targets many of the underlying issues captured in the SecuriMeter 2025 survey. Set to be implemented from 2024 to 2027, the plan

[11] World Bank. (2023). Western Balkans Regular Economic Report No. 23, Spring 2023. The World Bank Group. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/16b0d8f7-53a7-4f6e-8306-40f88837bc0e

introduces a €6 billion financial package, comprising of €4 billion in loans and €2 billion in grants, to improve living standards and strengthen economic resilience[12].

A central objective of the Growth Plan is to stimulate economic growth, create jobs, and attract new investments. These priorities align closely with the top-ranked public concerns in the region: inflation, high living costs, wages, and employment opportunities. By accelerating growth, the plan seeks to ease the pressure on household incomes and make the region more attractive for business activity.

Importantly, the plan is not just an economic measure, but also a political tool designed to support EU accession efforts. First, by increasing economy-level revenues through growth, governments in the region will have greater capacity to invest in reforms. Second, the plan is structured to promote gradual alignment with EU legislation and standards across economic and societal sectors, aiming to improve citizens' everyday life in the WB6.

Degree of concern for governance and political climate

This cluster addresses how people across the WB6 perceive the functioning of their political systems and the integrity of governance.

Table 2. Degree of concern for governance and political climate, by WB6
Q11. How concerned are you about each of the following in your economy? Base: All, N=6007

	Government and political leadership	Organised crime	Influence of foreign powers in domestic affairs	Erosion of democratic and human rights	Corruption in society
Albania	6.69	7.06	5.31	6.36	7.72
Bosnia and Herzegovina	8.24	7.28	7.35	7.38	8.28
Kosovo*	6.20	6.28	5.53	6.05	6.41
Montenegro	7.30	7.58	7.29	6.82	7.89
North Macedonia	6.89	7.60	7.25	6.99	8.26
Serbia	7.58	7.67	7.53	7.59	8.37
Western Balkans Six	7.14	7.24	6.71	6.86	7.82

The SecuriMeter 2025 data reveal that corruption in society ranks as the third highest concern overall (regional average: 7.82), following closely behind the cost of living and inflation. Citizens across the region also express concern with government and political leadership (7.14), while concerns about erosion of democratic and human rights (6.86) and foreign influence in domestic affairs (6.71) are also notable.

These results align with findings from other parts of the SecuriMeter 2025 survey, especially where institutional trust is low.

Serbia reports the highest levels of concern across this entire cluster. Corruption tops the list at 8.37, followed by fears of organised crime (7.67), and erosion of democratic and human rights (7.59). Citizens also express a strong sense of external interference, with foreign influence rated at 7.53, the highest in the region.

North Macedonia also ranks high on governance-related concerns. Corruption is rated at 8.26, and organised crime at 7.60, both among the top scores in the region. Perceived foreign influence (7.25) and concern over democratic erosion (6.99) are also elevated, indicating that citizens are wary of internal governance weaknesses and external political pressures.

[12] European Commission. (2024). Growth Plan for the Western Balkans 2024-2027. European Union, available at: https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/growth-plan-western-balkans_en

Bosnia and Herzegovina shows consistently high levels of concern across all indicators. Corruption (8.28) and foreign influence (7.35) are significant issues, along with strong concerns over democratic decline (7.38) and organised crime (7.28).

Montenegro's data indicate significant concerns, particularly regarding organised crime (7.58) and corruption (7.89). Concerns about foreign influence (7.29) and democratic erosion (6.82) are near the regional average.

In Albania, corruption remains a significant concern (7.72), while government and political leadership (6.69) draw slightly less criticism. Notably, Albania's citizens report the lowest level of concern about foreign influence in the region (5.31). Concerns over democratic erosion (6.36) remain moderate but not negligible.

Kosovo* consistently reports the lowest concern levels in this cluster. Scores for corruption (6.41), government and leadership (6.20), foreign influence (5.53), and democratic rights (6.05) are all well below the regional average.

Across the WB6, concerns about corruption, governance, and institutional integrity remain high, especially in Serbia, North Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The data highlights not only concern with political leadership but also about broader issues such as foreign influence and the erosion of democratic norms.

Degree of concern for demographic and social pressures

Migration and demographic change are also important societal issues facing the WB6 today. According to the SecuriMeter 2025 survey, citizens across the region express deep concern about depopulation and emigration, with a regional average score of 7.61, making it one of the highest-rated problems in the survey. Bosnia and Herzegovina (7.98) and Montenegro (7.87) rank this issue among their top concerns, reflecting the severe impact of long-term emigration of youth and working-age population. These trends pose a threat to labour markets, social cohesion, and the long-term sustainability of public welfare systems.

Interestingly, immigration and foreign workers are perceived as far less problematic. The regional average concern level is 6.65, showing a notable asymmetry in public sentiment: people are far more worried about who is leaving than about who is arriving. This pattern reflects the limited occurrence of immigration in the region and the broader perception that emigration represents a direct economic and demographic loss.

Table 3. Degree of concern for demographic and social pressures, by WB6
Q11. How concerned are you about each of the following in your economy? Base: All, N=6007

	Immigration / foreign workers	Depopulation and emigration	Increasing tensions among ethnic groups
Albania	5.34	8.35	4.46
Bosnia and Herzegovina	7.09	7.98	7.11
Kosovo*	5.69	6.35	5.21
Montenegro	7.34	7.87	6.59
North Macedonia	7.18	7.46	6.89
Serbia	7.36	7.66	6.54
Western Balkans Six	6.65	7.61	6.13

Ethnic tensions, with a regional average of 6.13, remain a moderate concern across the region. While no longer perceived as a pressing issue, their continued presence suggests that some identity-based divisions still influence social dynamics in parts of the WB6. Bosnia and Herzegovina (7.11) and North Macedonia (6.89) report relatively higher levels of concern compared to the rest of the region.

In summary, citizens in the WB6 are increasingly aware and concerned about the demographic trajectory of their societies, especially about the emigration of young and educated people.

Degree of concern for the environment and safety

While economic and governance issues dominate public concern in the WB6, a separate cluster related to safety, environment, and infrastructure also represents significant concern.

Table 4. Degree of concern for environment and safety, by WB6
Q11. How concerned are you about each of the following in your economy? Base: All, N=6007

	Terrorism	Climate change and pollution	Low traffic safety
Albania	4.61	7.18	7.19
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5.69	7.45	7.62
Kosovo*	4.96	6.43	6.63
Montenegro	5.33	7.26	7.86
North Macedonia	6.32	7.82	8.05
Serbia	5.72	7.88	7.25
Western Balkans Six	5.43	7.33	7.43

Among these, climate change and pollution are rated highly across the region, with a regional average of 7.33. Citizens in Serbia (7.88) and North Macedonia (7.82) express the highest concern, reflecting growing awareness of environmental challenges. In Kosovo*, concern about climate and pollution is significantly lower (6.43).

Closely related is the concern about traffic safety, with a regional average of 7.43. In fact, this issue ranks among the top concerns in some WB6. North Macedonia tops the list with a very high concern level of 8.05, followed by Montenegro (7.86) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (7.62).

In contrast, terrorism represents one of the lowest concerns, with a regional average of just 5.43. The issue appears to be of limited immediate relevance to most citizens in the WB6, particularly in Albania (4.61) and Kosovo* (4.96), where concern is the lowest. Slightly higher levels are observed in North Macedonia (6.32) and Serbia (5.72).

While terrorism is not perceived as a significant threat, climate change, pollution, and traffic safety are important issues in WB6 societies. The data shows a population increasingly aware of environmental risks and dissatisfied with infrastructure and public safety standards.

Among all surveyed issues, economic indicators such as the cost of living, inflation, wages, and pensions receive the highest average concern levels. This reflects the fact that the financial well-being of citizens in the region is heavily dependent on income levels such as wages and pensions.

On the other hand, terrorism, ethnic tensions, and erosion of democratic and human rights consistently receive the lowest average concern levels, suggesting that for most citizens, immediate economic pressures outweigh broader political or security fears.

BALANCING BETWEEN FREEDOM AND SECURITY

Across the WB6, citizens continue to face a dilemma between two essential values, freedom and security. While most consider both to be important, the question remains, when forced to choose, which value takes precedence?

Many citizens in the WB6 place a high value on freedom and security. Across the region, a majority of citizens (53.1%) prioritise freedom over security, yet this preference varies significantly by WB6.

Figure 11. Balancing between freedom and security
Q12. Most people consider both freedom and security to be important, but if you had to choose between them, which one would you consider more important?
(All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



Serbia shows the strongest inclination towards freedom, with a substantial 64.4% of respondents choosing it. A similar majority favouring freedom is found in Montenegro (58.3%), Kosovo* (56.5%), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (55.3%), suggesting a shared regional value for personal liberty. In contrast, population in Albania (63.8%) and North Macedonia (52.3%) prioritise security.

Overall, while the WB6 lean towards freedom, a significant portion of the population in certain WB6 demonstrates that the perceived need for security outweighs the desire for liberty. More details about the results by WB6, as well as a comparison between 2025 and 2024, are provided in Table 14 in Annex 1.

Between 2024 and 2025, distinct shifts in public preferences for security versus freedom emerge across the WB6. Albania stands out with a significant rise in the preference for security, from 56.7% in 2024 to 63.8% in 2025. Meanwhile, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo* continue to favour freedom.

Montenegro, although still strongly favouring freedom, saw a small decline in its score from 60.4% in 2024 to 58.3% in 2025. North Macedonia shifted slightly towards freedom in 2025, with 47.7% preferring freedom over security, compared to 46.8% in 2024. Serbia remains the most freedom-oriented, with nearly two-thirds consistently prioritising freedom over security, showing little change from 2024 to 2025.

In conclusion, the data reveals different priorities across the region. While some areas show an increasing preference for security, others maintain a strong focus on freedom. These shifting preferences highlight the complexity of balancing personal liberties with safety, shaped by unique challenges and evolving perceptions of stability across the region.

RADICALISATION THROUGH ONLINE VIDEOS AND MATERIALS

In an increasingly digital world, young people spend a significant amount of time online, engaging with video platforms, social media, and various content-sharing environments. The following question explores a concern for parents, guardians, and societies alike: To what extent do citizens believe that certain types of online messages and visuals could radicalise children, young relatives, or their friends?

This question touches on the public's perception of online vulnerability, especially in regions where ethnic tensions or religious polarisation may exist. Understanding these perceptions helps policymakers and educators shape prevention strategies, from media literacy programmes to stricter content moderation. The findings highlight the level of concern about different messages and how communities feel about the digital world's impact on the younger generation.

The average agreement levels increased across almost all statements from 2024 to 2025. In 2025, respondents were more likely to believe that certain types of online messages have a radicalising effect on youth, with the average agreement (combining "completely" and "mostly agree") rising across most statements.

According to the survey findings, most concerning messages in 2025 are:

- Showing people who own guns or act like a member of the mafia (47.8% agree)
- Reports connecting immigrants with crime rates (41.8% agree)
- Stereotyping Muslims as terrorists (41.2% agree)
- Claiming foreign workers cause poverty/unemployment (40.2% agree)

Figure 12. Radicalisation through online videos and materials
Q13. To what extent do you agree or disagree that the videos or other types of online visuals and materials with the following message may radicalise your children and young relatives and their friends in the online sphere? (All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



Depicting our ethnic or religious identity as superior to other identities

As digital content increasingly shapes the values and worldviews of young people in the WB6, concerns are growing around the role of online visuals and videos that depict ethnic or religious identity as superior. Monitoring public perceptions of this risk provides insight into how concerned parents and guardians are about the potential radicalising effects of such content on children and youth.

Across the region concern about the radicalising potential of content promoting ethnic or religious superiority is slightly higher in 2025 than in 2024, standing at 38.2% (up from 33.2% in 2024), meaning a growing share of citizens perceive this content as potentially harmful. At the same time neutrality dropped slightly, which suggests a gradual shift towards awareness and concern, even if views remain divided. Comparative data for 2024 and 2025 by WB6 is presented in Table 15, Annex 1.

Between 2024 and 2025, public attitudes across the Western Balkans shifted regarding the perceived dangers of online content that depicts one ethnic or religious identity as superior to others. The data reveals concern in some WB6, stagnation in others, and even declining awareness in one case, painting a picture of increasing divergence in how online radicalisation is understood in the region.

In Albania, public awareness has grown. The percentage of respondents who mostly or completely agree that such identity-based content poses a risk increased from 41.9% in 2024 to 47.3% in 2025. This suggests that Albania's citizens are becoming increasingly aware of the potential dangers associated with divisive online narratives.

By contrast, Bosnia and Herzegovina shows little change. The agreement remained flat at 30%.

The change is also observed in Kosovo*, where agreement with the statement rose sharply from 28.4% to 49.3%, and disagreement declined accordingly, marking the most considerable shift in the region.

Montenegro, however, remained relatively stable. The agreement rose only marginally from 28.8% in 2024 to 30.7% in 2025, while disagreement ticked slightly upward, leaving the net concern score effectively unchanged. This suggests that public scepticism persists regarding the potential radicalising effects of such content, with limited movement in either direction.

In North Macedonia, concern grew from 34.1% in 2024 to 42.0% in 2025, and disagreement decreased from 31.9% in 2024 to 29.8% in 2025.

Serbia, in contrast, has moved in the opposite direction. The agreement dropped from 35.9% to 30.0%, while disagreement increased significantly, pushing the net concern score from a mildly positive +2.5% to a clearly negative 9.3%. Serbia now stands out as the only one in the region with a strongly negative balance of opinion on this issue, suggesting a more dismissive or resistant stance towards the idea that such content can be harmful or radicalising.

Showing white people as more law-compliant than others, such as Africans, Roma, or Middle Easterners

Across the WB6, public perceptions shifted modestly between 2024 and 2025 regarding the risk posed by online content that portrays white people as more law-compliant than other ethnic groups, such as Africans, Roma, or Middle Easterners. While the regional average net agreement (completely and mostly agree minus completely or mostly disagree) rose from –1.6% to +4.2%, indicating a marginal increase in perceived risk, the story varies significantly by WB6. A detailed comparison of the 2024 and 2025 data by WB6 can be found in Table 16, Annex 1.

Albania recorded the most pronounced increase in awareness. The percentage of respondents who agreed that such content is potentially dangerous rose from 44.1% to 56.8%, while disagreement nearly halved (from 30.7% to 15.4%). This drove the net concern score to a remarkable +41.4%, the highest in the region. Albania's citizens now stand out as the most sensitive to the risks of racially biased narratives.

In North Macedonia, public concern also grew, though to a lesser extent. Agreement increased from 34.4% to 39.2%, while disagreement declined slightly, pushing the net score to +9.1%. This suggests a gradually maturing awareness of how racially biased content can contribute to harmful stereotypes and potentially radicalising worldviews. Kosovo* reversed a previously negative trend. In 2024, more people disagreed (33.3%) than agreed (22.4%) that such content was problematic. However, in 2025, agreement climbed to 37.0% while disagreement increased slightly to 34.8%, producing a modestly positive net score of +2.2%.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, moved in the opposite direction. Although agreement remained relatively stable (33.8% in 2024 to 31.8% in 2025), disagreement increased (from 32.5% to 37.4%).

In Montenegro, already one of the most sceptical in the WB6 in 2024 (net score –12.0%), the situation worsened slightly. The agreement rose marginally from 25.9% to 30.0%, but disagreement remained high (40.3% in 2025).

Finally, Serbia experienced the most significant drop in net concern. In 2024, opinion was relatively balanced with 33.3% agreement and 35.8% disagreement. However, in 2025, agreement slipped to 30.6%, and disagreement jumped to 42.1%, deepening the negative net score to –11.5%.

Overall, the region appears divided, with Albania, North Macedonia, and Kosovo* showing increased sensitivity, unlike the others, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia. Albania has become the regional outlier with its high and rising concern, while Serbia now holds the most dismissive stance. This divergence underscores the importance of tailoring counter-radicalisation and digital literacy efforts to individual WB6 contexts.

Stereotyping Muslims as terrorists and blaming them as perpetrators of terrorist attacks against the West

Public concern across the WB6 about the dangers of stereotyping Muslims as terrorists, a potential radicalising narrative online, increased between 2024 and 2025. The share of respondents who agree that such content is dangerous (combining “mostly agree” and “completely agree”) grew from 36.6% in 2024 to 41.2% in 2025, while those who disagreed fell from 30.5% to 29.7%. This shift indicates a growing public awareness of the risks associated with discriminatory and stigmatising content. However, a closer look at the individual WB6 reveals divergent trajectories.

According to the comparative data for 2024 and 2025 by WB6 presented in Table 17, Annex 1, the public concern increased sharply, making Albania the most sensitive WB6 on this issue in 2025. The agreement jumped from 51.5% to 60.9%, while disagreement plummeted from 27.6% to just 16.2%. This shift reflects a significant awakening to the dangers of Islamophobia content.

Kosovo* also saw a notable rise in concern. The agreement increased from 28.0% to 44.3%, and disagreement dropped from 31.8% to 28.4%. This brought Kosovo*’s net perception from negative to positive territory, suggesting growing recognition that these stereotypes are not just offensive but potentially radicalising in digital spaces.

Attitudes remained consistently concerned in North Macedonia, with agreement increasing slightly (from 42.6% to 44.9%) and disagreement remaining stable. With nearly one in five respondents (19.4%) strongly agreeing that this narrative is dangerous, North Macedonia continues to display moderate but solid concern on the issue.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the agreement declined slightly from 36.4% to 35.3%, while disagreement rose from 29.6% to 34.6%, resulting in a negative shift in net concern.

Montenegro showed the lowest perceived risk in both years. The agreement barely changed (from 27.7% to 28.4%), while disagreement rose from 34.2% to 37.9%, worsening the already negative net score.

Public opinion in Serbia remained relatively stable but dismissive, with agreement increasing modestly from 33.2% to 33.7%, and disagreement rising slightly from 32.7% to 35.7%. The shift suggests that public concern is stalling, with more people either sceptical about the risks or desensitised to these portrayals.

The regional average indicates an apparent increase in perceived danger, primarily driven by shifts in Albania and Kosovo*, and to some extent North Macedonia. These WB6 may be more attuned to the social consequences of Islamophobia or more responsive to international norms on anti-discrimination.

Claiming superiority of the religion which I believe as the most peaceful and merciful religion compared to other religions and beliefs

Between 2024 and 2025, public attitudes across the Western Balkans shifted towards greater recognition of the potential danger behind claims of religious superiority in the online space. Regionally, the share of respondents agreeing that such narratives can be harmful rose from 33.7% in 2024 to 37.5% in 2025, while disagreement declined slightly (from 30.5% in 2024 to 29.6% in 2025). This yielded an increase in net concern, from +3.2% to +8.0%. While this general trend suggests increased caution around content that portrays one religion as superior to others, individual WB6-specific trends highlight diverse perceptions and contrasting directions of change.

Comparative data for 2024 and 2025 by WB6 are presented in Table 18, Annex 1.

Albania recorded the most significant positive shift in concern. The agreement increased from 37.7% to 44.3%, while disagreement dropped significantly from 33.7% to 23.4%. This signals a notable rise in religious tolerance awareness.

The population in North Macedonia also showed greater awareness of the risks. The agreement increased from 32.7% to 40.7%, and disagreement remained stable at 30.0%.

Montenegro's net concern score rose from +3.2% to +7.4%, driven by a slight increase in agreement (from 32.7% in 2024 to 37.4% in 2025) and relatively stable disagreement.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina the agreement dropped slightly from 37.5% to 33.9%, and disagreement rose sharply from 20.8% to 31.4%.

Kosovo* experienced a turnaround. In 2024, it had the most negative net score in the region (−13.6%), with more respondents dismissing the danger of such content than acknowledging it. In 2025, agreement jumped to 35.3%, and disagreement dropped from 39.4% in 2024 to 32.2% in 2025, pushing the net score into positive territory (+3.1%).

Serbia's results remained relatively static. The agreement declined slightly from 36% to 33.9%, and disagreement ticked upward to 30.4%, narrowing the net concern score to +3.6%. This signals a modest drop in recognition of the dangers of religious superiority rhetoric.

The regional picture in 2025 is more alert than in 2024, with public concern over online claims of religious superiority rising modestly overall. It underscores the need for targeted educational and counter-narrative initiatives that acknowledge and address each society's unique sensitivities regarding religion, pluralism, and online discourse.

Reports claiming the increase in crime rates in cities are connected with the influx of immigrants

While there is an overall increase in concern about the influence of online disinformation regarding immigration across the region, individual WB6 show unique patterns. The total percentage of those who agree (mostly or completely) that such videos can radicalise youth rose from 34.2% in 2024 to 41.7% in 2025 across the Western Balkans Six. This suggests a growing awareness or concern about the influence of online disinformation regarding the connection of immigration to increase in crime rates.

A detailed comparison of the 2024 and 2025 data by WB6 can be found in Table 19, Annex 1.

In Albania, there was a significant increase in concern about the radicalising effect of this type of content. The combined agreement rate (mostly agree + completely agree) increased from 40.5% in 2024 to 52.6% in 2025. Specifically, the "completely agree" category saw a substantial rise, more than doubling from 8.4% to 17.9%. Conversely, the total disagreement rate (completely disagree + mostly disagree) fell sharply from 30.6% to 18.1%. This shift suggests a growing perception of the threat posed by online disinformation campaigns.

Bosnia and Herzegovina showed a moderate increase in concern from 2024 to 2025. The total agreement rate rose slightly from 34.8% to 37.1%. While the "mostly agree" percentage remained stable, the "completely agree" category saw a rise from 10.3% to 13.9%. At the same time, the neutral "neither agree nor disagree" option decreased from 35.5% to 30.8%, indicating that fewer people are on the fence and are instead forming a more defined opinion, leaning slightly towards agreement.

In Kosovo*, the data indicate a notable shift towards greater concern. The combined agreement rate increased from 23.8% in 2024 to 35.2% in 2025. This rise in concern coincided with a decrease in the neutral response rate, which dropped from 35.6% to 23.9%.

Montenegro experienced a year-on-year increase in concern about online radicalisation. The total agreement rate climbed from 31.6% to 41.1%, driven by a significant rise in both "mostly agree" and "completely agree" responses. Concurrently, the total disagreement rate plummeted from 29.8% to 19.8%.

North Macedonia showed a rise in concern. The total agreement rate rose from 37.8% in 2024 to 42.8% in 2025, with the "completely agree" category seeing a significant jump from 9.2% to 15.8%. The "Don't know/Refuse to answer" rate decreased, indicating that more people are forming a clear opinion on the matter. The data suggests that public awareness of online radicalisation and its potential impact on youth is growing in North Macedonia.

In Serbia, there was an increase in concern over the potential for online radicalisation. The combined agreement rate rose from 36.9% in 2024 to 41.8% in 2025. The "completely agree" response increased from 11.4% to 14.5%, and the "mostly disagree" rate dropped notably from 19.7% to 11.7%. The data points to a growing recognition of the dangers of online extremist content and its potential to influence young people.

Increase in unemployment and poverty due to the presence of foreign workers in my economy

There is a concern that online content linking unemployment and poverty to foreign workers can radicalise young people. Across the region, the percentage of respondents who agree with this statement rose from 33.2% in 2024 to 40.2% in 2025, indicating a shift in public perception. This trend suggests heightened awareness of the potential for online disinformation to fuel radicalisation, particularly within the context of economic anxieties. Comparative data for 2024 and 2025 by WB6 are presented in Table 20, Annex 1. It reveals a growing concern that online content linking unemployment and poverty to foreign workers can radicalise young people. Across the region, the percentage of respondents who agree with this statement rose from 33.2% in 2024 to 40.2% in 2025, indicating a shift in public perception. This trend suggests heightened awareness of the potential for online disinformation to fuel radicalisation, particularly within the context of economic anxieties.

In Albania, there was an increase in concern from 2024 to 2025. The total percentage of respondents who agreed (mostly agree + completely agree) that such content can radicalise youth increased from 35.4% to as much as 48.8%. This was driven by a substantial increase in the "completely agree" category, which more than doubled from 8.2% to 18.7%. This shift suggests that a growing portion of Albania's public is highly aware of the threat that anti-immigrant narratives can pose to young people online.

Bosnia and Herzegovina showed a stable yet slightly increased level of concern. The total agreement rate remained relatively consistent, with a minor decline from 32.9% in 2024 to 31.0% in 2025. However, there was a slight increase in the "completely agree" category, from 10.7% to 11.6%, even as the "mostly agree" rate dropped slightly. The proportion of those who "neither agree nor disagree" increased from 30.4% to 33.1%, indicating that a significant segment of the population remains neutral or uncertain about the issue.

Kosovo* experienced a shift towards increased concern regarding online radicalisation. The combined agreement rate surged from 23.9% in 2024 to 36.5% in 2025. This was driven by a significant increase in the "mostly agree" (from 19.6% to 27.6%) and "completely agree" (from 4.3% to 8.9%) categories. Concurrently, the neutral stance ("neither agree nor disagree") decreased from 33.7% to 26.2%, showing that a larger number of people are moving away from neutrality and taking a position that online content linking foreign workers to economic issues can be radicalising.

In Montenegro, there was an increase in concern about the radicalising potential of this type of content. The total agreement rate rose from 31.5% in 2024 to 39.2% in 2025. This shift was accompanied by a decrease in the "mostly disagree" category, from 22.8% to 14.8%, indicating that public scepticism about the issue has lessened. The data suggests that public awareness of the dangers of online disinformation on this topic is growing in Montenegro.

North Macedonia showed an increase in concern, with the total agreement rate rising from 41.3% in 2024 to 44.9% in 2025. The "completely agree" percentage increased substantially, from 11.7% to 19.4%, making it the highest increase in the WB6 in this category. These results highlight a heightened public perception of the threat posed by such online narratives to younger generations in North Macedonia.

Serbia also saw an increase in concern, with the total agreement rate rising from 34.3% in 2024 to 40.9% in 2025.

The data from 2024 and 2025 across the Western Balkans Six reveals a consistent and overall increase in public concern that online content targeting foreign workers can radicalise young people. This is particularly evident in Albania, Kosovo*, and North Macedonia, where there were significant shifts from neutral or non-concerned positions towards outright agreement. The trend suggests that as digital media becomes more pervasive, citizens are becoming more vigilant about the dangers of online disinformation and its potential to influence vulnerable populations, especially when it taps into sensitive socio-economic issues such as unemployment. This heightened awareness is a crucial first step in building digital resilience against radicalising narratives.

Praising the history of my economy and nation, despite all other nations' efforts to prevent

Public perception in the Western Balkans Six regarding the radicalising potential of nationalistic historical narratives online is varied, with some WB6 showing a significant increase in concern between 2024 and 2025. The comparative data for 2024 and 2025 by WB6 is presented in Table 21, Annex 1. While a combined average of 31.2% of respondents agreed with the statement in 2024, this rose to 36.5% in 2025, indicating a growing awareness of the dangers of such content, even if its message is framed as patriotic.

In Albania, there was a significant shift in public opinion, with concern about the radicalising effects of nationalist content increasing substantially. The combined agreement rate (mostly agree + completely agree) surged from 25.8% in 2024 to a striking 45.1% in 2025. This was largely due to a substantial increase in the "completely agree" category, which more than tripled from 5.1% to 16.8%, and a sharp drop in total disagreement from 36.1% to 20.2%. This suggests heightened awareness and recognition of the potential for historical narratives to be exploited for extremist purposes.

Bosnia and Herzegovina saw a moderate increase in concern, with the total agreement rate rising from 30.9% in 2024 to 33.4% in 2025. The most significant proportion of respondents remained neutral at 36.0%, though this was down from 43.6% in 2024.

Kosovo* also experienced a rise in concern, with the total agreement rate increasing from 29.5% in 2024 to 35.7% in 2025. Despite this increase, Kosovo* maintains a relatively high level of disagreement (32.1% in 2025), reflecting a divided public opinion.

Montenegro's public opinion on this issue became more concerned, with the total agreement rate rising from 28.3% to 32.2% between 2024 and 2025. This increase was driven by a rise in the "completely agree" category, which increased from 8.8% to 12.2%. The total disagreement rate decreased from 27.1% to 25.3%. This trend suggests a growing awareness in Montenegro of the potential for online nationalist rhetoric to become radicalising, moving away from a more non-committal stance.

In North Macedonia, there was an increase in concern, with the total agreement rate rising from 35.0% in 2024 to 37.2% in 2025. The most striking change was the sharp increase in the "completely agree" category, which jumped from 9.2% to 16.5%. The neutral category "neither agree nor disagree" decreased from 29.4% to 24.9%, and the "completely disagree" option increased from 15.1% to 17.1%.

Serbia also experienced a slight drop in the overall agreement rate, from 37.5% in 2024 to 35.7% in 2025. Correspondingly, the shares of disagreement, neutral responses, and “don’t know” answers increased marginally, indicating that the overall situation in Serbia remains largely unchanged.

The findings indicate that while some societies are becoming more sensitive to how nationalistic messages can be exploited, others may be either less exposed to such content or less inclined to view it as a radicalising threat.

Showing people who own guns or act like a member of mafia

Public concern across the Western Balkans Six about the dangers of showing people who own guns or act like a member of mafia increased. From 2024 to 2025, agreement with the idea that this kind of online content can radicalise youth has increased from 39.0% to 47.8%, while disagreement decreased from 26.1% to 24.5%. Comparative data for 2024 and 2025 by WB6 can be found in Table 22 of Annex 1.

In Albania, there was an increase in concern regarding whether videos "Showing people who own guns or act like a member of the mafia" may radicalise children and young relatives. The total agreement rate rose from 50.7% in 2024 to 69.7% in 2025. This was driven by a significant increase in the "completely agree" category, which more than doubled from 16.1% in 2024 to 34.5% in 2025. This data suggests that Albania’s public is becoming aware of the negative influence of such online content.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the total agreement decreased slightly from 42.9% to 41.9%, while the total disagreement rate increased from 21.8% to 29.1%.

In Kosovo*, there was a shift towards greater concern. The total agreement rate increased from 26.4% in 2024 to 41.8% in 2025. The drop in the neutral response rate, from 39.3% to 21.9%, shows that a significant number of people who were previously undecided have now taken a definitive position that such content can indeed be radicalising.

In Montenegro, public opinion on this issue became more concerned between 2024 and 2025. The total agreement rate rose from 33.5% to 39.6%, primarily due to a rise in the "completely agree" category, which increased from 13.9% to 18.4%. This was accompanied by a decrease in the total disagreement rate, from 27.2% to 24.8%. This trend suggests a growing awareness in Montenegro of the potential for online content glorifying gun violence and a mafia lifestyle to influence youth negatively.

In North Macedonia, there was a significant increase in concern, with the total agreement rate rising from 39.9% in 2024 to 49.9% in 2025. The most striking change was the sharp increase in the "completely agree" category, which jumped from 10.4% to 20.9%. This was accompanied by a decrease in the neutral "neither agree nor disagree" option from 25.7% to 20.3%, and a decrease in total disagreement from 27.7% to 24.8%. This shift highlights a growing public perception of the threat posed by these online narratives to younger generations.

In Serbia, public opinion on this issue showed an increase in concern from 2024 to 2025, with the total agreement rate rising from 40.8% to 44.0%.

Across the Western Balkans Six the data from 2024 and 2025 reveals a consistent and overall increase in public concern that online content glamorising gun ownership or mafia lifestyles can radicalise young people.

CONSIDERATION OF GUN OWNERSHIP

Despite expressed concerns about security in the region, the overwhelming majority of the citizens in the Western Balkans Six still rejects the idea of private gun ownership. The 2025 survey results are presented in Figure 13, and the comparative data from the 2021–2025 surveys is provided in Table 23 in Annex 1.

The data for Montenegro shows an increase in the percentage of people open to owning a gun, rising from just 3.7% in 2021 to 19.5% in 2025. Despite this growth, the majority of citizens, around 71-72%, continue to reject gun ownership, a trend that has remained relatively stable since 2022.

The data for Serbia indicates a fluctuation in attitudes towards gun ownership over the past few years. In 2021, only 4.7% of citizens were open to owning a gun, a figure that remained stable through 2022. However, in 2023, this number surged to 16.3%, before declining again to 10.1% in 2024 and slightly increasing to 12.2% in 2025. At the same time, the percentage of those opposed to gun ownership has steadily decreased from 91.3% in 2021 to 80.9% in 2025, indicating a gradual softening of the previously strong resistance to firearms. The percentage of those who already own a gun ranged from 3% in 2023 to 2.3% in 2025.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the data reveals a gradual rise in the number of people open to owning a gun over the past five years. From 3.9% in 2021, the percentage grew steadily, peaking at 18.5% in 2023, before slightly decreasing to 12.8% in 2024 and 11.7% in 2025. Meanwhile, the share of respondents opposing gun ownership has decreased from 92.3% in 2021, to 81.6% in 2025, pointing to a steady decline in resistance. Despite these shifts, the proportion of people who already own a gun remains relatively low, at just 4.4% in 2025. This suggests that while interest in firearms has increased somewhat, gun ownership remains limited, and broader societal resistance to firearms is still significant in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In Albania, the percentage of people open to owning a gun has remained consistently low over the past five years. Starting at just 3.4% in 2021, the number gradually increased to 8.4% in 2024, before slightly dropping to 7.2% in 2025. Despite this modest rise, the overwhelming majority of citizens continue to reject gun ownership, with those answering "no" ranging from 95.1% in 2021 to 90.4% in 2024, and slightly rising again to 91.1% in 2025. The percentage of people who already own a gun remains minimal, fluctuating between 1% and 2% throughout the period. This suggests that, while some level of interest in firearms has emerged, gun ownership is still not widely accepted or practiced in Albania.

Figure 13. Consideration of gun ownership
Q14. Would you consider owning a gun?
(All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



In Kosovo*, the data shows significant fluctuations in attitudes towards gun ownership over the past five years. In 2021, 6.8% of respondents expressed openness to owning a gun, which surged to 38.9% in 2022 before dropping to 17.8% the next year. The percentage of people open to gun ownership continued to decline in 2024 and 2025, reaching 4.8% and 4.4%, respectively. In contrast, the percentage of those rejecting gun ownership followed a reversed trend, starting at 92.8% in 2021, dropping to 53.4% in 2022, and rising again to 93.1% in 2024, with a slight increase to 94% in 2025. Gun ownership remains rare, though it saw a peak of 6.1% in 2022 before dropping to 1.2% in 2025.

In North Macedonia, the percentage of people open to owning a gun has steadily declined over the past five years, starting at 13.8% in 2021 and dropping to just 3.3% in 2025. Conversely, the proportion of those rejecting gun ownership has increased, rising from 81.6% in 2021 to 91.6% in 2025. The percentage of respondents who already own a gun has also fluctuated, peaking at 4.3% in 2021, dipping to a low of 1.7% in 2023, and stabilising at 2.7% in 2025. This trend suggests a declining interest in gun ownership, with the majority of the population increasingly opposed to firearms.

Across the region, attitudes towards gun ownership show varying trends, with some WB6 experiencing an increase in openness, although the opposition to gun ownership still remains regionally strong. The majority of citizens across the region continue to prioritise non-ownership, indicating a more cautious approach towards firearms in the broader societal context.

REASONS FOR GUN OWNERSHIP

In 2025, the main reason cited by respondents who either own a gun or consider owning one was personal protection or security (52.4%). This was followed by hunting and sport (21.5%) and inheritance or family heirloom (17.8%). A smaller proportion (6.7%) mentioned preparation for possible conflict or unrest, while less than 2% selected other reasons.

Table 24 in Annex 1 presents the comparative data for the period 2021 to 2025 by WB6.

Personal protection remains the top reason, selected by 52.4% of respondents across the region. However, this is down more than 12 percentage points from 64.7% in 2024, a substantial shift. The decline is most pronounced in Albania (from 64.5% to 49.2%) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (from 70.1% to 53.0%).

Despite this overall decline, Kosovo* remains the strongest outlier, with 68.7% of respondents citing protection, still lower than 2024's 75.9%, but far above the regional average.

Hunting and sport remain a prominent reason with 21.5% of the respondents citing it regionally. Albania shows a rise from 26.5% in 2021 to 35.8% in 2025, Bosnia and Herzegovina from 19.4% in 2021 to 24.9% in 2025, and Serbia from 10.7% in 2021 to 23% in 2025, hinting at shifting narratives of guns as recreational rather than defensive tools.

Figure 14. Reasons for gun ownership
Q15. What would be / is the main reason for you to own a gun?
Respondents who consider owning a gun or already own a gun, N=728, multiple answer, share of responses, %)



Inherited guns and family heirlooms/tradition has increased at the regional level (from 10% in 2024 to 17.8% in 2025), but it varies by individual WB6. Montenegro (23.3%) and North Macedonia (20.8%) lead on this front, indicating that for many, gun ownership is about legacy more than purpose.

Guns "in case of conflict or unrest" are less frequently mentioned, only 6.7% on the regional level. The differences among WB6 are small, ranging from 4.7% to 7.8%, suggesting that few people believe civil conflict is imminent or worth preparing for with arms.

The share selecting "Other" reasons is marginal at 1.6%, unchanged from 2024, showing limited diversification beyond the listed categories.

While self-protection remains the dominant reason to own a gun, its regional weight is diminishing as more people cite recreational or other motives, suggesting the Western Balkans Six may be slowly moving towards a more civilian and symbolic relationship with firearms.

PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF THE THREAT POSED BY ILLEGAL FIREARMS POSSESSION AND TRAFFICKING

The threat posed by illegal possession and trafficking in firearms is viewed as very serious or extremely serious by a majority (60.5%) of respondents across the region in 2025, reflecting persistent regional concerns around public safety, crime, and insecurity. However, the intensity of perceived risk varies widely across WB6.

Figure 15. Threat from illegal possession and trafficking in firearms
Q16. How serious a threat do you perceive the illegal possession and trafficking in firearms to be in your economy? (All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



Serbia tops the list for perceived severity with 37.5% of respondents saying the threat is "very serious" and another 21.5% rating it "extremely serious", which makes 69.0% of Serbia's citizens highly concerned about the issue, the highest overall level in the region, possibly reflecting effects of serious firearm incidents that shocked the population in recent years.

Albania and Montenegro follow closely, with 68.3% and 64.7% respectively, classifying the threat as very or extremely serious. Montenegro's numbers also reflect heightened sensitivity, with 30.2% choosing "extremely serious" and a relatively low share dismissing the threat as "not serious" (just 4.3%).

Kosovo* presents a more nuanced picture. While 38% rate the threat as "very serious", only 14.3% rate it "extremely serious", the lowest such rating in the region. Interestingly, Kosovo* also has the highest share of people rating the threat as only "moderately serious" (25.5%).

In Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia, perceptions are high but less extreme. Roughly 56% in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 52% in North Macedonia rate the threat as "very" or "extremely serious".

PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF LOCAL THREATS FROM ILLEGAL WEAPON POSSESSION AND MISUSE

Across the WB6, the sense of threat from illegal firearms in everyday environment remains widespread but uneven. The data suggest that although the majority of respondents acknowledge a sense of personal risk, the intensity of that concern varies significantly in WB6.

At regional level, 40.1% of citizens report feeling threatened, and additional 15.7% feel very threatened, meaning more than half of the Western Balkans Six population (55.8%) perceives a tangible local risk from firearm misuse. 37.6% state they do not feel threatened at all, and 6.6% are either unsure or chose not to answer.

Albania shows the highest overall concern, with 47.3% of respondents feeling threatened by illegal firearm misuse. In contrast, Kosovo* appears the least concerned overall, with 50.2% saying they do not feel threatened at all. Still, 13.3% feel very threatened, indicating that certain groups or areas may still experience heightened fear.

Figure 16. Endangerment from illegal possession and misuse of weapons
Q17. How threatened do you feel by the illegal possession and misuse of weapons in your neighbourhood (as in crime, domestic violence, celebratory shooting, etc.)?
(All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina register the most intense concern, with 19.2% in each reporting feeling very threatened, the highest among the WB6. Serbia also shows a notable level of uncertainty, with 11.3% of respondents refusing or unsure how to answer, which may reflect discomfort or distrust. North Macedonia and Montenegro fall in the middle, though Montenegro has the highest rate of “don’t know/refuse to answer” responses (11.8%).

CHAPTER D: IMMIGRATION

While emigration has long shaped the Western Balkans, recent years have seen a parallel trend of growing immigration, particularly in response to labour market needs. As labour shortages grow more acute and WB6 deepen their integration with global markets, foreign workers are more significant factor. Governments across the region have responded by expanding work permit schemes, introducing new legislation, and modernising administrative systems to manage this transition. Serbia and Albania, in particular, stand out as frontrunners in facilitating foreign employment. Others, such as North Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo*, also show a rising demand for international labour.

As policy evolves to address workforce gaps, the survey data on public perceptions of immigration in the Western Balkans Six reflect a region balancing between economic necessity, historical memory, and contemporary insecurity. While recognition of immigration's benefits is present, especially in relation to filling labour shortages, this is consistently offset by concerns about identity, security, and social cohesion. Immigration is thus not understood in isolation but filtered through each society's political climate, past experiences, and economic vulnerabilities.

CURRENT MIGRATION TRENDS IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

The vast majority of people arriving in the Western Balkans today are labour migrants, responding to the growing demand across various sectors, including construction, hospitality, transportation, and services. With many local workers emigrating to EU member states, Western Balkans Six are experiencing labour shortages, prompting employers to increasingly rely on foreign workers, which explains the increase in the number of work permits issued by all WB6 in recent years.

Serbia stands out as the regional leader in terms of hiring foreign labour. In both 2023[13] and 2024[14] it issued over 52,000 work permits each year, primarily to citizens of Russia, China, Turkey, India, and Nepal. This influx has prompted major administrative reforms. In February 2024, Serbia introduced a digital simplified "single residence and work permit" system, replacing the previously separate processes. The new legislation allows foreigners to apply online and receive permits valid for up to three years. At the same time, the changes have expanded the grounds for temporary residence and increased penalties for non-compliance, signalling a stronger regulatory framework aligned with the needs of a modern labour market.

In Albania, foreign employment is also steadily increasing. The Employment and Skills Agency (AKPA) reported 9,825 employment approvals for foreigners in 2023[15], and by 2024, roughly 12,000 foreigners were working in the economy[16]. To better manage this shift, with support from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) Albania has launched a new Strategy for Migration (2024–2030) and an accompanying Action Plan (2024-2026)[17] to strengthen its migration governance framework.

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[13] Beta. "Serbia Issued 52,185 Work Permits to Foreigners in 2023." N1 Info, 14 October 2024. https://n1info.rs/english/news/serbia-issued-52185-work-permits-to-foreigners-in-2023/

[14] Serbian Monitor. "Employers Facing a Choice: Hire a Foreigner or Shut down the Business." Serbian Monitor, 23 July 2025. https://www.serbianmonitor.com/en/employers-facing-a-choice-hire-a-foreigner-or-shut-down-the-business/

[15] Monitor Albania. "In Albania, there are over 1,000 foreign waiters." Monitor Albania. https://monitor.al/en/ne-shqiperi-ka-mbi-1-mije-kameriere-te-huaj/.

[16] Kosovo-Online. "Stopover or End of the Road? How Attractive Is the Western Balkans for Foreign Workers?" Kosovo-Online, 9 July 2024. https://www.Kosovo-online.com/en/news/analysis/stopover-or-end-road-how-attractive-western-balkans-foreign-workers-9-7-2024.

[17] International Organization for Migration (IOM) Albania. National Strategy on Migration 2024-2030 and Action Plan 2024-2026. December 2024. https://albania.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1401/files/documents/2024-12/nsm-eng.pdf.

In Montenegro, the government has set an annual quota of approximately 28,988 work permits[18] for foreigners in 2025. Of these, around 21,600 are allocated for full-time employment, 2,370 for seasonal work, and 5,000 are reserved for addressing special labour market needs.

North Macedonia has also seen rising demand for foreign labour. According to the Employment Service Agency, around 8,000 work permits were issued in 2024, a notable increase from 6,000 the previous year.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the number of foreigners entering the workforce has been growing more slowly but steadily. The Service for Foreigners' Affairs reports an increase in issued work permits, from 2,300 in 2021[19] to 5,798 in 2024[20]. This figure closely approaches the 2024 quota of 6,073 permits, set by the Council of Ministers, indicating that demand is catching up to allocated quota for foreign workers.

Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kosovo* (MIA) issued a total of 8,293 residence permits to foreigners in 2024, of which 3,974 were issued for employment purposes[21]. Most of these immigrants originate from WB6 such as Albania, Serbia, and North Macedonia, as well as beyond the region, from Turkey, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and other Asian nations.

Together, these developments suggest that as labour shortages intensify in the region and Western Balkans Six continue to integrate further into global and regional markets, foreign workers are becoming an increasingly essential part of the solution.

At the same time, the region remains a transit corridor for migrants and refugees seeking to reach Western and Northern Europe. The region has experienced several distinct waves of transit migration, shaped by conflict, geopolitical shifts, and evolving EU border policies.

UNHCR estimates that around 17,500 people passed through the region in 2024, mostly originating from Afghanistan, Syria, Morocco, and sub-Saharan Africa[22]. Despite these flows, very few choose to settle in the region. Most avoid applying for asylum in the Western Balkans Six, hoping instead to reach EU member states where they believe their chances of long-term protection and economic opportunities are higher. Consequently, asylum applications remain low, and the majority of these migrants are categorised as being in transit, moving quickly through WB6 that function more as a corridor than as destination.

But while migration is increasingly a fact of life in the WB6, in some communities, foreign workers are viewed as essential to address labour shortages. In others, they are viewed with suspicion or linked to social tension. Perceptions are often shaped more by fear or limited exposure than by real interaction. The SecuriMeter 2025 survey examines public perception of immigrants by measuring the level of agreement among respondents to immigration-related claims.

ASSESSING ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRATION

The results show that even though there is a consensus on some issues, significant divisions exist across different WB6. The provided analysis reveals that attitudes towards immigration are not monolithic but are influenced by specific context of each WB6, including its history with conflict, its role as a transit hub for migrants, and its own patterns of emigration.

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[18] Government of Montenegro. "In 2025, 28,988 permits were issued for the temporary residence and work of foreigners." Vijesti, 25 December 2024. https://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/drustvo/738463/u-2025-za-privremeni-boravak-i-rad-stranaca-28988-dozvola.

[19] Connecting Region. "Rise in Foreign Workforce Fills Gaps in Bosnia and Herzegovina's Industries." Connecting Region, 7 March 2025. https://connectingregion.com/news/rise-in-foreign-workforce-fills-gaps-in-bosnia-and-herzegovinas-industries/.

[20] N1 Info. "Foreign Workers Make Up 0.7% of Bosnia's Workforce in 2024." N1 Info, 22 July 2025. https://n1info.ba/english/news/foreign-workers-make-up-07-of-bosnias-workforce-in-2024/.

[21] GAP Institute. Emigration and the Labor Market in Kosovo: The Untapped Potential of the Inactive Workforce. 2 April 2025. https://www.institutigap.org/documents/11538_Emigrationaandlabormarket.pdf.

[22] UNHCR (2025). Western Balkans - Refugees, asylum-seekers and other people in mixed movements.

Figure 17. Attitudes about immigration
Q18. From your point of view, how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the effects of immigration on the development of your economy?
(All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



While a majority of respondents agree that immigration provides people from poorer economies with a chance at a better life (54.8%), and also significant number sees granting asylum to refugees as a humanitarian obligation (44.7%), there is also widespread concern about its potential negative impacts.

A substantial portion of the population believes that immigration contributes to social tensions and conflict (41.4%), leads to higher unemployment among locals (40.9%), and increases the crime rate (43.5%).

Fewer people view immigration as a source of cultural enrichment or as a solution to labour shortages, with less than a quarter of respondents agreeing that immigrants help fill important job vacancies (24.8%) or that contribute to cultural diversity (26.6%). The regional data also reveal a cautious stance on security, as nearly half of the respondents agree that immigration increases the risk of terrorism (41.7%).

These figures suggest a region that is simultaneously empathetic to the plight of migrants but also very concerned about the economic, social, and security implications of their arrival.

Comparative data by WB6 can be found in Table 25 of Annex 1.

Statement: Immigrants help fill important job vacancies in our economy

Across the Western Balkans Six, opinions are divided on whether migrants contribute to the labour market. Albania and Kosovo* stand out with 52.8% and 41.2%, respectively, agreeing that immigrants fill critical job gaps, a notable contrast to the regional average of 24.8%. On the other hand, only 18.5% of respondents in North Macedonia, 13.0% in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 12.3% in Montenegro and 11.2% in Serbia agree with this statement.

The refugee crisis from 2015–2016, involving WB6, likely amplified economic concerns. Additionally, these societies do not have large immigrant populations, so people rarely witness migrants working in sectors with genuine labour shortages.

Statement: Immigration contributes to cultural diversity and enriches society

In the Western Balkans Six, the idea that immigration contributes positively to cultural diversity is often met with ambivalence or suspicion. Among the WB6, Albania appears to be the most positive towards the idea that immigration contributes to cultural diversity, while the rest of the region is more sceptical and around 20% of the population on average agree that immigration contributes to cultural diversity.

Statement: Immigration increases the crime rate

Roughly four out of ten respondents across all WB6 believe immigration increases crime (46.7% in Albania, 44.6% in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 41.2% in Serbia, 48.1% in North Macedonia, 42.9% in Montenegro, 37.3% in Kosovo*). Albania, despite its openness on other questions, shows comparable levels of concern, illustrating that optimism may coexists with security concerns. In contrast, North Macedonia records the highest level of agreement with the statement that immigration increases crime rate (48.1%) and one of the lowest levels of disagreement (19.3%), showing a more firmly negative view.

Statement: Granting asylum to refugees is a humanitarian obligation

Attitudes towards asylum vary widely across the Western Balkans, revealing deep regional contrasts in how people view their economy's responsibility towards refugees.

Support is strongest in Albania, where 78% of respondents agree that granting asylum is a humanitarian duty, while in Kosovo* 53% share this view.

In the rest of the region, support is significantly lower. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, 42.1% agree with the humanitarian framing of asylum, while nearly 28.6% disagree. Montenegro and North Macedonia exhibit even greater scepticism, with only 35.9% and 31.3%, respectively, viewing asylum as a humanitarian obligation, while a sizable portion either disagrees or remains undecided.

Serbia shows the lowest level of support, with just 28.3% agreeing and nearly the same share (29%) disagreeing.

Overall, these results show a clear divide, while Albania and Kosovo* exhibit humanitarian sentiment, the rest of the region holds more cautious, divided, or sceptical views.

Statement: Immigration increases the risk of terrorism

Public attitudes towards the perceived link between immigration and terrorism vary significantly across the Western Balkans, revealing a region divided on how it views the security implications of migration. In Albania and Kosovo*, public concern is relatively low. In Albania, 43.9% of respondents disagreed with the idea that immigration is linked to terrorism, compared to 39.8% who agreed, while in Kosovo* 31.7% disagreed and 36.2% agreed.

In contrast, North Macedonia and Serbia exhibit higher levels of concern. In North Macedonia 47.4%, and in Serbia 43.7% agreed with this statement, while only 17% disagreed in both. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro fall somewhere in between, reflecting more ambivalent views but with a noticeable lean towards concern.

Statement: Immigration gives people a chance at a better life

Public attitudes across the Western Balkans reveal varying levels of support for viewing immigration as a positive opportunity rather than a threat.

Albania stands out with the strongest support, 80.1% agreeing and only 10.9% disagreeing. Similarly, Bosnia and Herzegovina (55.2%) and Kosovo* (54.3%) show higher agreement with this statement, compared to Montenegro (45.7%), North Macedonia (46.7%) and Serbia (47.0%).

Statement: Immigration leads to higher unemployment among locals

Across the Western Balkans, there is a widespread concern that immigration could lead to increased unemployment among locals. While the intensity varies slightly, a majority or near-majority in all WB6 agree with this perception.

The view is most strongly held in North Macedonia (47.1%), followed by Serbia (44.6%), Kosovo* (42.5%), and Albania (41.4%). These figures suggest a common regional sentiment that immigration poses a risk to job security.

Montenegro (39.8%) aligns closely with this trend, while Bosnia and Herzegovina (30%) stands out as an exception, with notably lower agreement.

Overall, the data reveal a shared regional concern, and even in WB6 where actual immigration remains limited the idea that newcomers could take jobs resonates widely. This reflects not only concerns about labour market competition but also broader economic insecurity.

Statement: Immigration contributes to social tensions and conflict

Public attitudes across the Western Balkans Six suggest a prevailing concern that immigration may contribute to social tensions and conflict, though this view is not universally held. Across the region, 41.4% of respondents agree that immigration fuels social tensions, compared to 25.4% who disagree, indicating that apprehensions about the societal impact of immigration are relatively widespread. Agreement is strongest in Albania (51.1%), followed by North Macedonia (43.4%) and Kosovo* (41.2%).

These views may reflect broader concerns over integration, identity, and the capacity of local institutions to manage migration in socially cohesive ways. However, the sizable share of people who disagree also indicates that the region is not uniformly opposed to immigration.

PREFERRED POLICY APPROACHES TO FOREIGN WORKERS

The survey results show that the Western Balkans is divided on immigration policies, with a strong preference for strict controls. A majority of respondents (62.6%) support placing strict limits on the number of foreign workers. While a significant portion (56.5%) also agrees that foreign workers should be allowed to work as long as jobs are available, this is often tempered by a desire for regulation. The most polarising policy issue concerns immigration restrictions from outside the Western Balkans and the EU, with the public split between support (32.3%) and opposition (51.3%). The comparative data for all three policy approaches by WB6 is presented in Table 26, Annex 1.

Figure 18. Preferred policy approach
Q19. Thinking about people from other countries coming to work in your economy, which of the following policy directions do you personally support? (All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



Policy approach: Allow people to come work as long as there are jobs available

Public support for open labour migration, specifically the idea that people should be allowed to come and work as long as there are jobs available, varies widely across the Western Balkans, revealing differing public attitudes and levels of acceptance towards foreign labour.

Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo* show the highest levels of support, with 76.9%, 61.9% and 61.0% of respondents respectively agreeing with the statement.

Montenegro displays moderate support, at 52.6%, suggesting a cautious but generally favourable view of labour migration, potentially shaped by economic need.

On the other hand, North Macedonia and Serbia show the least support for foreign labour as long as there are jobs available, with around 43% in support of this statement. In Serbia's case, this is particularly notable given the large and growing number of work permits issued annually, which suggests a disconnect between public perception and economic reality.

Policy approach: Place strict limits on the number of foreign workers

Public opinion across the Western Balkans Six consistently shows a clear preference for placing strict limits on the number of foreign workers. In every WB6 surveyed, a majority of respondents support such restrictions, pointing to widespread caution, even in the face of growing economic demand for migrant labour.

Support ranges from 55.2% in Bosnia and Herzegovina to nearly 68% in North Macedonia and Albania, with Serbia (61.4%), Montenegro (58.1%), and Kosovo* (65.6%) also showing strong majorities in favour of limiting foreign worker inflows.

This widespread sentiment suggests that, while governments and businesses across the region are increasingly relying on foreign labour to address shortages, especially in construction, hospitality, and transportation, public attitudes have not necessarily kept pace with this shift.

Policy approach: Prohibit people coming here from outside the Western Balkans and EU

Public opinion across the Western Balkans Six shows a majority opposing the exclusive restriction of immigration to people from the EU and the Western Balkans.

In Albania (41.6% Yes / 51.8% No) and Kosovo* (40.9% Yes / 49.4% No), public opinion is more evenly split, but still leans against the idea of regionally exclusive migration. This suggests that while some support exists for prioritising regional ties, a larger share of the population is not in favour of broad exclusions based on origin. In North Macedonia (37.6% Yes / 43.6% No), Serbia (26.6% Yes / 49% No), Bosnia and Herzegovina (24.7% Yes / 59.1% No), and Montenegro (22.8% Yes / 55% No), the opposition is more pronounced.

Taken together, the data point to a regional majority that rejects rigid geographic restrictions on immigration. While some concern or preference for regional proximity may exist, most people across the Western Balkans Six appear to favour more inclusive or flexible migration policies rather than outright bans on non-regional migrants. This reflects a public stance that is more open and globally oriented than restrictive narratives might suggest.



CHAPTER E: EMIGRATION INTENTIONS, HUMAN SECURITY AND RESILIENCE

Migration has long shaped the WB6, influencing their population, economy, and politics. After the World War II, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia initially discouraged emigration, but by the mid-1960s, rising unemployment and Western Europe's demand for labour led to bilateral agreements that allowed workers from Yugoslavia to work abroad as *Gastarbeiter*. This sparked labour migration, especially from rural areas, sustaining local economies through remittances. The emigration persisted throughout the 90s, and since the 2010s, the outflow of young, educated people has intensified, creating a brain drain that threatens the region's development. By 2024, around 4.4 million people[23] born in the Western Balkans Six lived abroad, with an even larger diaspora when including later generations.

Building on this context, the findings of the SecuriMeter 2025 survey on emigration intentions, human security, and resilience across the WB6 provides valuable insights into how contemporary perceptions of security, economic opportunities, and governance continue to shape people's motivations to migrate from the region.

TRENDS IN EXTENDED STAYS ABROAD AMONG WB6 RESIDENTS

The data on extended stays abroad among the residents of the Western Balkans Six is presented in the figure below.

Figure 19. Extended stays abroad among WB6 residents
Q20. Have you so far stayed abroad for longer than 3 months?
(All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



The regional average shows that 75.7% of people responded "No" to having stayed abroad for an extended period, while 22.9% responded "Yes". This pattern is consistent across all WB6, with a

[23] United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. International Migrant Stock 2024. New York: United Nations, 2024. https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/content/international-migrant-stock

particularly high percentage of "No" responses in Kosovo* (83.5%) and North Macedonia (79.3%). Albania stands out as the only exception with a considerably lower "No" response rate of 65.3%, which corresponds to a higher "Yes" rate of 34.7%. This difference likely reflects Albania's history of emigration, particularly across the region for seasonal work and economic opportunities, making extended stays abroad more common for its citizens compared to the rest of the region.

The comparative data for the period 2023-2025, presented in Table 27, Annex 1, show a varied but generally declining trend over the last three years. The region experienced a dip in the percentage of people who have stayed abroad for longer than three months from 26.8% in 2023 to 20.5% in 2024, followed by a rebound to 22.9% in 2025.

Examining individual WB6, Albania consistently leads with the highest proportion of people staying abroad for extended periods, although there was a dip in 2024. Kosovo*, on the other hand, saw a significant drop from 41.6% in 2023 to under 17% in the following two years, indicating a substantial shift in movement or residency trends. Other WB6, such as Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia, show a slow but steady increase, while Serbia remains relatively stable at around the 20% mark. These variations likely reflect differing migration policies and social factors influencing WB6 extended stays abroad.

INTENTION OF MOVING ABROAD

Building on the finding that a significant number of people have already spent time abroad, the following SecuriMeter 2025 survey data explores whether citizens across the Western Balkans Six have future intentions to move abroad for living and working.

Figure 20. Intention of moving abroad
Q21. Do you intend to move abroad to live and work?
(All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



The data on intentions to move abroad for living and working across the Western Balkans Six from 2023 to 2025 shows a clear division between two main groups, those who intend to stay and those who have some intention or plan to move. The majority consistently belong to the first group, with around 68% to 71% of respondents each year stating that they do not want to move abroad. This strong preference to stay highlights a general attachment to their home economies despite various economic and social challenges.

This is most pronounced in Kosovo*, where the percentage of people who "do not want to move" has consistently risen, reaching 80.5% in 2025. Similarly, the 2025 data shows a large majority of the population in Serbia (71.3%), Albania (69.9%) and North Macedonia (67.7%) consistently expressing no intention of moving abroad.

On the other hand, the group of respondents who express some intention to move, whether vague or concrete, also represents a significant portion of the population. Those with vague plans to move have increased over the years, reaching 15% across the region in 2025, with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro showing high levels. When combining those who have already developed a plan and those who have a definite plan and have started taking action, their share exceeds 10% in most WB6. While smaller than the group intending to stay, this is still a substantial segment that signals a real potential for migration. Table 28 in Annex 1 presents the comparative data for 2023, 2024 and 2025 by WB6. According to the data, Bosnia and Herzegovina stands out with the lowest percentage of people who "do not want to move" (54.8%) in 2025 and the highest combined rate of those with emigration plans (41.7%). This trend has remained consistently high over the past three years.

Despite the majority's desire to remain, the Western Balkans Six long history of continuous emigration and recent brain drain demonstrate the importance of not overlooking these migration intentions. The presence of 12.3% of the population with concrete plans to move abroad could have profound implications for the region's labour markets, economic growth, and demographic balance. These trends suggest that while many prefer to stay, the intentions to move abroad remain a persistent and vital challenge for the region's policymakers.

PREFERRED DESTINATIONS FOR MIGRATION

When citizens of the Western Balkans Six consider moving abroad, their top choices are mostly in Western and Central Europe. The most popular destinations by a large margin are Germany and Austria, which together are chosen by 25.5% of respondents. This is followed by Switzerland at 15.2% and the USA at 11.9%. Overall, the data reveals a strong preference for economically stable and developed countries, which likely offer better employment prospects and higher living standards. The results also indicate a regional preference, with a smaller percentage of respondents choosing to move to another Western Balkans Six (4.3%).

Beyond the general regional trends, a closer examination of the data by each WB6 and year provides a more detailed picture of how specific individual WB6 contexts influence these choices. This comparative data is presented in Table 29, Annex 1.

The data on preferred destination countries for living and working abroad highlights a consistent pattern across the Western Balkans Six. In both 2024 and 2025, Germany and Austria stand out as the most desired destinations, Switzerland ranks second in preference across the region (15.2% in 2025), especially among people from North Macedonia and Kosovo*.

Figure 21. Preferred destinations for migration by economy and by year.
Q22 Which of the following countries would you choose to move for living and working?
(All respondents, n=6007, single answer, share of total %)



Beyond the German-speaking countries, the USA remains a significant destination, although its preference slightly declined from 12.3% in 2024 to 11.9% in 2025. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand consistently attract a modest share of interest (6.4% regionally), with Serbia and Montenegro, for example, showing above-average preference for these destinations. Other EU members, including Italy, Sweden, Slovenia and Croatia, receive a lower but stable level of interest. Preferences for countries such as Russia, China, or Gulf countries remain marginal, underlining the strong Western orientation of migration aspirations. Table 29 in Annex 1 presents the comparative data for 2024 and 2025 by WB6.

Individual WB6 differences further illustrate the nuances in migration preferences. Respondents from Montenegro and Albania show comparatively higher interest in the USA, while Kosovo* stands out with over 21% of respondents choosing Switzerland in 2025. Respondents from North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina exhibit firm interest in Germany and Austria, reinforcing regional patterns but with greater intensity. Most people choosing Italy or Greece as their destination are from Albania.

The intense interest in countries like Germany, Austria, and Switzerland reflects long-established migration corridors, often reinforced by family ties, labour demand, and well-developed diaspora communities. Given that 12.3% of respondents across most Western Balkans Six have already developed or begun acting on plans to move abroad, the consistency of preferred destinations indicates not only where people want to go, but where they realistically believe opportunities exist. These choices also highlight the ongoing challenge of brain drain, as many of these destination countries are known to attract skilled workers, healthcare professionals, and young people whose departure poses long-term risks to the demographic and economic stability of their home economies.

PERCEIVED HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC CAPACITY TO MEET BASIC NEEDS

While many individuals across the Western Balkans Six express a desire to remain in their home economies, their decisions are often shaped by the economic realities they face daily. Understanding the financial capacity of households, such as the ability to handle unexpected expenses, afford basic needs, or enjoy a modest holiday, provides critical context for interpreting both migration aspirations and overall well-being.

Across the WB6, public perceptions of economic capacity show significant variations, with most respondents feeling confident about meeting basic needs but less so about covering larger expenses. A substantial majority agrees that they can keep their home adequately warm and cool (62.6%) and afford a meal with meat or equivalent every second day (58.3%). However, confidence drops for more substantial purchases, with only 40.4% feeling they can afford to replace worn-out furniture, and even fewer feeling able to afford a one-week annual holiday (43.9%). The most pressing financial anxieties revolve around unexpected expenses and debt. A high percentage of the population disagrees that they have the capacity to face an unforeseen expense of approximately €1000 (37.0%) or avoid payment arrears on loans or bills (34.0%), highlighting widespread financial vulnerability and a lack of a strong financial safety net in the region.

Figure 22. Household economic resilience and living standards
Q23. From your point of view, does your household have sufficient economic capacity to afford the following? (All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



Household need: The capacity to face an unexpected expense of approximately €1000 without borrowing or relying on others

The data from 2025 reveals that only one-third (33.1%) of respondents across the Western Balkans Six feel confident that their household could manage an unexpected expense of €1,000 without borrowing or relying on others. This marks a slight decline from 36.7% in 2024, suggesting a worsening perception of financial resilience.

At the individual WB6 level, the picture is mixed but concerning. The comparative data for 2024 and 2025 by WB6 is presented in Table 30 in Annex 1.

Albania reports the highest share of financial insecurity in 2025, with 54.5% of respondents stating they could not cover such an expense independently, a slight increase from 53.3% in 2024. Similarly, North Macedonia shows a significant level of vulnerability, with nearly half (48.1%) unable to manage such an emergency cost in 2025.

In contrast, Kosovo* stands out with relatively higher levels of confidence: 50.1% of respondents agreed they could cover the expense, a marked improvement from 38.2% in 2024. This suggests a potential shift in perceived economic stability. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro also show some relative improvement or stability, with around one-third agreeing that they could manage the cost in 2025; however, these figures still reflect a limited financial cushion for many households.

Serbia presents a somewhat concerning trend. In 2025, only 25.2% of respondents said they could handle a €1,000 expense, a noticeable drop from 35.0% in 2024. Additionally, Serbia had the highest share of respondents who were uncertain ("hard to say") in 2025, at 38.7%, indicating rising insecurity or a lack of clarity about household finances.

Overall, the data shows that a majority of households across the region feel financially unprepared to deal with even relatively modest unexpected costs. The situation either stagnated or worsened in many WB6 between 2024 and 2025, reflecting persistent economic fragility and underlining pressures that may be driving migration or limiting well-being across the region.

When placed alongside average wage data for 2025, the responses regarding the capacity to cover an unexpected € 1,000 expense highlight just how financially vulnerable many households in the WB6 remain, even among those employed. The data on average net salary is given in Table 31, Annex 1.

In the WB6 with the highest average net salaries, Montenegro (€1,014 in May 2025[24]) and Serbia (€920 in May 2025[25]), only 32% and 25% of the population, respectively, can afford an unexpected expense of €1,000, which is approximately the amount of a one-month salary. The situation is even more strained in North Macedonia and Albania, where the average monthly net wages stood at around €744[26] and €662[27], respectively. In both, nearly half of the respondents (48.1% in North Macedonia, 54.5% in Albania) said they could not manage the €1000 expense, an amount that equates to 1.3 to 1.5 times the average monthly wage, putting it well out of reach for many. Even in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo*, where confidence was relatively higher (35.4% and 50.1% said they could afford it), the average wages, €805[28] and €639[29] respectively, suggest that any financial shock of this size would require serious financial planning or dipping into limited savings, if available. The data reveals that households across the region are not only operating on tight budgets, but that even those with average incomes remain one unexpected cost away from financial strain.

Household need: The capacity to afford paying for a one-week annual holiday away from home

The 2025 data shows that less than half of respondents across the Western Balkans Six (43.9%) feel they have the economic capacity to afford a one-week annual holiday away from home. This represents a slight decline compared to 2024, where 47.9% agreed they could afford such a holiday, indicating a modest decrease in discretionary spending power or financial confidence related to non-essential expenses.

At the individual WB6 level, the responses reveal varying degrees of economic capacity. The comparative data by WB6 is presented in Table 32 of Annex 1. Kosovo* stands out positively, with a majority (54.0%) of respondents in 2025 agreeing they could afford a one-week holiday, an increase

[24] Statistical Office of Montenegro (MONSTAT). " Average net salary in Montenegro for May 2025.." MONSTAT, 30 June 2025. https://www.monstat.org/cg/novosti.php?id=4517

[25] Statistical Office of Serbia. "Incomes." Statistical Office of Serbia. Accessed 19 August 2025. https://www.stat.gov.rs/sr-latn/oblasti/trziste-rada/zarade

[26] Statistical Office of North Macedonia. "Average monthly net salary per employee – May 2025." Accessed 19 August 2025. https://www.stat.mk/mk/stat/населење-и-услови-за-живеење/пазар-на-трудот/просечна-месечна-исплатена-нето-плата-по-вработен/просечна-месечна-исплатена-нето-плата-по-вработен-мај-2025-година/

[27] Albania's Institute of Statistics (INSTAT). Wage Statistics Q1 - 2025. Tirana: INSTAT, 11 June 2025. https://www.instat.gov.al/en/themes/labour-market-and-education/wages/publications/2025/wage-statistics-q1-2025/

[28] Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Average monthly net and gross earnings of persons in employment, May 2025. https://bhas.gov.ba/?lang=en

[29] Kosovo* Agency of Statistics (ASK). "Average monthly net pay – May 2025." Kosovo Agency of Statistics, 2025. https://ask.rks-gov.net/Releases/Details/8630

from 41.9% in 2024, suggesting improved financial optimism or stability. Similarly, North Macedonia and Albania show moderate levels of capacity, with 46.0% and 44.3%, respectively, affirming they can afford a holiday, although these figures reflect a slight decline from the previous year.

Conversely, Montenegro and Serbia report relatively lower confidence in affording such holidays, with only 34.9% and 42.3%, respectively, indicating they have the capacity. Montenegro, in particular, saw a notable drop from 45.2% in 2024, and a large share of respondents (39.4% in 2025) expressed uncertainty, highlighting financial fragility or unpredictability. Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina display similar patterns, with less than half of respondents able to confirm the capacity to afford a holiday, and significant shares of respondents expressing either disagreement or uncertainty.

Overall, the data highlights that a substantial portion of households in the Western Balkans Six still face constraints on discretionary spending, reflecting broader economic challenges that may limit quality-of-life improvements such as holidays. The declining or stagnant capacity to afford a one-week holiday underscores persistent financial pressures. It suggests that many households remain cautious or are unable to allocate resources for leisure and travel.

Household need: Capacity to be confronted with payment arrears (on mortgage or rental payments, utility bills, hire purchase instalments, or other loan payments)

Building on the broader concerns around financial resilience, the data on households' capacity to manage payment arrears, such as mortgage or rent, utility bills, higher purchase instalments, or other loan payments, further highlights economic fragility across the Western Balkans Six. In 2025, only about one-third (34.6%) of respondents in the region expressed confidence in their ability to meet such obligations, a slight decline compared to 40.6% in 2024. Meanwhile, a significant share of households either disagreed or were uncertain.

Looking more closely, the comparative data for 2024 and 2025 by WB6 presented in Table 33, Annex 1, shows that Kosovo* again stands out with a relatively stronger position, just over half (52.2%) of respondents believe they can handle payment arrears, marking an improvement from 46.5% the year before. Montenegro, however, shows a decline in confidence, with less than 30% agreeing they can manage arrears and a substantial 42.8% expressing uncertainty about their capacity.

Conversely, Albania's situation appears most precarious, with only 28.7% affirming their ability to cope with arrears and a majority (55.6%) unable to do so. North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina present a similar challenge, with roughly one-third of the population feeling capable of managing arrears, and a notable portion remaining unsure. Serbia's figures follow this pattern, with only around 33% confident in their financial capacity and a large percentage expressing uncertainty.

This continued struggle to manage arrears highlights the precarious nature of household finances across the Western Balkans Six, reinforcing the picture of widespread economic vulnerability and limited financial buffers within the region.

Household need: Capacity to afford a meal with meat, chicken, fish, or a vegetarian equivalent every second day

Continuing the evaluation of household economic capacity, the ability to afford a meal with meat, chicken, fish, or a vegetarian equivalent every second day serves as an essential measure of food security and quality of life in the Western Balkans Six. The comparative data by year and WB6 is provided in Table 34, Annex 1.

In 2025, most WB6 report that between 50% and 65% of respondents agree they can afford such meals regularly, indicating a moderate level of nutritional security for a majority of households. These figures show a relatively consistent pattern of moderate food affordability across the region.

When combining those who "disagree" and those who find it "hard to say", a clearer picture of economic vulnerability emerges.

In Montenegro and Kosovo*, this combined group accounts for nearly half the population (around 48% and 44%), highlighting considerable uncertainty or an inability to afford regular, nutritious meals. Serbia and North Macedonia also show notable shares of households in this vulnerable category, 44% and 39%, respectively. Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina fare somewhat better, although they still face around 35% and 38% of respondents, respectively, who are unable or unsure about affording such meals.

This grouping reveals that while a majority of households can secure regular meals with protein or vegetarian options, a significant portion either lacks this capacity or is uncertain, underscoring persistent economic fragility and food insecurity risks in the Western Balkans.

Household need: Ability to keep the home adequately warm in winter and cool in summer

The ability to maintain adequate indoor temperatures throughout the year, warm in winter and cool in summer, is a basic component of household well-being. In the Western Balkans, 62.6% of respondents in 2025 reported they could afford this standard, a slight decline from 65.6% in 2024. While this may appear to reflect a generally stable situation, a closer look reveals significant disparities across WB6 and growing vulnerability in some areas. The comparative data by year and WB6 is provided in Table 35, Annex 1.

In most WB6 a majority of households (over 60%) confirm they can maintain adequate indoor temperatures. Bosnia and Herzegovina (68.2%) and North Macedonia (68.8%) are at the top, followed closely by Kosovo* (64.7%) and Montenegro (60.5%). Serbia, at 59.4%, is just below the regional average.

However, when combining those who said they disagree or are unsure, the share of potentially vulnerable households becomes significant, especially in Albania, where 30% disagreed. Another 16% were uncertain, resulting in nearly 46% of respondents being unsure or unable to adequately heat or cool their homes. Serbia also has a concerning share in this group, with a combined 40.6%, followed closely by Montenegro (39.5%).

This data illustrates that while the majority of households across the Western Balkans Six manage to maintain adequate living conditions in terms of temperature, a considerable share, ranging from one-third to nearly half in some WB6, faces energy insecurity. This has broader implications for health, quality of life, and housing stability, particularly in a region with seasonal extremes and rising energy costs.

Household need: Have access to a car/van for personal use

Access to private transportation, such as a car or van, is not only a marker of household wealth but also a key enabler of mobility, employment opportunities, and access to services. The comparative data for 2024 and 2025 is given in Table 36, Annex 1.

In 2025, just over half of respondents in the Western Balkans Six (55.3%) said their household could afford personal vehicle access, a slight decrease from 57.3% in 2024.

At the individual WB6 level, Bosnia and Herzegovina stands out, with 66.2% of respondents in 2025 reporting access to a car or van, by far the highest share in the region. Montenegro and North Macedonia follow with 56.0% and 56.9%, respectively, while Kosovo* and Serbia report slightly lower figures, at 51.1% and 52.8%.

Albania remains the outlier on the other end of the spectrum, with fewer than half of respondents (48.9%) able to afford vehicle access, showing minimal improvement over 2024 (45.8%).

Taken together, this data shows that despite marginal progress in some WB6, access to personal vehicles remains out of reach for a significant portion of households in the Western Balkans Six.

Household need: Replacing worn-out furniture

When it comes to the ability to replace worn-out furniture, the data reveals more financial vulnerability across the Western Balkans. The comparative data for 2024 and 2025 is given in Table 37, Annex 1.

In 2025, only 40.4% of respondents in the region agreed that their household could afford to replace old or broken furniture, down slightly from 43.8% in 2024.

At the individual WB6 level, in Albania, 32.6% of respondents reported being able to replace furniture, while 55.1% disagreed, an increase from 48.4% in 2024, signalling a worsening situation. North Macedonia and Serbia also show hardship, with around 36% of the respondents affirming their capacity to afford replacement furniture, while the rest are either unsure or unable to afford it.

Even in WB6 with relatively higher agreement levels, like Bosnia and Herzegovina (49.4%) and Kosovo* (47.3%), the balance tilts heavily when combining “disagree” and “hard to say” responses. In Montenegro, although the share of those who agreed remained around 40%, those who could not or were uncertain about affording such a basic expense made up nearly 60% of respondents.

This indicator may seem less urgent compared to paying bills or affording food, but it speaks much about long-term material well-being and quality of life. Furniture replacement is often a deferred expense, and an inability to cover it suggests households are functioning in a state of persistent financial constraint. Combined with data from other dimensions of household capacity, this result highlights the chronic under-resourcing many families face, not just in emergencies but also in maintaining a dignified living environment.

ECONOMIC POWER AT THE PERSONAL LEVEL

While the previous question focused on household-level financial resilience, this one examines the individual's experience of economic well-being. By examining respondents’ ability to afford basic personal items and activities, we gain a more detailed understanding of how economic limitations affect not only survival but also quality of life and individual dignity.

The data from the SecuriMeter 2025 survey on personal economic capacity reveal a clear divide between people's ability to afford necessities versus leisure activities. A substantial majority of respondents feel they can afford essential items, such as having an internet connection (81.7%), replacing worn-out clothes (75.3%), and having two pairs of properly fitting shoes (76.4%).

Figure 23. Economic power to afford everyday essentials
Q24. Do you have the economic power to afford the following for your individual use?
(All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



However, confidence drops significantly when it comes to spending on social and leisure activities. Less than two-thirds of the population agrees they can afford to get together with friends or family for a drink or meal at least once a month (64.4%), and the numbers are even lower for those who can spend a small amount of money on themselves each week (56.2%) or have regular leisure activities (49.6%). These results suggest that while most people can meet their fundamental needs, a substantial portion of the population struggles to afford a better social life or engage in recreational pursuits.

Personal need: Having an internet connection

The 2025 data on individuals' ability to afford internet access paints a generally positive picture across the Western Balkans Six, with 81.7% of respondents saying they can afford this essential service, a slight improvement from 2024 (81.0%). This suggests widespread digital inclusion across the region, which is especially significant given the growing reliance on online services for communication, work, education, and daily life.

The comparative data by year and WB6 is given in Table 38, Annex 1.

All WB6 report similar results, with 80–85% of respondents affirming they can afford internet access. The most significant concern arises in Albania, where 17.5% of respondents reported they could not afford internet access, by far the highest in the region.

Overall, while internet access is broadly affordable for most individuals in the region, pockets of digital exclusion persist.

Personal need: Replacing worn-out clothes with some new ones

The data on the ability to afford replacing worn-out clothes with new ones reveal a relatively stable but modest level of economic security across the Western Balkans Six. In 2025, about 75.3% of respondents in the region stated they could afford to replace worn-out clothes, a slight decline from 77.1% in 2024. The comparative data by year and WB6 is presented in Table 39, Annex 1.

The majority of WB6 report similar levels of agreement, suggesting a broadly consistent perception of affordability. North Macedonia stands out with 80.3%, while Serbia and Montenegro report somewhat lower levels (72.1% and 72.5%, respectively). Notably, Kosovo* shows improvement, with the agreement rising from 66.5% in 2024 to 74.0% in 2025, possibly indicating a positive shift in economic capacity.

However, it is worth noting that disagreement rates hover around 7–10% in most WB6, and a non-negligible share of respondents remain uncertain, particularly in Serbia (22.0% answered "hard to say"). Overall, while the majority of citizens appear able to afford this basic personal necessity, the data also reflect a persistent economic fragility for a substantial minority across the region.

Personal need: Having two pairs of properly fitting shoes (including a pair of all-weather shoes)

The data on the ability to afford two pairs of properly fitting shoes, including an all-weather pair, reveals a generally positive but still somewhat limited financial capacity across the Western Balkans Six. In 2025, 76.4% of respondents across the region confirmed they can afford two pairs of shoes, a slight decline from 77.0% in 2024. This suggests a relatively stable situation, but still points to a significant minority of respondents who struggle with or are uncertain about meeting this basic need. Comparative data by year and WB6 is provided in Table 40, Annex 1.

At the individual WB6 level, the results are relatively consistent, with most of the WB6 reporting agreement levels between 73% and 80%. Bosnia and Herzegovina (80.1%) and Kosovo* (73.3%) are at opposite ends of the spectrum, showing strong levels of agreement in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina and a more modest result for Kosovo*. Serbia and Montenegro have the same proportion of people agreeing (74.9%), while North Macedonia (79.2%) and Albania (76.1%) are somewhere in the middle.

Overall, the data demonstrates that while many households across the region can afford essential items like properly fitting shoes, economic limitations still affect a sizable portion of the population, particularly in Albania and Kosovo*.

Personal need: Spending a small amount of money each week on myself

In the Western Balkans Six, the ability to spend a small amount of money each week on personal needs remains a significant indicator of financial well-being. In 2025, only 56.2% of respondents across the region confirmed they could afford this small weekly expenditure, showing a decrease from 59.2% in 2024. The comparative data by year and WB6 is presented in Table 41, Annex 1.

At the individual WB6 level, Albania stands out with 40.5% of respondents unable to spend money on themselves weekly, the highest rate of financial constraint in the region. This suggests that many individuals in Albania are struggling with basic financial security. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and North Macedonia report over 40% of respondents who either can't afford or are uncertain about spending small amount of money on themselves, further indicating widespread economic hardship.

Overall, although the majority in the Western Balkans agree they can spend a small amount of money each week on themselves, the data shows that a significant portion of the population remains financially constrained, particularly in Albania, where the inability to afford even small personal expenses highlights economic vulnerability across the region.

Personal need: Having regular leisure activities

The ability to afford regular leisure activities, an indicator of personal well-being and financial ease, declined across the Western Balkans Six in 2025. Regionally, 49.6% of respondents reported that they could afford such activities, down from 55.2% in 2024, continuing the trend of reduced discretionary spending. The comparative data by year and WB6 is given in Table 42, Annex 1.

At the individual WB6 level, Albania stands out with the lowest share of agreement, where only 26.6% stated they could afford leisure activities and nearly 60% disagreed, highlighting significant economic constraints. In contrast, all other Western Balkans Six reported that at least half of respondents could afford regular leisure activities, with agreement rates ranging between 51% and 59%. This suggests that while leisure remains within reach for many, a substantial portion of the population, often more than a quarter, still cannot afford them.

The overall trend points to increasing limitations on quality-of-life expenditures for many households across the region, with economic fragility persisting even in areas once considered relatively stable.

Personal need: Getting together with friends/family for a drink/meal at least once a month

Regarding the ability to gather with friends or family for a drink or meal at least once a month, the 2025 results show a slight decline in the proportion of people across the Western Balkans Six who feel financially able to do so. According to the data, 64.4% of respondents reported that they could afford this activity, compared to 67.8% in 2024. While a majority across the region still manages to cover the cost of occasional social outings, the downward trend suggests growing financial constraints. The comparative data by year and WB6 is presented in Table 43, Annex 1.

At the individual WB6 level, Montenegro (69.3%), North Macedonia (68.0%), and Bosnia and Herzegovina (68.6%) reported the highest shares of agreement, although Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced a decline from 74.8% in the previous year. Kosovo* also saw a decline, with 62.6% of respondents in 2025 agreeing they could afford such gatherings, down from 66.1% in 2024, and the highest share (27.7%) saying they were uncertain, indicating increased economic insecurity.

In Serbia, the share of respondents agreeing fell from 68.9% to 60.1%, accompanied by a rise in both disagreement and uncertainty, reflecting more widespread financial difficulty. Albania reported the lowest level of agreement at 57.7%, along with the highest share of people (33.5%) saying they could not afford to meet friends or family monthly, a significant increase from 23.9% in 2024.

Overall, the 2025 data on personal-level economic capacity in the WB6 reveal a mixed but generally modest picture of well-being. While basic digital and material needs appear to be broadly met for many, for a sizable portion of the population even modest personal expenses are unaffordable. The data highlights a persistent disparity between meeting basic needs and accessing the small yet meaningful aspects of daily life that contribute to social inclusion, personal dignity, and overall well-being.

USE OF INSURANCE POLICIES

An analysis of insurance policy ownership across the WB6 reveals that while public social safety nets are widely utilised, private insurance remains far less common. The data reveal varying levels of insurance policy adoption across different Western Balkans Six, reflecting diverse socio-economic conditions and public policy frameworks.

Figure 24. Insurance policy coverage
Q25. Which types of insurance policy do you have at present?
(All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



Public health insurance coverage remains high across most WB6, led by North Macedonia (88%) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (87%). Albania and Montenegro also maintain strong coverage above 82%. Kosovo*, however, is a clear outlier with only 5.9% coverage in 2025, as its 2014 health insurance law has yet to be implemented. Private health insurance is limited, with the highest uptake in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, while Albania and Kosovo* lag behind.

Life insurance coverage varies between 10% and 30% across the region, with Montenegro showing higher rates while Kosovo* and Albania have the lowest (1.6–7.9%).

Public pension coverage is highest in North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Albania (above 60%), while Kosovo*'s coverage remains significantly lower.

Private pension participation is modest across the region, generally below 10%, except in North Macedonia, where it reaches about 16% in 2025. This higher rate reflects the North Macedonia's three-pillar pension structure, which includes a traditional public scheme (Pillar I), a mandatory private component managed by licensed pension funds (Pillar II), and a voluntary private savings option (Pillar III). Despite this advanced framework, public understanding of the system remains limited, as many contributors view the mandatory Pillar II as purely private, blurring the line between public and private coverage.

Disaster home insurance, covering risks such as fires, floods, and earthquakes, is vital for protecting homeowners from major financial losses. According to the SecuriMeter 2025, the use of disaster home insurance varies across the Western Balkans Six, ranging from 2.5% to 20.4%.

Car insurance appears to be one of the most widely held types of insurance across the Western Balkans Six. In most, over 40% of respondents reported having car insurance in 2025, with the highest rates observed in Bosnia and Herzegovina (64.0%), Montenegro (56.4%) and Serbia (53.9%). These figures are closely connected to the number of registered passenger cars per thousand inhabitants, which reflects vehicle ownership levels across the region. The high car insurance coverage is primarily the result of it being mandatory across the region, as is standard practice for motor vehicle use.

Casco insurance, which provides voluntary coverage for damages to one's own vehicle, is far less common than basic mandatory car insurance across the Western Balkans Six. In 2025, only a small share of respondents reported having casco coverage, probably due to its higher cost and the fact that it is not legally required. The low uptake of casco insurance, reported by only 14% of respondents in the Western Balkans Six, aligns with the financial constraints highlighted in earlier questions, indicating that many households cannot afford to prioritise optional coverage due to limited disposable income.

Based on this data, the conclusion is that the Western Balkans Six is a region where financial protection largely depends on public systems, with significant financial limitations and other barriers still restricting the broader development of private insurance markets. Consequently, insurance types that are mandatory by law enjoy widespread acceptance, while those that are voluntary or more niche are held by only a small portion of the population.

However, actual insurance usage rates differ from the reported figures in the survey, largely due to varying levels of financial literacy and confusion or lack of differentiation between types of insurance policies.

SATISFACTION WITH LOCAL LIVING CONDITIONS

While financial constraints continue to shape many dimensions of well-being in the Western Balkans Six, people's perceptions of local services, such as healthcare, education, childcare, and elderly care, offer valuable insight into the lived realities behind economic data. In addition, the quality and accessibility of housing, transport infrastructure, air and water, and other basic amenities play a crucial role in shaping people's overall quality of life.

When assessing satisfaction with public services, citizens of the Western Balkans Six express most dissatisfaction with the elderly care (43.6%) and availability and affordability of housing and rents (42.5%).

Figure 25. Satisfaction with local living conditions
Q26. Could you please tell how satisfied you are with each of the following in your place of living?
(All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



The quality of transport infrastructure and health services also receive high dissatisfaction rates at 41.8% and 39.2%, respectively. In contrast, the highest satisfaction is reported for clean and affordable drinking water (50.2% satisfied) and childcare (39.2% satisfied).

The assessment below captures how satisfied respondents are with these core elements in their cities and towns, revealing not only what is available but also how well it meets the needs and expectations of the population. The comparative data on public satisfaction with each of these public services by year and WB6 are given in Table 44 throughout Table 51, Annex 1.

Health services

Public satisfaction with health services in the Western Balkans Six remains mixed, reflecting persistent challenges in healthcare delivery across the region. In 2025, around 39% of respondents across the Western Balkans Six reported dissatisfaction (combining "completely" and "mostly dissatisfied"), while 30.2% expressed satisfaction. This represents a modest improvement compared to previous years (42.7% dissatisfied in 2024, 46.3% in 2023), suggesting some gradual progress in the perceived quality or accessibility of healthcare.

Kosovo* stands out with the highest level of satisfaction with healthcare services (36.8%), compared to other Western Balkans Six, where satisfaction levels range between 25% and 32%. One possible explanation for this difference may lie in the findings from the previous question, which revealed that less than 6% of population of Kosovo* has either public or private health insurance, the lowest rate in the region. In the absence of health insurance coverage, many citizens of Kosovo* may turn to private healthcare services, which are often perceived as being more efficient and having higher quality, potentially contributing to greater satisfaction. In contrast, Albania and Serbia report the highest levels of dissatisfaction with healthcare services.

In North Macedonia dissatisfaction level is among the lowest in 2025 (38%), while its satisfaction rate is also comparatively modest (31.4%). This may reflect an overall perception of stagnation in health service quality, as most respondents fall into the "neutral" or "mostly satisfied" categories.

Serbia and Montenegro, meanwhile, show relatively consistent figures over time, with minor year-on-year variations. Their moderately high satisfaction rates suggest some public confidence in the health system, although the data still indicate room for improvement.

Education

Satisfaction with education services across the Western Balkans Six in 2025 shows only minor shifts compared to the previous year, with some notable exceptions. Overall, the regional satisfaction rate stands at 35.9%, a slight decrease from 36.1% in 2024, while dissatisfaction has decreased modestly from 29.6% to 28.4%. This relative stability suggests that perceptions of education quality and accessibility have mainly remained consistent across the region, despite ongoing efforts to improve the sector.

On the positive side, Kosovo* continues to lead the region with the highest satisfaction rate at 43.7%, maintaining a slight but steady improvement compared to the previous year. North Macedonia stands out with a notable increase in satisfaction, rising from 29.0% in 2024 to 37.3% in 2025. Albania also shows progress, with satisfaction increasing from 24.0% to 27.6%.

On the other hand, Bosnia and Herzegovina faces a significant decline in satisfaction, dropping from 42.2% in 2024 to 34.9% in 2025. Montenegro and Serbia both experience modest decrease, with satisfaction rates falling from 37.3% to 35.1% and from 41.4% to 37.1%, respectively, highlighting ongoing challenges in maintaining or improving education services amid economic or social pressures.

These contrasting trends highlight areas of progress alongside ongoing challenges in the Western Balkans Six.

Childcare

Satisfaction with childcare services across the Western Balkans Six in 2025 presents a mixed picture, with developments varying significantly between WB6. On the regional level, satisfaction remains relatively stable, with 39.2% of respondents expressing satisfaction, a slight dip from 39.3% in 2024. Dissatisfaction also remains nearly unchanged at 24.6%, compared to 24.9% the previous year. These minor changes at the regional level mask more notable shifts at the individual WB6 level.

North Macedonia shows the most significant improvement in satisfaction with childcare services, increasing from 31.8% in 2024 to 40.7% in 2025. This substantial rise suggests growing public confidence, possibly driven by improvements in service quality.

Albania also records progress, with satisfaction increasing from 24.5% to 33.4%. However, despite the improvement, Albania still reports the lowest satisfaction rate in the region, pointing to persistent gaps in service provision or quality that need to be addressed. In contrast, Bosnia and Herzegovina shows a notable decline in satisfaction, dropping from 45.2% in 2024 to 34.1% in 2025, which may signal growing concerns over accessibility, affordability, or service standards in the childcare sector.

Kosovo* and Montenegro both experience slight declines in satisfaction. Kosovo*, while still reporting the highest satisfaction rate in the region at 44.9%, is down from 47.4% in 2024. Montenegro also shows a slight decrease, from 44.3% to 42%, suggesting a possible stagnation in service improvements.

Serbia remains relatively stable, with satisfaction at 40.4% in 2025, compared to 42.5% in 2024. Although there is a minor decline, the change is minimal and indicates overall consistency in public perception of childcare services.

Elderly care

In 2025, public satisfaction with elderly care services in the Western Balkans Six remains low overall, but trends vary across the region. While the regional average shows only a slight improvement, some WB6 report encouraging progress, while others continue to struggle or see little change.

The situation is most noticeable in Albania, where over 65% of respondents report being dissatisfied and only 11% express satisfaction. While this represents an improvement compared to 2024, when dissatisfaction peaked at 73%, the figures highlight a need for substantial investment and reform in this area. Kosovo* exhibits a notable improvement in public perception, with satisfaction levels rising and dissatisfaction decreasing significantly, an encouraging development that distinguishes it from most of the region.

In North Macedonia, the situation remains unchanged, and the overall public sentiment is still largely negative, suggesting limited progress. Serbia and Montenegro have experienced slight declines. These trends suggest stagnation rather than deterioration. Bosnia and Herzegovina stands out for the most significant decline among the WB6 surveyed. Compared to the previous year, satisfaction has decreased, indicating a decline in how elderly care services are perceived.

Air quality and pollution in my city/town

In 2025, public satisfaction with air quality in the Western Balkans Six shows modest but positive progress. Kosovo* and Montenegro lead with over 40% of respondents expressing satisfaction, while Albania records the largest improvement, from 22.5% in 2024 to nearly 40% in 2025.

North Macedonia shows modest but steady improvement in air quality satisfaction, reflecting sustained efforts over time. Bosnia and Herzegovina sees a slight decline. Serbia remains the lowest in the region, with only 23% satisfied, indicating ongoing air pollution challenges and unmet public expectations. Environmental experts have also acknowledged the overall improvement in air quality.

According to the European Commission[30], which monitors both the environmental conditions and the alignment of Western Balkans Six with the EU acquis, progress has been made; however, considerable efforts are still needed.

Clean and affordable drinking water at my place

Access to clean and affordable drinking water across the Western Balkans Six has shown a moderate overall improvement, although significant disparities persist. Regionally, just over half of respondents (50.2%) report being satisfied with the availability and affordability of drinking water, an increase from 45.7% the previous year.

North Macedonia and Montenegro report the highest satisfaction rates, both at approximately 59%, continuing their relatively stable performance in this area. Kosovo* records a notable improvement, with satisfaction increasing from 39.3% in 2024 to 51% in 2025. Bosnia and Herzegovina also maintains positive results, with satisfaction of 56.1% in 2025. In contrast, Albania remains with the lowest results despite showing the most significant year-on-year improvement. Satisfaction increased from 11% in 2024 to 26.8% in 2025, while dissatisfaction, although reduced, remains the highest in the region at 55.1%. This suggests that while public perception has improved, significant challenges persist.

Serbia's results remain essentially unchanged. Satisfaction levels are at 49% in 2025, similar to 48% the previous year, with no significant shift in the share of dissatisfied respondents.

Availability and affordability of housing and rents

In 2025, public satisfaction with the availability and affordability of housing and rents in the Western Balkans Six remains low, however, the overall trend indicates a moderate improvement. At the regional level, satisfaction rose to 23.9%, up from 20.9% in 2024, while dissatisfaction decreased from 48% to 42.5%. Despite this, housing remains one of the most pressing concerns for citizens across the region.

In 2025, satisfaction with housing conditions increases in Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Kosovo*, indicating a gradual improvement in public perception. Bosnia and Herzegovina is the only WB6 to record a slight decline, though the change is marginal and reflects stagnation rather than a significant drop. Despite this, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia continue to have the highest share of satisfied respondents, suggesting relatively better housing conditions compared to the rest of the region. In contrast, Albania stands out for its very poor satisfaction rate of just 6.3%, highlighting persistent challenges in housing availability and affordability.

Quality of transport infrastructure (please take into consideration the overall transport: public transport, quality of roads, railways, airports)

Public satisfaction with the quality of transport infrastructure across the Western Balkans Six shows mixed results, with some WB6 demonstrating progress while others face stagnation or decline. At the regional level, 27% of respondents express satisfaction, up slightly from 24.6% in 2024, suggesting a mild overall improvement. However, dissatisfaction remains high at 41.8%, highlighting ongoing challenges in transport infrastructure development and maintenance.

In 2025, Albania, Kosovo*, and Serbia report the highest satisfaction with transport, ranging from 30% to 36%. Albania leads with the largest year-on-year increase, from 22.5% to 35.8%, reflecting public recognition of improvements in road maintenance, public transport, and infrastructure. Kosovo* and Serbia also show satisfaction at 33.2% and 30.9%, respectively. In contrast, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, and Montenegro lag behind, with satisfaction between 15.4% and 24.3%. Declines

[30] European Commission. Status of Environment and Climate in the Western Balkans. Brussels: Publications Office of the European Union, June 2025. https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/88112f55-b904-11ef-91ed-01aa75ed71a1/language-en

in both satisfaction and dissatisfaction in Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia may indicate public disengagement or unmet expectations, while Montenegro shows little change. Overall, the region displays uneven progress, emphasizing the need for sustained investment, transparency, and communication in transport development.

HOUSEHOLD SPENDING ON HEALTH IN RELATION TO INCOME

The data on out-of-pocket health expenses as a share of household income reveal important differences across the Western Balkans Six. On average, nearly half of households (49.5%) spend 1-10% of their income on healthcare, while over a quarter (27.4%) spend more than 10%, highlighting a significant financial burden. Serbia and Kosovo* have the highest shares of households spending over 10% (34.0% and 32.3%), suggesting reliance on private care or limited public coverage. In contrast, Bosnia and Herzegovina reports the lowest share of households spending more than 10% (20.5%) and the highest share spending less than 1% (18.9%), indicating stronger public insurance. Overall, these figures demonstrate persistent challenges in ensuring affordable healthcare across the region.

Figure 26. Household spending on health in relation to income
Q27 Can you please give us an estimated amount of health expenses (including doctor and medication) your household had to spend out of pocket as a percentage of the total income of your household last year?
(All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



PUBLIC CONCERN OVER ABILITY TO AFFORD HEALTHCARE COSTS

In 2025, a large share of the Western Balkans Six population remains worried about healthcare costs, especially for serious illness or accidents. Overall, 77.2% of respondents are concerned (42.8% very worried + 34.4% somewhat worried) about major medical expenses, compared to 53.8% (17.7% very worried + 36.1% somewhat worried) for routine healthcare and medication. While most people feel financially secure for everyday medical needs, these figures reveal widespread anxiety and a lack of adequate protection against major health events. However, there are notable differences between Western Balkans Six and between types of healthcare needs.

Figure 27. Public concern over the ability to afford healthcare costs
Q28. Please tell me how worried or not you are right now about not being able to pay medical costs in each of the following situations, based on your current financial situation?
(All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



The comparative data for public concern over the ability to afford routine healthcare and medication and for healthcare and medication in the event of a serious illness or accident by year and WB6 are presented in Table 52 and Table 53 in Annex 1.

Routine healthcare and medication

When it comes to routine healthcare and medication, levels of concern are somewhat lower compared to emergencies.

North Macedonia stands out with the most optimistic outlook, where 58% of respondents report being "not too worried" or "not worried at all."

Similarly, Bosnia and Herzegovina shows a relatively balanced distribution of responses, with fewer people expressing extreme worry. On the other hand, Serbia and Montenegro report the highest levels of concern in the region, with around 59% of respondents stating they are "very" or "somewhat" worried about meeting routine healthcare expenses.

Healthcare and medication in the event of a serious illness or accident

Public concern grows sharply when people are asked about their ability to afford healthcare in the event of a serious illness or accident. Across all WB6, the share of respondents who are worried rises significantly. Albania records the highest levels of anxiety, with more than 88% expressing concern, out of whom 63% say they are "very worried". The other Western Balkans Six all show worry, around 70% to 80% of the population say they are "very worried" or "somewhat worried".

These results indicate a broad regional pattern, while people are somewhat less anxious about routine medical expenses, the financial risk posed by more serious health needs remains a significant source of insecurity. Despite minor year-to-year improvements in some cases, the overall findings suggest limited progress in reducing the out-of-pocket healthcare burden, particularly in situations involving serious illnesses or emergency care.



CHAPTER F: TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS AND PERSONAL TRUST

Trust is the foundation of a functioning society, enabling people to cooperate, strengthening institutions, and supporting democracy. It exists as personal trust (belief in others' honesty and reliability) and institutional trust (confidence in government, police, and media), with both types reinforcing each other and promoting social stability.

According to the OECD, rebuilding institutional trust requires transparency, fairness, citizen engagement, and better public services. Trust both supports and results from good governance.

Building on this understanding of trust, the following section analyses how citizens in the region perceive institutional performance and integrity.

IMPACT OF PUBLIC INSTITUTION PAYMENTS ON COST OF LIVING

The relationship between trust and economic outcomes is not abstract. Citizens' perceptions of how institutions perform and how they treat people directly shape economic behaviour, tax morale, and willingness to participate in formal systems.

Figure 28. Impact of public institution payments on cost of living (%)
Q29. If you take into account all the costs you pay to public institutions in your economy, including taxes, administrative fees, and service charges, by how much would you estimate these increase your cost of living, in percentage terms?
(All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



Across the region, 70.3% of respondents estimate that public institutions increase their cost of living by up to 30%, specifically, 14.6% report less than 10%, 31.0% report 10-20%, and 24.7% report 21-30%. This majority view suggests that most citizens perceive a moderate, but not excessive, financial burden.

Comparing these perceptions to the actual fiscal burden (tax revenue as a share of GDP) shows a clear link between the two. According to the data presented in the table below, respondents who believe public institutions increase their cost of living by up to 30% show a moderately strong negative correlation (−0.60) with tax revenue as a share of GDP, meaning higher-tax economies have fewer people perceiving low costs. Conversely, the share of respondents who perceive the burden as over 50% correlates moderately positively (+0.44) with actual tax revenue, indicating that higher-tax economies see more people feeling heavily burdened.

Table 5. Breakdown of direct taxes and social contributions by WB6

		SecuriMeter: Up to 30%	SecuriMeter: Over 50%	Total Tax Revenue (% GDP)	Direct Taxes (% GDP)	Social Contributions (% GDP)	Main Sources
WB6	Albania	76.1%	2.9%	26.9%	~21.8%	6.2%	ALTAX 2024
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	70.8%	4.1%	37.8%	~17.4%	14.5%	ALTAX 2024, IMF 22/52
	Kosovo*	75.8%	3.7%	25.8%	~14.8%	10.0%	ALTAX 2024, Kosovo* MoF
	Montenegro	71.6%	5.2%	37.5%	~18.9%	8.0%	ALTAX 2024, IMF WP 22/239
	North Macedonia	67.2%	7.8%	27.9%	~25.5%	10.2%	ALTAX 2024, World Bank 2021
	Serbia	60.3%	10.7%	39.0%	~24.3%	13.0%	ALTAX 2024, IMF 22/91, Serbia Business

In Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where tax revenue exceeds 37% of GDP, citizens are more likely to feel heavily burdened, while in Albania and Kosovo*, with tax-to-GDP ratios below 27%, more respondents perceive the public burden as relatively light.

A closer examination of individual Western Balkans Six reveals how individual contexts shape the relationship between perceived and actual tax burdens.

In Serbia, just 60.3% of respondents believe public costs account for up to 30% of their living expenses, the lowest in the region, while 10.7% feel costs exceed 50%, the highest share. With tax revenue at 39% of GDP, Serbia has the highest real tax burden in the WB6, suggesting alignment between high objective taxes and perceived burden.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, 70.8% say public costs are up to 30%, while only 4.1% believe the burden exceeds 50%. Despite this relatively moderate perception, Bosnia and Herzegovina has an actual tax revenue of 37.8% of GDP, among the highest in the region.

In Montenegro, 71.6% of respondents perceive public costs as up to 30%, and only 5.2% see them as exceeding 50%. With a tax burden of 37.5% of GDP, public discontent remains relatively low.

North Macedonia presents a paradox While its actual tax revenue is a moderate 27.9% of GDP, 7.8% of citizens feel that public costs exceed 50%, the second highest share in the region. Although, 67.2% still perceive the burden to be up to 30%.

Albania records the most favourable public perception, 76.1% believe public institutions raise their cost of living by no more than 30%, and only 2.9% think it is above 50%. With tax revenue at 26.9% of GDP, Albania also has one of the lowest real burdens. Here, public sentiment largely aligns with the fiscal reality.

Kosovo* mirrors Albania in its public perception with 75.8% of respondents report costs of up to 30%, and just 3.7% believe they exceed 50%. With the lowest tax revenue in the region (25.8% of GDP), this suggests a consistent relationship between low taxation and low perceived burden.

PERCEIVED CHANGE IN QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS OVER THE PAST FIVE YEARS

Beyond perceptions of tax burden, citizens' views on the quality and performance of public institutions in managing the economy offer another crucial lens for understanding trust in government. The majority of respondents across the region (42.1%) believe that the quality and performance of public institutions have remained about the same over the past five years, while 32% think they have worsened and 21.7% perceive an improvement.

Figure 29. Perceived change in the quality and performance of public institutions over the past five years
Q30. In your view, how has the quality and performance of public institutions in your economy changed over the past five (5) years?
(All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



Serbia leads with the most negative view on institutional performance, where 48.3% of respondents feel institutions have worsened, yielding a net score of -30.6% ("Better and Much better" – "Worse and Much worse").

Bosnia and Herzegovina follows with a net score of -24.8%, as 38.1% perceive institutional decline and 13.3% perceive improvement. North Macedonia also shows pessimism, with a net score of -20.5%. In contrast, Montenegro has a more balanced view, with a net score of +1.9%, as well as Albania with net score of +1.7%. Kosovo* stands out with the highest optimism in the region, reporting a net score of +10.6%.

Overall, the regional net score is -10.3%, reflecting a generally negative outlook on public institutions, with Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia showing disillusionment, while Kosovo*, Albania and Montenegro show moderate optimism.

PUBLIC VIEWS ON FAIRNESS AND EQUALITY IN INSTITUTIONAL TREATMENT

When asked whether public institutions treat all people equally, regardless of social status, political views, or ethnic background, almost half of respondents across the region (48.8%) gave a negative response, while only 24.1% responded positively. The responses varied significantly among the Western Balkans Six.

Figure 30. Public views on fairness and equality in institutional treatment by economy

Q31. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: “Public institutions in my economy treat all people equally, regardless of their social status, political views, or ethnic background.”
(All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



Kosovo* is the only WB6 with a net-positive perception of equal treatment by public institutions (+9.5%), with 37.7% agreeing versus 28.2% disagreeing that public institutions treat people equally. This aligns with the highest reported improvement in institutional quality (29.7%) over the past five years. However, a closer look reveals an ethnic divide: while 28% of the ethnic Albanian majority feels public institutions treat all citizens equally, 55% of the Serb minority disagrees. This suggests that institutional reforms may not yet be perceived as fair or inclusive by all communities. Additionally, only 2% of respondents "completely agree" with the statement of equal treatment, signalling lingering scepticism even among those who generally agree.

In contrast, all other WB6 show negative net agreement score, indicating that the majority of their citizens disagree with the statement that public institutions threat people equally.

The percentage of respondents who disagree with the statement is highest in Serbia (57.9%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (57.4%) and North Macedonia (55.5%), and slightly lower in Albania (47.8%) and Montenegro (46.0%).

MAPPING SOCIAL TRUST IN THE WESTERN BALKANS SIX

Trust is a foundational element of social capital, shaping not only personal relationships but also the legitimacy of institutions and the potential for societal cohesion. SecuriMeter survey explores this by asking citizens across the Western Balkans Six how much they trust various categories of people, from family and neighbours to strangers and people of other ethnic or religious backgrounds.

According to the results, respondents’ trust varies depending on how close the trusted person is to the respondent. Hence, over 77% of the respondents trust their family, 72% trust people they know personally, 64% trust their neighbours, 51% trust people of other religion, almost 48% trust people of other nationality, 41% trust people who work in administration, and only 25.5% trust people they meet for the first time.

The comparative data on trust in different social groups by year and WB6 are presented in Table 54 throughout Table 60, Annex 1.

Figure 31. Trust in different social groups
Q32. I would like to ask you how much you trust people from various groups. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from this group completely, somewhat, now very much or not at all?
(All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



Trust in family

In all WB6, family continues to be the most trusted social unit. Almost all respondents in Albania (99.2%) and Kosovo* (98.4%) express trust in their family members, with similarly high levels in North Macedonia (94.5%), Serbia (85.7%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (83.9%), and Montenegro (83.9%). These results point to the region's strong tradition of family-based trust.

Trust in neighbourhood

Neighbourhood trust is a key indicator of community cohesion, showing how citizens perceive their immediate social environment. At the regional level, trust in neighbours remains relatively stable, averaging around 64%. However, notable differences persist among the WB6.

Bosnia and Herzegovina reports the highest level of neighbourhood trust at 74%, followed by Serbia (69%) and North Macedonia (67%), where levels remain largely unchanged compared to 2024. Montenegro shows positive increase, from 62.6% in 2024 to 70.5% in 2025, suggesting gradual strengthening of local social ties.

The most significant change is observed in Kosovo*, where trust in neighbours declined from 78.4% in 2024 to 64.7% in 2025.

Meanwhile, Albania remains an outlier, with consistently low levels of neighbourhood trust (39.5% in 2024 and 38.5% in 2025). This suggests that persistent challenges remain in building community-level social capital, despite improvements in other areas of trust.

Trust in personal acquaintances

On average, over 72% of the people across the Western Balkans Six trust their personal acquaintances.

Serbia and Montenegro remain with the highest levels of such trust, even though these numbers have declined compared to the previous year. In Serbia, the share of those who trust their acquaintances fell from 80% in 2024 to 74.0% in 2025, while in Montenegro it declined from 77.7% to 73.6%.

In North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the changes were more modest. Trust in acquaintances decreased slightly, from 71.3% to 69.5% in North Macedonia and from 75.2% to 73.5% in Bosnia and Herzegovina, indicating a relatively stable level of confidence in personal networks. Kosovo* followed a similar trajectory, with a mild decline from 75.5% to 74.4%, reinforcing the overall regional pattern of small but consistent decline.

Albania stands out as the only Western Balkans Six to record an increase, albeit a marginal one, with trust in personal acquaintances rising from 69.3% in 2024 to 69.9% in 2025.

Overall, the data point to a region where trust among acquaintances remains high and relatively stable.

Trust in administrative workers

Trust in administrative workers, an indicator of how citizens perceive everyday interactions with public institutions, remains significantly lower than interpersonal trust across the WB6. This suggests that while people continue to place confidence in those within their personal networks, attitudes towards institutional representatives are more cautious and often shaped by broader perceptions of public sector performance and efficiency.

Among the WB6, Serbia experienced the sharpest decline in trust, dropping from 45.1% in 2024 to 35.8% in 2025.

In contrast, Albania recorded the most notable improvement. Trust in administrative workers rose from 28.9% to 36.7%. A similar, though more moderate, positive trend was observed in Kosovo*, where trust increased from 44.7% to 46.9%

Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina all recorded relatively stable levels of trust in administrative workers, with only modest year-on-year changes. In Montenegro, trust rose slightly from 43.5% to 45.3%, while in North Macedonia it increased from 38.4% in 2024 to 40.8% in 2025, both indicating a slow but positive shift in citizens' perceptions of public administration. Bosnia and Herzegovina showed almost no change, with trust remaining around 42.2% in 2025, up only marginally from 41.6% the year before. Together, these results point to a pattern of gradual, if limited, improvement in institutional trust, suggesting a degree of stability in how citizens view the performance of public services.

Trust in strangers

Among all forms of trust measured in the Western Balkans Six, trust in strangers remains consistently the lowest, which shows people are cautious towards unfamiliar individuals. In 2025, levels of trust in strangers across the region range from 8% to 32%.

In Albania, only 8.4% of people express trust strangers, up slightly from 7.1% in 2024, yet still far below regional average. This suggests that in Albania trust tends to stay within close circles of family and friends.

By contrast, Kosovo* records the highest level of trust in strangers in the region, increasing from 28.2% to 32.4%. This steady rise points to a more open social environment and a growing readiness to engage with people outside immediate circles. Similar levels are observed in Montenegro, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where trust in strangers averages around 28%. North Macedonia, with 26.3%, shows little change from the previous year, suggesting that trust patterns remain largely unchanged.

Overall, while there are small positive movements in some WB6, trust in strangers remains low across the region.

Trust in people of another religion or nationality

Trust in people of different faiths and nationalities provides an important perspective on the ongoing process of building understanding across communities.

In 2025, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina stand out as regional leaders in inter-group trust. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, trust in people of another religion reaches 65%, while trust in those of another nationality is nearly the same at 64.8%. Similarly, Montenegro records high levels of mutual confidence, with 60.4% expressing trust in people of another religion and 60.3% in those of another nationality.

Serbia also reports comparatively high levels of inter-group trust, with 56.5% of citizens expressing trust in people of another religion and 56.9% in those of another nationality. Both indicators do not show significant change compared to 2024, which points to a consistent, though cautious, openness to diversity.

By contrast, North Macedonia continues to report the lowest levels of inter-group trust in the region. Trust in people of another religion is just 36.5%, while trust in people of another nationality remains similarly low at 36.8%, with minimal year-on-year change.

Albania presents a mixed picture regarding social trust. Trust in people of another religion declined from 59.9% in 2024 to 50.8% in 2025, while trust in people of another nationality fell from 36.1% to 30.7%, indicating a decline in inter-group trust.

In Kosovo*, inter-religious trust fell from 41.7% in 2024 to 38.7% in 2025, while trust in other nationalities decreased from 38.0% in 2024 to 36.1% in 2025.

While some of the WB6 demonstrate encouraging progress towards greater tolerance and inclusiveness, others face enduring barriers to trust across ethnic and religious lines, which shows a region where inter-group trust continues to evolve unevenly.

CONFIDENCE IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS

Measuring trust in institutions is essential because trust underpins the legitimacy, effectiveness, and stability of democratic governance and public life. High trust levels indicate that citizens believe institutions are fair, competent, and act in the public interest. Low trust, on the other hand, often signals alienation or past institutional failures, and may erode civic engagement, compliance with laws, and support for reforms.

The following section provides a more detailed analysis of trust across various institutions.

Trust in public security and justice institutions

Institutions responsible for law and order represent the frontline of government authority. Confidence in them reflects not only perceptions of competence and fairness but also broader judgments about the functioning of the rule of law. Comparative data for trust in the armed forces, the police and the courts by year and WB6 is presented in Table 61, Annex 1.

The armed forces remain the most trusted of the three public security and justice institutions across the region. In 2025, average trust in the military stands at 57.9%, broadly consistent with 2024, and exceeds distrust in most WB6.

At the top of the regional ranking, Kosovo* (74.6%) and North Macedonia (67.7%) lead the region, followed by Serbia with 59%. By comparison, Albania and Montenegro register moderate but still positive levels of trust, at 51.3% and 50.4%, respectively.

The exception in this regional landscape is Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the level of trust in the armed forces (44.7%) is lower than the level of distrust (48.9%).

Public trust in the **police** is more divided. In 2025, regional trust stands at 52.4%, down slightly from 53.9% in 2024. Kosovo* again leads, with 70.6%, while Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina have trust levels slightly above 50%, nearly offset by equal levels of distrust. In North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia, trust in the police falls just below the 50% mark.

The **judiciary** continues to show the lowest levels of public trust across the Western Balkans Six. In 2025, the average trust in the courts is 27.8%, a slight decline from 2024, while distrust remains high at 65.1%.

Trust levels vary across the region but remain low in nearly all Western Balkans Six. North Macedonia (20.7%) and Albania (21.4%) record the lowest levels of public confidence, followed by Serbia (27.3%) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (29.8%). Montenegro, with 30.9%, performs only slightly better, indicating that even where trust is relatively higher, perceptions of the judiciary remain fragile.

Kosovo* stands out as the regional leader, with 36.9% of citizens expressing trust in the courts. However, despite this comparatively higher figure, overall distrust still exceeds 60%, suggesting that confidence in the judiciary remains limited in all WB6.

Trust in core government institutions

Public trust in core political institutions, governments, parliaments, political parties, and civil services serves both as a barometer of societal progress and as a driving force behind it. The comparative data for public trust in the government, political parties, parliament and the civil service for WB6 for 2024 and 2025 is given in Table 62, Annex1.

On average, 59.5% of respondents across the region express distrust in their **governments**, while only 34.6% report trust. Nevertheless, 2025 marked several noteworthy improvements as well. In Albania trust has increased from 36.5% to 47.2%, while distrust has fallen significantly. Kosovo* now reports the highest trust in government (51.9%), up from 45.5% in 2024. Similarly, North Macedonia saw trust rise from 26.4% in 2024 to 32.1% in 2025.

By contrast, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia moved in the opposite direction. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s trust in government declined from 23.7% in 2024 to low 18.2%, while Serbia’s fell from 33.3% in 2024 to 27.7% in 2025.

Across the Western Balkans Six, **political parties remain the least trusted entities**, ranking below all other **institutions and organisations surveyed.** In 2025, only 18.0% of citizens reported trust in political parties, a modest increase from 15.8% in 2024. However, the vast majority, 76.6%, still voice distrust.

Parliaments across the WB6 show slightly better trust scores than political parties but still considerably low. The regional average trust in parliament rose modestly, from 23.4% in 2024 to 25.3% in 2025, while distrust decreased slightly.

Kosovo* (35.2%), North Macedonia (29.2%) and Albania (28.5%) enjoy relatively higher levels of parliamentary trust compared to Bosnia and Herzegovina (14.2%) and Serbia (20.6%). Among the WB6, Albania showed the most significant improvement with trust rising from 14.7% in 2024 to 28.5% in 2025.

Trust in **civil services** shows varied patterns. The regional average in 2025 stands at 35.1%, slightly lower than 36.5% in 2024, but with noticeable differences among WB6.

Kosovo* leads again, with trust at 48.8%, followed by Albania (46.4%) and North Macedonia (40%), indicating relatively stronger public perceptions of institutional reliability. In contrast, several of the WB6 report declining trust. Montenegro saw trust fall to 30.3%, a drop of 2.1 p.p., while Serbia continues to experience a decline, with civil service trust declining by 6.1 points to 25.5% in 2025. Bosnia and Herzegovina registers the lowest level of confidence in the civil service across the region, at just 19.7%.

Trust in oversight and integrity institutions

In democratic systems, trust in oversight institutions like electoral commissions and public procurement authorities is essential for ensuring legitimacy, transparency, and combating corruption. In the Western Balkans Six, these institutions are critical to both democratic development and EU integration.

The comparative data for public trust in election commission and public procurement authorities by year and WB6 is presented in Table 63, Annex 1.

In 2025, public trust in **election commissions** across the Western Balkans Six showed a modest overall improvement, rising from 29.0% in 2024 to 31.0% in 2025, while distrust declined from 63.8% in 2024 to 61.1% in 2025.

Among the WB6, Albania recorded the largest increase in confidence, with trust rising by 12.7 percentage points from 24.7% in 2024 to 37.4% in 2025. North Macedonia also saw a moderate improvement, with trust rising 3.3 points from 34% to 37.3%, indicating a slow but positive change in attitudes towards election commission. Montenegro remained largely stable with small improvements from 25.5% in 2024 to 26.4% in 2025.

Kosovo* continues to stand out maintaining relatively high trust at 43.8%, up slightly from 41.8% in 2024. In contrast, Bosnia and Herzegovina continued to experience the highest level of distrust in the region (76.0%), while Serbia saw a decline in trust from 30% in 2024 to 23.6% in 2025.

In 2025, public trust in **public procurement authorities** across the Western Balkans Six remains low, with an average of 23.1% of citizens expressing confidence, while distrust continues to dominate at 64.1%. These figures point to a concern about transparency, accountability, and fairness in the management of public procurement processes.

Among the WB6, Bosnia and Herzegovina reports the lowest level of trust at 14.2%, accompanied by the highest level of distrust at 76.1%. Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Albania cluster near the regional average, with trust levels at 20.2%, 24.3%, and 25.6%, respectively, suggesting modest confidence in these institutions.

Kosovo* stands out as an exception in the region, recording the highest trust at 37.7% and distrust of 55.9%.

Overall, the data indicate that both the election commissions and the public procurement authorities across the Western Balkans Six still face significant credibility challenges.

Trust in knowledge and educational institutions

In a region where political and judicial institutions often suffer from public distrust, universities stand out as some of the most respected institutions in the Western Balkans Six.

The comparative data for public trust in universities by year and WB6 is presented in Table 64, Annex 1.

According to the SecuriMeter 2025 findings, universities enjoy a regional average trust rate of 53.4%, largely unchanged from 2024. Distrust has declined marginally from 36.6% in 2024 to 35.5% in 2025, reinforcing the perception that higher education institutions remain one of the few consistent pillars of societal confidence.

Kosovo* stands out with a notable increase in trust in universities, rising from 69.6% in 2024 to 73.1% in 2025. North Macedonia follows closely, recording the largest year-over-year improvement in the region, with trust rising 5.7 percentage point to 55.2% in 2025.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, trust in universities improved modestly by 1.1 points, reaching 49.9%, despite a persistently high distrust rate of 41.1%

On the other hand, Albania and Serbia both saw declines in trust. In Albania, trust dropped 3 points to 43.6%, accompanied by an increase in distrust of 6.1 points, which shows growing public scepticism. In Serbia, trust fell 4.3 points to 50.0%, while distrust remained at 36.7%. Public trust in universities in Montenegro decreased slightly by 0.3%, while distrust also declined by 1.7%, reaching 39.7% in 2025.

Trust in media

The SecuriMeter 2025 data reveals a detailed picture of how citizens in the Western Balkans Six perceive the two dominant sources of information, television and social media. While both channels continue to play central roles in shaping public opinion, how much people trust them is changing, influenced by media regulation, disinformation, political polarisation, and digital literacy. The comparative data on trust in TV and social media by year and WB6 is presented in Table 65, Annex 1.

Television remains the most widely used news source across the Western Balkans Six, yet public trust in TV continues to decline. In 2025, only 29.5% of citizens said they trust TV either "quite a lot" or "a great deal", down from 31.1% in 2024.

Albania saw the most notable decline, with trust falling from 31.5% in 2024 to 24.9% in 2025, while distrust increased to 74.9%. A similar pattern is seen Bosnia and Herzegovina, where trust declined from 22.7% in 2024 to 18.4% in 2025, while distrust increased to 76.2%.

In contrast, Serbia and Montenegro show marginal increases in trust, Serbia reaching 18.7% (+0.6%) and Montenegro 26.9% (+1.3%).

A more positive trend emerges in Kosovo*, where trust in television rose modestly from 46.1% in 2024 to 49.0% in 2025, maintaining the highest level of confidence in the region. Meanwhile, North Macedonia recorded a slight decline in trust in TV from 42.8% in 2024 to 38.9% in 2025, though it continues to hold the second highest trust in television among the WB6.

Social media continue to divide public opinion across the Western Balkans Six. In 2025, average trust in social media rose slightly to 19.2%, from 17.5% in 2024, yet distrust remains widespread at 71.4%, underscoring persistent concerns about media credibility.

Kosovo* shows the most significant rise in trust towards social media from 22.4% in 2024, reaching 31.7% in 2025, followed by Serbia where confidence also increased notably from 12.8% in 2024 to 19.1% in 2025. Albania and Montenegro show marginal increases in trust (+1.4 and +1.5 pp respectively), and continue to rank among the WB6 with the lowest confidence in social media, at 10.9% and 18.7%, respectively.

By contrast, North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina saw trust in social media decline. In North Macedonia the trust in social media declined from 28.2% in 2024 to 22.7% in 2025, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina it declined from 14.9% in 2024 to 11.8% in 2025, suggesting growing scepticism towards online information sources.

When comparing media trust across platforms, a clear trend emerges: TV is more trusted than social media in all WB6, but both channels face widespread public doubt. The exception is Kosovo*, where trust in both platforms is comparatively high, 49.0% for television, and 31.7% for social media.

Trust in religious organisations

Trust in religious organisations is important as these institutions often shape moral values, influence public opinion, and serve as pillars of social cohesion.

In 2025, religious organisations across the Western Balkans Six continue to receive high public trust, with minimal year-on-year shifts. As shown in the comparative data presented in Table 66, Annex 1, 62% of respondents across the WB6 report trusting religious institutions, a slight increase from 60.4 % in 2024, and only half as much, 32.8%, said they distrust religious institutions in 2025, highlighting the enduring role of religion in WB6.

Kosovo* leads the region with 89.2%, followed by North Macedonia with 72.1%, Albania with 58.8%, Montenegro with 52.6% and Bosnia and Herzegovina with 53.1%, all showing high level of trust. Serbia records the lowest trust in religious institutions at 46.2%, marking a slight decline from 48.8% in 2024.

Trust in international organisations: EU and NATO

In 2025, trust in international organisations such as the European Union and NATO remains an important indicator of how Western Balkans Six citizens position themselves in a shifting global order. The comparative data for 2024 and 2025 is given in Table 67, Annex 1.

At the regional level, trust in the **European Union** has declined modestly, from 54.5% in 2024 to 52.1% in 2025, and at the same time distrust has risen, reaching 42.1%. This apparent stability, however, masks significant WB6 divergences.

Albania with 81.5% and Kosovo* with 71.0% remain the strongest EU supporters, despite recording small declines compared to 2024.

In North Macedonia public trust increased from 54.6% in 2024 to 59.5% in 2025, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina it decreased from 42.8% in 2024 to 35.2% in 2025, and in Montenegro from 49.3% to 46.8%.

Serbia with 18.8% of trust remains the regional outlier, where trust in the EU is persistently the lowest among WB6, while distrust stands at 68.6% in 2025.

The pattern of trust in **NATO** follows a similarly mixed trajectory. At the regional level, trust declines slightly to 52.0% in 2025 (a drop of 2.0 percentage points), while distrust stands at 42.1%.

Kosovo* with 90.8% and Albania with 87.8% continue to top the regional rankings, reflecting consistently strong public support for the Alliance.

North Macedonia also recorded a significant rise in trust, increasing by 6.7 percentage points to 59.5% in 2025, aligning with its full NATO membership and recent military cooperation.

By contrast, Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced a 10.3-point decline in trust, reaching 30.4% in 2025. In Montenegro the decline is more modest going from 37.2% in 2024 to 36.5% in 2025. Serbia remains firmly opposed with trust at only 7.2% and distrust at 81.8%, largely unchanged from 2024.

Overall, the region continues to demonstrate a solid foundation of trust in the EU and NATO, suggesting enduring public support for Euro-Atlantic integration.

CONFIDENCE IN LOCAL RECOVERY FROM CRISIS

Beyond institutional trust, an equally important aspect of public perception is how people view their own communities' ability to recover from major disruptions or crises.

Across the Western Balkans Six, almost 30% of respondents say they are "not at all confident" in their local community's ability to recover from a crisis, while another 27.6% are "slightly confident". In total, over half of the population (57%) expresses little to no confidence in their community's resilience. By contrast, 11.6% report higher levels of confidence, with 9.5% saying they are "mostly confident" and just 2.1% saying they are "very confident".

Figure 32. Confidence in local recovery from crisis
Q34. How confident are you that your local community could recover from a serious crisis (e.g. natural disaster, economic collapse, pandemic)?
(All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



Among the WB6, Kosovo* stands out with the most optimistic outlook. Nearly 57% of its citizens place themselves in the “moderately”, “mostly”, or “very confident” categories, by far the highest share in the region. Only 15.3% report having no confidence at all in their community’s resilience.

By contrast, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 40.1% say they are not at all confident, and only 6% are “mostly” or “very confident”. Similarly, Serbia, Montenegro and Albania have around one third of their respondents saying they are not confident at all, and less than 12% placing themselves in the top two categories.

In North Macedonia results are close to the regional average. While 56.3% express little or no confidence, 40% consider themselves moderately to very confident.

Overall, the SecuriMeter 2025 results highlight a prevailing sense of insecurity across the Western Balkans Six regarding local crisis preparedness.

CIVIC ENGAGEMENT THROUGH VOTING

As a cornerstone of democratic participation, voting reflects citizens’ engagement in public life. Measuring how actively people across the Western Balkans Six exercise this right helps reveal broader patterns of political involvement, confidence in electoral systems, and perceptions of democratic legitimacy.

According to the SecuriMeter 2025 survey, 76.6% of respondents in the Western Balkans Six claimed they had voted in the last general or local elections, showing a moderate increase from 74.8% in 2024. The comparative data for 2024 and 2025 by WB6 is given in Table 68, Annex 1.

Among individual WB6, Albania leads with 88.4% of respondents claiming they voted, up from 76.5% in 2024, marking the highest reported turnout in the region. North Macedonia also saw a noticeable rise, from 73.9% in 2024 to 77.0% in 2025. In contrast, Montenegro and Serbia remain at the lower end of reported turnout (69.0% and 74.0%, respectively).

However, the self-reported engagement is significantly higher than official data for turnout in all WB6. The following table compares self-reported turnout from the SecuriMeter 2025 survey with official electoral turnout data from the most recent parliamentary and/or local elections in each WB6.

Table 6. Comparison of reported voting turnout and official turnout
Q35. Did you vote in the last either local or general elections?

	SecuriMeter 2025 Reported Turnout	Official Turnout (Last Election)	Election type
Albania	88.4%	47.9%	Local 2023
Bosnia and Herzegovina	75.1%	45.8%	Local 2024
Kosovo*	76.2%	46.5%	Parliamentary 2025
Montenegro	69.0%	56.4%	Parliamentary 2023
North Macedonia	77.0%	59.0%	Parliamentary 2024
Serbia	74.0%	58.7%	Parliamentary 2023

The difference between reported and actual turnout is very clear in Kosovo* and Albania, where reported turnout exceeds official numbers by over 30 percentage points. The discrepancy suggests a strong normative expectation to vote, even among those who may not have participated.

By contrast, in WB6 like Serbia and Montenegro, the gap between self-reporting and official statistics is smaller, perhaps indicating more realistic responses or lower social pressure to report civic engagement. While the SecuriMeter 2025 results suggest high democratic engagement across the Western Balkans Six, official data does not support this.

IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION

Understanding how citizens define their political identity offers insight into democratic maturity, party alignment, and public trust in ideological platforms. It also serves as an indicator of social polarisation, populist tendencies, and openness to liberal democratic values, factors closely observed by the European Union in its enlargement assessments.

Across the WB6, citizens continue to identify most frequently with Socialist, Liberal Democrat, and Centre political ideology. However, patterns vary significantly by WB6, and year-on-year changes reflect both political shifts and increased volatility in personal ideological clarity. The most common response across the region is "Don’t know/Refuse to answer" at 29.6%, highlighting a significant level of political ambivalence.

Among those who do identify with a political view, "Liberal Democrat" is the most popular at 17.7%, followed by "Social Democrat" at 15.5%.

However, these regional averages mask significant differences by individual WB6. The comparative data by year and WB6 is presented in Table 69, Annex 1.

According to the survey results, Albania is a clear outlier, with 46.1% of respondents identifying as Socialist, a far higher percentage than any other group in the region. This represents an increase from 40.5% in 2024, likely reflecting sustained support for the ruling Socialist Party. At the same time, identification with liberal democratic values rose from 11.1% in 2024 to 28.4% in 2025, while other political orientations declined.

Notably, just 7.7% of respondents refused or did not know how to describe their political views, well below the regional average of 29.6%.

Bosnia and Herzegovina's ideological landscape in 2025 remains fragmented. The largest group continues to identify as social democrats at 25.9%, showing only a marginal decline from 26.8% in 2024. Support for liberal democrats has decreased from 16.0% to 12.4%, while socialist identification and political centre remain stable at 10.4% and 7.3%, respectively. In contrast nationalist identification increased from 9.4% in 2024 to 10.9% in 2025. The most significant movement is in the share of respondents who either don't know or refuse to answer, which increased from 29.4% to 32.1%, representing nearly a third of the population.

Figure 33. Ideological orientation
Q36. In general, how would you describe your political views?
(All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



Results for Kosovo* in 2025 show a shift towards centrist and moderate-left orientations. The political centre is the most prominent group with 25.9%, up significantly from 15.6% in 2024. Close behind are the liberal democrats at 25.7%, though this reflects a notable decline from 36.0% the previous year, indicating diminishing liberal enthusiasm. Social democrat identification increased from 15.1% to 18.9%, while socialist affiliation also rose modestly, from 5.2% to 7.2%, suggesting the growing appeal of moderate-left positions. Nationalist identification remains relatively low at 4.7%. A key development is the drop in those who did not express any ideological preference, from 23.2% in 2024 to 17.5% in 2025, which, while below the regional average, suggests a more politically engaged and self-identifying electorate.

Montenegro presents a moderate ideological distribution with no single dominant alignment. The leading category is Liberal Democrat which increased to 17.7% in 2025 from 13.4% in 2024, followed by Social Democrat (15.9%) and Socialist (13.6%). Nationalist identification declined slightly from 10.8% to 9.1%, and Centrists are only 6.6%, down from 7.2% in 2024. Montenegro also has a significant 36.0% of people who didn't know or refused to say.

North Macedonia retains a fragmented and undecided political base, though moderate shifts towards the centre and nationalism are visible. Centre orientation is still increasing from 15.0% in 2024 to 17.0% in 2025, while 14.9% identify as Social Democrats and 14.0% as Nationalists. This is the highest nationalist share in the region. Socialist identification dropped slightly to 4.6% in 2025, while liberal democratic views remained steady at 9.2%. Notably, 38.1% of citizens from North Macedonia refused to identify ideologically, a slight drop from 41.1% in 2024.

Serbia has the highest rate of indecision, with 46.5% of respondents refusing to answer or saying they didn't know, which is an increase of 11.9% from 34.6% in 2024. Among those who did answer, 7.6% identify as Socialist, 13.2% as Social Democrat, and 12.8% as Liberal Democrat. Nationalist identification is relatively low at 7.3%. All major ideological categories, Socialist (down 5.0 pp), Centre (down 2.6 pp), and Liberal Democrat (down 0.6 pp), saw slight declines. Serbia remains ideologically diverse with only modest support for any single bloc and the highest proportion of respondents (46.5%) avoiding clear identification.

PERCEPTIONS OF GOOD LEADERSHIP

Understanding public perceptions of leadership is important to understanding how citizens in the Western Balkans Six balance sovereignty and regional cooperation when considering their futures. Survey findings from the SecuriMeter 2025 provide valuable insight into how people across the region define and perceive effective leadership.

When asked about the qualities of a good leader, citizens across the Western Balkans Six prioritise international cooperation over rigid independence. The data reveal that a clear majority of respondents, 51.5%, believe a good leader "seeks the best for the economy through international cooperation", while just over a quarter (26.7%) favour a leader who "always stands up for the economy's independence".

Figure 34. Perceptions of good leadership
Q37. In your opinion, a good leader of your economy is someone who…
(All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



The comparative data for 2024 and 2025 by WB6 is given in Table 70, Annex 1.

According to the data, the preference for international cooperation is particularly strong in Albania (62.5%) and Kosovo* (61.3%). These findings suggest a regional recognition of the importance of global partnerships for the WB6 progress, with only a minority favouring a more isolationist approach. Compared to 2024, on the regional level, the support for either of the two options is almost unchanged.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, close to half of respondents express support for international cooperation, whereas the other half is nearly evenly divided between supporters of national sovereignty and those expressing no clear preference or declining to answer.

Serbia and Montenegro show similar patterns, with around 25% of respondents supporting national sovereignty and about 45% favouring international cooperation, the lowest level of pro-cooperation sentiment in the region.

In North Macedonia, 47.1% of respondents supported international cooperation, while 29.3% expressed preference for sovereignty. Overall, international cooperation remains the preferred leadership model across the region, but an increase in "neither" and "don't know" responses highlight a fragile trust in both domestic and international leadership.

CHAPTER G: CORRUPTION

Measuring public perception of corruption is important in the Western Balkans Six, where it affects economic growth, trust in institutions, and EU integration. Corruption, linked to political instability, weak rule of law, and clientelism, remains a challenge despite EU reforms. Surveys such as SecuriMeter show public views on anti-corruption measures and expose gaps between reforms and implementation. Understanding these perceptions helps assess policy outcomes and identify structural weaknesses that sustain corrupt practices.

PERCEPTION OF WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION

The public perception of corruption in the Western Balkans Six is overwhelmingly negative, with most citizens believing it is a widespread issue. On average, 81% of respondents across the region believe corruption is either "very widespread" or "fairly widespread".

The comparative data on perception of widespread corruption for 2023-2025 by WB6 is presented in Table 71, Annex 1.

The regional overview indicates that the perception of widespread corruption in the region is declining from 85.4% in 2023 to 82.8% in 2024 to 81.0% in 2025.

Looking at individual WB6, the highest levels of perceived corruption as “very widespread” in 2025 are recorded in Serbia (53.4%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (48.7%), and North Macedonia (44.3%). Montenegro follows with 39.5%, while Albania (28.3%) and Kosovo* (24.2%) show significantly better results.

Examining year-on-year changes in this indicator, most of the WB6 show decline in their perception of widespread corruption from 2023 to 2025. Serbia shows a decline from 90.8% in 2023 to 82.6% in 2025, Montenegro from 84% in 2023 to 74% in 2025, followed by North Macedonia which recorded a decrease from 86% in 2023 to 78% in 2025. In contrast, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo*, and Albania show more moderate changes.

However, it is worth noting that in all Western Balkans Six fewer than 1% of respondents say there is no corruption, and fewer than 6% consider corruption to be very rare.

PERCEIVED CHANGES IN THE LEVEL OF CORRUPTION

Perceived levels of corruption offer a starting point for tracking how citizens judge changes in their intensity over time.

Across the region, the results for 2025 show signs of improvement, with fewer respondents, 45.5%, reporting that corruption has "increased" (either a little or a lot), compared to 53.3% in 2024. The comparative data by year and WB6 is given in Table 72, Annex 1.

Across the region, the largest share of respondents who believe that corruption has "increased a lot" are in Serbia (42.1%) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (34.2%), followed by North Macedonia (28.6%), Albania (25.9%), Montenegro (19.5%), and Kosovo* (13.9%).

In Serbia, the perception that corruption has "increased a lot" rose by 12% in 2025 compared to 2024, while the perception that corruption has “increased a little” fell from 24.4% in 2024 to 19.2% in 2025.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the perception of corruption increasing (either a little or a lot) has been on decline since 2023 (68.3%) reaching 62.7% in 2024 and 54.6% in 2025. At the same time, the portion of those believing that corruption has grown increased from 20.6% in 2023 to 26.2% in 2024 and 29.3% in 2025.

North Macedonia shows a drop in the share of respondents who perceive that “corruption increased a little or a lot” from 66.8% in 2024 to 49.3% in 2025. Similarly, in Montenegro, the share of citizens who believe corruption has increased has steadily declined, from 42.9% in 2023 to 38.5% in 2024, reaching 33.3% in 2025. This trend aligns with the positive shift observed in responses regarding how widespread corruption is perceived to be in the relevant WB6.

Albania shows a significant improvement, with the share of citizens who believe corruption levels have decreased rising from 15.6% in 2024 to 30% in 2025. At the same time, the proportion of respondents who think corruption is increasing fell from 59.6% in 2024 to 40.1% in 2025.

Kosovo* shows an improvement in perceptions of rising corruption, with the share of respondents who believe corruption has increased declining from 46.6% in 2023 to 34.3% in 2025. Meanwhile, the proportion of those who think corruption has decreased has steadily grown, from 16.5% in 2023 to 20.1% in 2024, reaching 21.8% in 2025.

Overall, the 2025 data indicate a gradual improvement in perceptions of corruption across the WB6, with fewer respondents reporting increases and more recognising stagnation or decline in corruption levels.

CITIZENS’ EXPERIENCE WITH CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS

Between 2023 and 2025, the SecuriMeter surveys investigated citizens’ direct experiences of corruption, specifically whether respondents or their household members had to provide extra payments, valuable gifts, or donations when interacting with various public institutions. According to the survey results, direct experiences with corruption, such as being required to make extra payments or offer gifts, are a notable issue in the region, though the prevalence varies by individual WB6 and institution.

The majority of respondents report not having to make extra payments, gifts or donations to public institutions. The healthcare system stands out with 27.7% of respondents indicating that such payments or gifts were required. Other notable sectors with higher percentages include the police (13.1%) and officials issuing building permits (9.1%). On the other hand, sectors like courts, public prosecution, and political parties show relatively lower incidences of extra payments or gifts. There is also a notable percentage of "Don’t know/Refuse to answer" responses across all sectors, generally ranging from 6% to 9%.

Corruption in public institutions involved in law enforcement

Among all public institutions, the **police** rank as the second most frequently cited public institution for citizens’ direct experience with corruption in the Western Balkans Six, after the health care system. Alongside the police, the **courts and public prosecution** services, key pillars of the justice system, also remain a source of concern across the region. While the intensity of reported corruption varies by WB6 and over time, these institutions consistently appear among those most commonly associated with such experiences.

The comparative data for each of the public institutions involved in law enforcement by year and WB6 is given in Table 73, Annex 1.

According to the latest data, across the region, 13.1% of respondents reported that someone in their household had to give an extra payment, valuable gift, or donation in interactions with the police.

Figure 35. Citizens' experience with corruption in public institutions
Q40. In your contact or contacts with the following public institutions, did you or anyone living in your household have to give an extra payment or a valuable gift, or make a donation to the following public institutions in the past 3 years?
(All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



Albania stands out with the highest reported level at 25.6% in 2025, marking the largest increase of 9.1% compared to 2024, pointing to persistent systemic issues in law enforcement. Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Serbia, also report relatively high levels (16.4% and 13.3%, respectively), although both show signs of gradual decline, indicating some progress.

At the lower end, Montenegro and North Macedonia both reported around 10%. In contrast, Kosovo* records a sharp and unusual drop in reported cases, from 30.2% in 2023 to 2.6% in 2024 and 2.1% in 2025.

Closely tied to the police in the broader law enforcement context, **the courts and public prosecution services** also appear frequently in citizens' reports of corruption experiences. Although reported slightly less often than the police, the similarity in levels points to systemic issues within the justice sector as a whole. In 2025, 8.8% of respondents across the Western Balkans Six reported having to make an extra payment or gift when dealing with the courts, and 5.8% reported the same regarding the prosecution.

Beyond core law enforcement institutions, other **public officials tasked with regulatory and administrative functions** also feature prominently in citizens' reports of corruption. These include officials who award public tenders, those who issue building and business permits, and various types of inspectors responsible for oversight in areas such as health, safety, construction, labour, and food quality.

In 2025, 9.9% of respondents across the Western Balkans Six reported that someone in their household had to make an extra payment or gift when dealing with inspections, followed by 9.1% for building permits, 6.5% for business permits, and 5.3% for **officials awarding public tenders**.

While Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia show relatively high percentages, gradual declines over time may signal incremental improvements. By contrast, Kosovo* continues to report lower figures, which might reflect either genuine progress or lower reporting. Montenegro and North Macedonia remain in the mid-range but show fluctuations, indicating unstable progress in curbing administrative corruption.

Corruption in other public institutions

One of the findings from the data is the persistently high level of reported corruption in the **health care system** across the Western Balkans Six. On average, nearly one in three respondents (around 27%) stated that they or someone in their household had to give an extra payment, gift or donation when interacting with public health institutions. The situation is most notable in Albania, where 62.2% of respondents reported experiencing corruption when using public healthcare services.

Figure 36. Citizens' experience with corruption in public institutions
Q40. In your contact or contacts with the following public institutions, did you or anyone living in your household have to give an extra payment or a valuable gift, or make a donation to the following public institutions in the past 3 years?
(All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



Several factors help explain this trend. First and foremost, health care is a sector marked by urgency and vulnerability. When people are ill or in pain, they are more likely to comply with informal requests or offer gifts unprompted in the hope of receiving better or faster care. In many cases, these exchanges are so normalised that they blur the line between gratitude and corruption. Combined with limited private health care alternatives in many areas, citizens often feel they have no other option but to "play along" with these informal arrangements. Addressing this issue other than legal reforms, it will also require systemic investment, cultural change, and the creation of transparent, trustworthy public services that protect the dignity of both patients and providers.

The comparative data for each of other public institutions by year and WB6 is given in Table 74, Annex 1.

Between 2023 and 2025, about 10.3% of people in the Western Balkans Six reported experiencing corruption in **education**, showing that while it is less common than in healthcare, it remains a concern. Albania consistently reports the highest rates, peaking at 23.6% in 2025, while Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia report gradual improvements, suggesting that reforms may be taking effect.

Kosovo*, meanwhile, reports a steeper decline, from 14.4% in 2023 to just 2.4% in 2025, raising questions about the underlying drivers of this trend.

The analysis of corruption experiences across other public institutions, such as **customs, social security and welfare authorities**, **as well as tax authorities,** show that around 8% to 10% of people across the WB6 report experience of corruption in this sector. These figures indicate that the reported experience of corruption is part of a broader landscape of institutional vulnerability.

Between 2023 and 2025, there were reported experiences of corruption involving **political parties and politicians** in the Western Balkans Six, with an average corruption rate of 7.2% for politicians and 6.2% for political parties. While these levels are lower than those in sectors like healthcare, they remain a concern due to the central role these institutions play in democratic governance. Serbia, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Albania stand out with rates higher than the regional average.

From 2023 to 2025, reported experiences of corruption involving **private companies, banks and financial institutions** in the Western Balkans Six remained relatively constant, with regional averages ranging between 6% and 8%. For private companies, the average declined slightly from 7.9% in 2023 to 6.6% in 2025, while for banks and financial institutions it hovered around 6%, indicating a moderate but consistent level of perceived corruption. These sectors appear less affected than public institutions such as healthcare or education, but still reflect important areas of concern, particularly given their influence on economic activity and public trust in financial systems.



CHAPTER H: EMERGING SECURITY THREATS

The SecuriMeter 2025 findings show that emerging security threats in the Western Balkans Six are multidimensional, including both traditional and novel challenges. Distant conflicts, such as the war in the Middle East and the ongoing war in Ukraine, continue to shape citizens' perceptions of personal and regional security.

The rapid development and integration of artificial intelligence (AI) introduced additional complex dimensions to security perceptions. Citizens increasingly recognise both AI's potential benefits in healthcare, education, and environmental monitoring, and the concerns over job displacement, surveillance, and disinformation. Along with the development of technology, digital security emerges as an important concern for people worrying about theft of personal information online or about their personal information being used by the government or by foreign countries.

Misinformation and biased information represent another emerging security threat eroding public trust. Taken together, the emerging security threats create a complex security landscape for the WB6's governments to respond to and build systems that protect the citizens in the future.

IMPACT OF THE WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST ON THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE WESTERN BALKANS SIX

The terrorist attacks on Israel on 7 October 2023 and the subsequent escalation of violence in Gaza have continued to cast a long shadow over global security discussions.

In 2025, the Western Balkans Six will continue to be affected by these distant yet symbolically potent events. The ongoing conflict in the Middle East, much like the wars in Syria and Iraq in previous years, has extended its psychological and security footprint to regions far from the frontline, including South East Europe.

In 2025, perceptions of the overall security situation across the Western Balkans Six remain largely stable compared to 2024, with most respondents continuing to opt for the neutral option, "neither negative nor positive". This category remains the most frequent answer in every WB6, ranging from 36% in Kosovo* to 53% in North Macedonia. While this indicates a consistent middle-ground assessment across the region, notable shifts are visible at both ends of the sentiment spectrum. Detailed and comparative data on the impact of the war in the Middle East on the security situation in the Western Balkans by year and WB6 is presented in Table 75, Annex 1.

According to the results, the share of respondents viewing the security situation as "completely negative" increased slightly in most WB6. The most significant rise occurred in Kosovo*, from 17% in 2024 to 22% in 2025, followed by North Macedonia (up from 7.6% to 10.9%) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (up from 8.3% to 9.9%). Serbia was the only one to record a decline in this perception, dropping from 11.8% to 7.7%.

Assessments of the situation as "mostly negative" remain relatively stable in most cases, with minor increases in Bosnia and Herzegovina (+2.7 percentage points) and Kosovo* (+0.8 points), and slight decreases in Albania (–1.9 points) and Montenegro (–2.2 points). Positive perceptions remain low across the region.

Meanwhile, the share of respondents who answered "don't know/refuse to answer" rose in several WB6, particularly in Serbia (up from 7.9% to 12.8%) and Montenegro (from 9.1% to 12.1%), suggesting either increased uncertainty or a reluctance to provide an answer.

IMPACT OF THE ONGOING WAR IN UKRAINE ON THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE WESTERN BALKANS SIX

Concerning the impact of the war in Ukraine on perceptions of security, the aggregate regional data suggest a subtle but noticeable shift away from neutrality towards more negative perceptions.

Across the region, the proportion of respondents reporting a negative impact, combining "completely negative" and "mostly negative", rose from 43.2% in 2024 to 46% in 2025. Neutral perceptions, while still the single largest category, declined from 46.4% to 43.5% over the same period. Those holding positive views remained a small minority. Similarly, the share of respondents who did not know or refused to answer grew from 5.0% to 5.7%, indicating a slight increase in uncertainty or reluctance to commit to a position. To explore these trends in greater detail, the comparative data given in Table 76, Annex 1 breaks down the survey results by year and WB6, highlighting the unique shifts in perception regarding the war's impact on personal security.

In Albania, negative sentiment became markedly stronger, rising from 54.7% in 2024 to 64.2% in 2025, accompanied by a sharp decline in positive views. This shift indicates that citizens increasingly perceive the war as a direct and detrimental influence on their security. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, although neutral sentiment still dominates, negative views increased slightly from 34.2% in 2024 to 37.9% in 2025.

Kosovo* experienced one of the most pronounced shifts, with "completely negative" responses rising from 19.3% to 30.7%, even as "mostly negative" responses declined. This pattern points to a consolidation of negative perceptions into more extreme sentiment, reflecting heightened concern about security consequences.

In Montenegro, neutral views still account for nearly half the population, suggesting that many citizens of Montenegro view the war as a background issue rather than an immediate personal threat. North Macedonia's results also reflect stability, with nearly half of the respondents remaining neutral and only minor fluctuations in other categories.

In Serbia, negative and neutral perceptions dipped slightly, while the percentage of those who "don't know or refuse to answer" increased from 7.7% to 10.9%, the highest in the region. This may indicate growing public hesitation to articulate a stance.

KEY SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS TO ADDRESS CURRENT CHALLENGES

The following analysis examines public perceptions of the most important security cooperation mechanisms for addressing current challenges in the Western Balkans Six, assessing preferences for various options, including NATO, the EU, a military alliance with other economies, regional cooperation, and complete neutrality.

The findings reveal a complex and evolving security landscape, with public opinion often divided between existing major alliances and alternative strategies, reflecting the unique geopolitical context of each WB6. The comparative data on citizens' preference for security cooperation is presented in Table 77, Annex 1.

The survey results indicate that NATO remains the most frequently preferred security mechanism for addressing challenges in the Western Balkans Six, with 29.8% of regional respondents favouring it in 2025. However, this represents a slight decline from the previous year (31.1%). The European Union (EU) is the second most important choice, showing a modest increase in support from 20.5% in 2024 to 21.5% in 2025, suggesting growing confidence in its security role.

Figure 37. Preferences for security cooperation
Q43. Which security cooperation mechanism do you think is the most important for addressing the current security challenges of your economy?
(All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



Nevertheless, the regional averages mask significant WB6 differences. While Albania and Kosovo* continue to show strong support for NATO, their preference for NATO has declined. In Albania, support for NATO fell from 64.6% in 2024 to 52.7% in 2025, while preference for the EU increased from 20.6% to 36.4%, suggesting a reorientation towards EU security mechanisms. Kosovo* recorded a decrease in NATO preference (55.0% to 48.8%) alongside a rise in military alliances outside the EU/NATO (14.7% to 24.2%).

In contrast, Serbia maintains its distinct security policy, with a majority of respondents preferring complete neutrality and non-alignment (27.2%), and showing minimal support for NATO (3.6%). Meanwhile, North Macedonia saw a notable increase in its preference for NATO from 22.1% in 2024 to 34.1% in 2025, demonstrating strengthening of citizens’ confidence to the Alliance.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, support for NATO declined from 23.1% to 19.0%, while preference for EU membership remained stable at around 19%. This decline in NATO support corresponds to an increase in respondents who were uncertain or declined to answer.

In Montenegro, support for NATO increased from 16.6% in 2024 to 20.8% in 2025, while preference for EU membership declined from 27.0% to 21.9%.

Preferences for military alliances with countries outside the EU and NATO saw a marginal decline, across the region, from 9.7% in 2024 to 9.5% in 2025, while regional cooperation between neighbouring economies also dropped slightly from 17.0% in 2024 to 16.2% in 2025. Support for complete neutrality and non-alignment remained almost unchanged (11.4% in 2024 vs. 11.6% in 2025), as did the share of respondents who did not provide an answer (10.3% to 11.4%).

Overall, while NATO remains the leading choice in most of the region, its popularity has slightly eroded in several WB6, particularly Albania and Kosovo*.

THE ROLE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

In 2025, AI and emerging technologies saw significant advancements in education, healthcare, and climate monitoring, including AI-assisted drug discovery and personalised learning systems. AI-driven technologies which range from chatbots to predictive analytics are transforming citizen interactions and streamlining bureaucratic processes.[31]

In parallel, AI's role in improving energy efficiency and reducing exposure to hazardous labour is gaining attention; for instance, energy firms are adopting AI for predictive maintenance and grid optimisation, while robotic systems are being deployed to replace human workers in dangerous environments.[32]

Yet, these encouraging developments are tempered by growing unease. Concerns about job displacement remain acute: according to the *Financial Times*, AI has already led to job cuts in sectors such as e-commerce and white-collar services. Some companies have reduced staffing significantly thanks to efficiency gains, and industries are observing AI reshape roles and workflows, instilling anxiety about the future of the labour market.[33]

This context of both the promise and the peril set the stage for the SecuriMeter 2025 survey findings, which provide a comprehensive overview of public perceptions of AI's future impact. Comparative data on public perception of the role of AI in the next 20 years is presented in the chart below and in Table 78, Annex 1.

Figure 38. AI and new technologies
Q44. These days, there are machines or robots that can think and make decisions on their own, often known as artificial intelligence. Do you think artificial intelligence will mostly help or mostly harm people in your economy in the next 20 years?
(All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



[31] The National, “AI Is Changing Everything—including Making Public Services More Efficient,” 12 February 2024. https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/comment/2024/02/12/ai-is-changing-everything-including-making-public-services-more-efficient/

[32] Financial Times. AI Is Accelerating the Energy Transition, Say Industry Leaders. Financial Times, 26 March 2024. https://www.ft.com/content/07671f2e-d7b4-4f94-836c-eb0be9f6b605

[33] Financial Post. “AI Taking Jobs—White-Collar Workers.” Financial Post, 10 November 2023. https://financialpost.com/financial-times/ai-taking-jobs-white-collar-workers

While the prevailing view remains that AI will “mostly harm” people in the next 20 years (37%), there was a drop of over three percentage points compared to 2024 (40.1%). More importantly, there was a notable increase in the share of those who believe AI will “mostly help”, rising from 18.0% in 2024 to 22.1% in 2025 regionally. This suggests that awareness of the potential benefits is growing, even if optimism is still tempered by concern. The share of respondents seeing AI as neither helpful nor harmful remained stable (29.1%), while those uncertain or unwilling to answer remained at 11.8%.

Individual analyses of the Western Balkans Six reveal some of the most notable shifts in attitudes towards AI. Albania, for instance, recorded a rise in positive perceptions, from 23.6% in 2024 to 36.4% in 2025, while negative views fell from 46.4% to 38.2%. Despite this substantial improvement, the share of those who fear AI remains higher than those who believe it will mostly help (36.4%).

Kosovo* also sustained relatively high optimism, with 24.1% of respondents viewing AI as beneficial and 25.2% as harmful. In contrast, Bosnia and Herzegovina (40.6%), Montenegro (41.0%), and Serbia (43.8%) view AI as mostly harmful, displaying strong scepticism, despite slight improvements in optimism compared to 2024. Meanwhile, North Macedonia remains divided, with 33.2% of those who believe AI will mostly harm people, 27.1% are neutral (“neither harm nor help”), and 26.5% believe it will mostly help.

CONCERNS ABOUT SECURITY OF PERSONAL INFORMATION

The analysis of this question focuses on three specific threats to personal information which are theft, government use, and use by foreign countries. The goal is to identify the intensity and prevalence of these concerns across different WB6. The findings highlight that while a high degree of worry about personal information persists, there is a gradual shift towards moderate concern or uncertainty, suggesting a complex and evolving public perception of digital risks.

Figure 39. Concerns about personal information theft online
Q45. When you use the internet or social media, how worried or not are you that the following things could happen to your personal information?
(All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



According to the survey data, nearly one in three respondents said they are “very worried” about each of the three privacy-related concerns examined. The largest share, however, selected “somewhat worried”, indicating a moderate but widespread sense of unease. Specifically, 46.6% expressed concern about their personal information being stolen, 40.1% about its use by the government without permission, and 40.2% about its use by foreign countries. Less than one quarter of respondents said they were not worried about these issues, while 5-8% either did not know or declined to answer.

These results indicate that, although deep concern is limited to a smaller segment, the vast majority of citizens remain at least moderately worried about digital privacy and data misuse. This points to a potential normalisation of risk perception, where the threat of online privacy breaches is widely recognised but no longer triggers intense fear for an increasing portion of the population.

To better understand these findings, the following analysis provides a detailed breakdown of the survey results for each type of threat to personal information, comparing data from 2024 and 2025 across each WB6.

Concerns about personal information theft online

In 2025, 29.1% of respondents reported being "very worried" about personal information theft online, slightly down from 31.9% in 2024. Meanwhile, those who were "somewhat worried" increased modestly from 44.6% in 2024 to 46.6% in 2025, suggesting that while deep concern eased, general unease remained prevalent. The share of respondents reporting no worry remained stable at about 18%, and those answering "don't know" or refusing to respond rose slightly at less than 6%. The comparative data by year and WB6 is presented in Table 79, Annex 1.

In both 2024 and 2025 Albania showed the highest level of concern about personal information theft online. In 2024, 51.1% of respondents were "very worried", however, in 2025, this figure declined to 47.5%. "Somewhat worried" respondents also fell slightly, from 34.1% in 2024 to 31.1% in 2025, suggesting that while overall concern remains high, attitudes are gradually shifting towards reduced anxiety and greater reassurance.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the other hand, has the lowest percentage of citizens who are "very worried" about personal information theft online, only 21.6% in 2025, a decline from 26.8% in 2024. At the same time, almost half of the respondents from Bosnia and Herzegovina reported being "somewhat worried" and just over 20% of being not worried at all.

Kosovo*'s results indicate that nearly 60% of respondents described themselves as "somewhat worried". Compared to 2024, the share of those reporting no worry declined from 21.6% to 15.1% in 2025, while the proportion of respondents who are somewhat or very worried increased correspondingly.

In contrast, Montenegro showed slight increase in the percentage of citizens who are not worried, and decline in those who are somewhat or very worried. North Macedonia's results are closest to the regional average and have changed only slightly between 2024 and 2025.

Serbia also recorded some shifts in attitudes, the share of respondents who were "very worried" declined from 30.3% to 27.2%, while those "somewhat worried" rose from 42.1% to 44.0%. The proportion of respondents who did not know or refused to answer also increased, from 8.0% to 10.2%, the highest level of uncertainty among all WB6 in 2025.

Concerns about personal information being used by the government

Across the Western Balkans Six, public concern about the government's use of personal information remains widespread, although the intensity of this worry slightly decreased between 2024 and 2025. The regional average for respondents who are "very worried" decreased from 32.0% in 2024 to 29.8% in 2025. This decline was offset by a slight increase in those who are "somewhat worried", which rose from 38.8% to 40.1%, indicating that while intense anxiety is lessening, a strong sense of moderate concern persists. The comparative data by year and WB6 is presented in Table 80, Annex 1.

At the individual WB6 level, Albania stands out with the highest percentage of "very worried" respondents in both years (46.3% in 2024, decreasing to 44.1% in 2025). In contrast, WB6 like Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro showed a clear shift away from severe worry, with their "very worried" percentages declining and being replaced by a mix of "somewhat worried" and "not worried" responses, along with an increase in uncertainty ("don't know/refuse to answer").

While Kosovo* and Serbia also saw shifts, Serbia recorded a slight increase in "very worried" responses (31.7% to 33.4%) and a rise in the "don't know/refuse to answer" category, suggesting growing public uncertainty or unwillingness to express an opinion on the matter. These trends collectively indicate that, while the public remains highly aware of the risks associated with government data use, the nature of that concern is evolving from acute fear to a more tempered, yet pervasive, sense of unease.

Concerns about personal information being used by foreign countries

Public concern about personal information being used by foreign countries remained a significant issue in the Western Balkans Six between 2024 and 2025. Overall, the percentage of respondents who were “very worried” decreased slightly from 32.2% to 29.7%, while those who were “somewhat worried” increased from 39.0% to 40.2%. This trend indicates a shift towards a more moderate, yet still widespread concern. The comparative data by year and WB6 is presented in Table 81, Annex 1.

At the individual WB6 level, Albania is an outlier, showing an increase in "very worried" respondents from 46.0% to 48.4%, a deviation from the regional trend. This suggests a growing fear of foreign data use in Albania.

In contrast, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia all experienced a decrease in "very worried" responses, with this concern often shifting to the "somewhat worried" category.

Kosovo* showed a slight increase in "very worried" respondents, but maintained the highest percentage of "somewhat worried" respondents at over 53% in both years, reflecting a high, but not extreme, level of concern.

Serbia and Montenegro also stood out for their high levels of uncertainty, with their "don't know/refuse to answer" responses rising to 11.4% and 11.6%, respectively, in 2025. This may suggest that a segment of the population is either unsure about the threat or unwilling to express their views on the matter.

PERCEPTIONS OF MISINFORMATION AND BIAS IN NEWS SOURCES

This analysis examines public perceptions of misinformation and bias across various information sources in the Western Balkans Six, based on the survey conducted in 2024 and 2025. The study differentiates between misinformation, defined as made-up or unverifiable stories, and bias, which refers to prejudiced information.

The primary goal is to identify which sources the public views as most and least trustworthy and to understand the prevailing attitudes towards different media types and entities, including traditional news media, social networks, politicians, and independent journalists.

The data highlights a complex landscape of public trust, revealing significant variations in perceptions across WB6 and media platforms. In the following section, the survey results are examined in detail, with a breakdown of public perceptions of misinformation and bias across each specific information source. The comparative data by year and WB6 is presented in Table 82 throughout Table 89, Annex 1.

Figure 40. Perceptions of misinformation and bias in news sources
Q46. Misinformation can be defined as stories that are made up or cannot be verified as accurate but are presented to people as if they are accurate. Whereas biased information is referring to the stories prejudiced for or against someone or something. Do you believe the following news resources are the source of misinformation or bias?
(All respondents, N=6007, single answer, share of total, %)



News source: Local TV channels and traditional news media

Regarding local TV channels and conventional news media, a clear majority of respondents across the region tend to see these outlets as biased rather than outright sources of misinformation. In Albania, around 60–64% labelled them biased both in 2024 and 2025, while only about a quarter thought they primarily spread misinformation.

Similar perceptions were observed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where in 2025, about 33.8% perceived misinformation, but almost 45% considered bias the main issue. Kosovo* stands out for having the lowest proportion of respondents viewing local media as misinformation sources (rising from 8.8% in 2024 to 13.8% in 2025), with nearly half judging them biased. In North Macedonia, perceptions of bias increased, reaching 63.6% in 2025 from 51.8% in 2024. Serbia shows a comparable split, where about 32.5% saw local TV as a misinformation source and 40.8% as biased. These results show that in the Western Balkans Six local mainstream media are more often regarded as systematically partial rather than simply fabricating information.

News source: Online anonymous social networks

For online anonymous social networks, however, a significantly larger share of respondents consistently described them as sources of misinformation.

In Albania, the share of citizens perceiving anonymous social networks as a source of misinformation increased from 70.2% to 77.2% in 2025, the highest level of mistrust among all categories and WB6 surveyed.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, nearly half of respondents consider these networks a misinformation source, a pattern mirrored in Montenegro and North Macedonia. Kosovo* displayed a more mixed view, and while 22.7% in 2024 and 29.4% in 2025 perceived misinformation, the majority instead judged them biased (over 45%). Serbia also saw a decline in perceptions of misinformation from 40.6% to

34.3%. Despite some variation, respondents generally agreed that anonymous online spaces are more suspect than traditional media, reinforcing the idea that social networks remain the main source of concern about misinformation.

News source: International TV channels or other traditional news media

When asked about international TV channels and traditional news media, perceptions were more nuanced and balanced across misinformation, bias, and neutrality. Albania showed a decline in the share labelling them misinformation sources (from 12.4% in 2024 to 8.3% in 2025), with about 38% still perceiving bias. Similar trends were observed in Montenegro and Serbia, where approximately one-third perceived international media as biased and about one-quarter identified them as misinformation sources. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, around 30% perceive them as both misinformation and bias. The relative stability of these figures suggests that while foreign outlets are perceived as less trustworthy than strictly neutral ones, they are not seen as the primary source of falsehoods, showing that trust is influenced by political orientation, foreign policy attitudes, and media literacy.

News source: Foreign countries' social media accounts

The responses about foreign countries' social media accounts illustrate mixed perceptions. In Albania, the share describing them as misinformation sources increased from 38.8% in 2024 to 43.0% in 2025. Bosnia and Herzegovina remained steadier, with roughly 30% seeing misinformation and similar shares perceiving bias. Kosovo* continued to exhibit the lowest suspicion overall, with less than 20% labelling them as misinformation sources, while about half consistently viewed them as biased. Notably, in Montenegro and Serbia, a substantial share of respondents reported not knowing or refused to answer, rising to nearly a quarter in Serbia in 2025. This pattern suggests that the public may lack clarity about who operates foreign social media channels and how they shape information flows.

News source: Social media influencers

Attitudes towards social media influencers reveal persistent doubts about their credibility, although these doubts are less severe than those towards anonymous networks.

In Albania, more than half of respondents in 2024 considered influencers as misinformation sources, but this fell to 46.7% in 2025, suggesting some softening of perceptions. Bosnia and Herzegovina showed stability, with 36–38% perceiving misinformation and a comparable share (33.7% in 2024 and 28.8% in 2025) seeing bias. Kosovo*, in contrast, again stood out for labelling influencers more often as biased (around half) rather than sources of misinformation. Montenegro and North Macedonia exhibited relatively balanced perceptions across the categories of misinformation and bias. In Serbia, there was an increase in uncertainty, with almost 26% of respondents in 2025 choosing not to answer, suggesting that the public may be increasingly disengaged from influencer discourse or less sure about how to categorise it.

News source: Politicians

According to the SecuriMeter 2025 findings, the politicians were consistently seen as the most untrustworthy entities overall. In Albania, nearly two-thirds labelled politicians as biased in years 2024 and 2025, and about a third considered them to be misinformation sources. Bosnia and Herzegovina showed a similar picture, with the share of politicians described as spreading misinformation growing from 37.1% to 43%. Kosovo* respondents again leaned towards labelling politicians as biased (54.7% in 2025), although the proportion describing them as misinformation sources also increased. Respondents from Montenegro and North Macedonia mainly viewed politicians as biased, although there was a decline in this perception in Montenegro from 2024 to 2025. Serbia exhibited persistently high distrust, with over 36% labelling politicians as misinformation sources and over 38% seeing bias. These results highlight that across the region political elites are broadly distrusted.

News source: Independent journalists

Independent journalists were perceived more favourably, with a higher share of respondents describing them as neutral. Albania, for example, showed that around one-third of respondents viewed independent journalists as neutral, and a smaller share (22.3%) labelled them as misinformation sources. All other WB6 showed similar patterns, with around one-third of respondents assigning neutral credibility. However, Montenegro and Serbia recorded significant increases in uncertainty in 2025, with nearly one-fifth of respondents in Serbia declining to answer whether independent journalists were misinformation sources or not.

News source: Political parties

Political parties were perceived very negatively, with high and stable levels of mistrust. In Albania, over two-thirds of respondents in 2024-2025 classified political parties as biased. Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced an increase in perceptions of misinformation, reaching nearly 44% in 2025. Kosovo* showed rising scepticism, with the proportion labelling parties as misinformation sources increasing from 13.7% to 20.2%. In Montenegro and North Macedonia, similar patterns were evident, with most respondents identifying political parties as biased. Serbia again stood out for high levels of uncertainty, with the share of respondents declining to answer about political parties rising to 13.5% in 2025.

Overall, the data indicate that perceptions of misinformation and bias are widespread across all information sources, but they vary significantly by WB6, media type, and source. Local and international TV channels are often seen as biased rather than as primary sources of misinformation, while anonymous online spaces and politicians are regarded with the most suspicion. Social media influencers and foreign social media accounts occupy an intermediate position, with notable shares of respondents expressing uncertainty. These findings suggest that public trust in information sources remains fragile and might be influenced by local political contexts and media literacy levels.

METHODOLOGY AND SAMPLE

The methodology used for the Public Opinion Survey on Security – SecuriMeter was quantitative research, employing a computer-assisted interviewing data collection method. The data were collected by trained interviewers from a regional consortium of research companies between 30 May and 18 June 2025 in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo*, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia.

As part of the project set-up phase, some preparations and adjustments were undertaken as necessary for the successful implementation of the survey.

Questionnaire

RCC provided the initial draft questionnaire. The main questionnaire, consisting of 46 questions, and an additional 20 demographic questions were initially written in English and subsequently translated into local languages. Since the computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI) method of data collection was used in the research, all questionnaires were programmed/converted to a digital format to include all scripting and interviewers' instructions.

Training of Interviewers

The survey was conducted by experienced interviewers in all WB6. All interviewers were given detailed instructions that included a general description of the project objective, the questionnaire, and the method for selecting respondents. In addition, project coordinators/WB6 team leaders reviewed the programmed questionnaires jointly with the interviewers and emphasised all important elements (mainly which individual answers to read or not, where one or more answers were possible, etc.).

Sample

Public Opinion Survey on Security – SecuriMeter was conducted among a minimum of N=1000 respondents in each Western Balkans Six, aged 18+, with the total sample size of N=6007 respondents for the entire region. The sample size for each WB6 is designed to achieve a 95% confidence level with a 3% margin of error.

The target respondents were persons:

- aged 18 or older who reside in private households,
- whose usual place of residence is in the territory of the WB6 included in the survey,
- who speak the local language(s) well enough to respond to the questionnaire.

SAMPLE STRUCTURE

Table 7. Sample structure by gender, age, education, ethnicity and sense of belonging to minority group, by WB6

		WB6						
		Albania	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Kosovo*	Montenegro	North Macedonia	Serbia	Western Balkans
Gender	Female	51.0%	51.5%	49.8%	51.5%	51.0%	52.0%	51.2%
	Male	49.0%	48.5%	50.2%	48.5%	49.0%	48.0%	48.8%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Age	18 - 24	10.4%	11.3%	15.7%	9.8%	10.0%	8.7%	11.0%
	25 - 34	15.3%	17.8%	19.1%	16.6%	17.0%	14.0%	16.6%
	35 - 44	14.9%	17.3%	17.8%	18.8%	17.0%	16.8%	17.1%
	45 - 54	15.8%	19.0%	17.6%	16.9%	17.0%	16.9%	17.2%
	55 - 64	19.2%	17.0%	14.7%	16.3%	17.0%	16.8%	16.8%
	65+	24.3%	17.7%	15.1%	21.5%	22.0%	26.7%	21.2%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Education	No education / primary school	14.8%	5.6%	19.7%	5.9%	16.4%	7.5%	11.6%
	High school (vocational or high school)	56.4%	59.2%	52.0%	47.3%	55.3%	51.9%	53.7%
	College / university	21.4%	26.5%	25.4%	33.4%	25.0%	29.9%	27.0%
	Master's degree / Doctorate	7.4%	6.5%	2.9%	8.3%	3.1%	6.5%	5.8%
	Refuses to answer		2.2%		5.1%	0.2%	4.2%	1.9%
Ethnicity	Serb		30.9%	5.0%	33.2%	2.6%	80.8%	25.5%
	Macedonian	0.5%			0.3%	62.9%	2.7%	11.1%
	Bosniak	0.5%	50.1%	1.2%	9.5%	1.2%	2.3%	10.8%
	Albanian	95.1%		90.0%	5.0%	26.0%	0.9%	36.1%
	Montenegrin	0.5%			41.5%	0.2%	0.7%	7.2%
	Croatian		15.4%		0.8%	0.1%	0.6%	2.8%
	Roma	1.9%		1.0%	0.9%	3.6%	2.0%	1.6%
	Other	1.1%	2.8%	2.8%	5.9%	3.3%	3.2%	3.2%
	Refuses to answer	0.4%	0.8%		2.9%	0.1%	6.9%	1.8%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Sense of belonging to minority group	Yes	5.0%	10.8%	7.4%	20.8%	11.8%	17.2%	12.2%
	No	94.6%	84.6%	92.1%	73.2%	86.0%	76.0%	84.4%
	Don't know /Refuse to answer	0.4%	4.6%	0.5%	6.0%	2.2%	6.8%	3.4%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 8. Sample structure by working status, employment in public or private sector and occupation

		WB6						
		Albania	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Kosovo*	Montenegro	North Macedonia	Serbia	Western Balkans
Working status	Employed – having a paid job	57.2%	52.5%	46.8%	54.3%	53.8%	52.0%	52.8%
	Unemployed-not having but actively searching for a job	7.7%	15.2%	8.5%	11.3%	12.1%	11.7%	11.1%
	Not employed and not actively searching employment	35.1%	27.6%	29.4%	24.1%	27.5%	25.6%	28.2%
	Refuse to answer		4.7%	15.3%	10.3%	6.6%	10.7%	7.9%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Employment in private or public sector	Private sector	81.3%	63.4%	74.8%	53.8%	65.4%	60.7%	66.6%
	Public sector	18.7%	36.6%	25.2%	46.2%	34.6%	39.3%	33.4%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Occupation	Farmer	4.6%	2.1%	3.4%	1.8%	2.6%	2.1%	2.8%
	Fisherman	0.2%	1.3%		0.7%		0.8%	0.5%
	Professional (lawyer, medical practitioner, accountant, architect, etc.)	4.2%	5.7%	5.1%	4.0%	2.0%	4.6%	4.3%
	Owner of a shop, craftsmen, other self-employed person	29.8%	4.2%	12.6%	3.9%	7.4%	5.7%	10.8%
	Business proprietors, owner (full or partner) of a company	1.2%	2.3%	4.5%	2.6%	1.7%	1.9%	2.3%
	Employed professional (employed doctor, lawyer, accountant, architect)	9.8%	9.9%	6.6%	11.6%	5.2%	10.5%	9.0%
	General management, director or top management (managing directors, director general, other director)	2.3%	1.7%	2.6%	2.9%	1.9%	0.8%	2.0%
	Middle management, other management (department head, junior manager, teacher, technician)	6.8%	8.0%	11.3%	9.6%	11.0%	12.5%	9.8%
	Employed position, working mainly at a desk	12.5%	24.5%	9.4%	30.5%	22.3%	21.3%	20.2%
	Employed position, not at a desk but travelling (salesmen, driver, etc.)	7.9%	12.0%	13.2%	9.4%	8.9%	6.1%	9.5%
	Employed position, not at a desk, but in a service job (hospital, restaurant, police, fireman, etc.)	7.2%	9.9%	15.1%	11.0%	9.9%	14.2%	11.1%
	Supervisor	0.2%	0.4%	0.6%	1.5%	1.7%	1.7%	1.0%
	Skilled manual worker	10.2%	13.5%	8.7%	6.3%	22.2%	11.1%	12.0%
	Other (unskilled) manual worker, servant	3.2%	4.6%	6.8%	4.2%	3.2%	6.7%	4.7%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 9. Sample structure by civil status

		WB6						
		Albania	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Kosovo*	Montenegro	North Macedonia	Serbia	Western Balkans
Civil status	Married without kids	3.4%	18.6%	4.5%	11.8%	9.8%	11.3%	9.9%
	Married with kids	68.4%	41.9%	65.6%	43.8%	55.3%	45.5%	53.4%
	I live with a partner	0.9%	5.5%	1.3%	6.9%	2.6%	8.6%	4.3%
	Divorced	1.7%	6.1%	1.0%	7.5%	2.7%	9.6%	4.8%
	Single	19.7%	20.2%	24.6%	17.3%	19.9%	11.9%	18.9%
	Widow/er	5.9%	4.6%	2.9%	6.4%	8.5%	7.7%	6.0%
	Refuses to answer	0.0%	3.1%	0.1%	6.4%	1.2%	5.6%	2.7%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 10. Sample structure by region

WB6	Region	%
Albania	Tiranë	38.0%
	Veri	16.0%
	Qendër	17.0%
	Jug	29.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina	62.1%
	Republika Srpska	35.5%
	Brčko District	2.4%
Kosovo*	Prishtina	31.2%
	Mitrovica	14.0%
	Gjilani	9.2%
	Peja	8.9%
	Prizreni	16.5%
	Gjakova	9.2%
	Ferizaji	11.0%
Montenegro	North region	24.4%
	Centar	49.6%
	South	26.0%
North Macedonia	Vardar	8.0%
	East	9.0%
	Southwest	8.0%
	Southeast	10.0%
	Pealgonia	12.0%
	Polog	13.0%
	Northeast	8.0%
	Skopje	32.0%
Serbia	Belgrade	25.1%
	Vojvodina	26.1%
	Central and Western Serbia	27.4%
	Southern and Eastern Serbia	21.4%

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ANNEX 1

Table 1. The level of satisfaction with the current state of the economy, by year and WB6

Q1. How satisfied are you with the way things are going in your economy?
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024 / N=5791 in 2023 / N=6041 in 2022 and N=6046 in 2021

		I'm completely dissatisfied	I'm mostly dissatisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	I'm mostly satisfied	I'm completely satisfied	Don't know / Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2021	9.1%	31.1%	29.1%	29.1%	1.6%	0.0%	100.0%
	2022	22.1%	36.0%	22.2%	18.9%	0.7%	0.0%	100.0%
	2023	16.4%	26.5%	26.1%	26.7%	4.2%	0.0%	100.0%
	2024	15.1%	28.4%	26.1%	28.3%	2.0%	0.1%	100.0%
	2025	16.0%	28.7%	23.5%	28.2%	3.6%	0.1%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2021	16.5%	26.8%	26.8%	20.7%	9.2%	0.1%	100.0%
	2022	30.9%	28.4%	23.9%	14.7%	1.7%	0.4%	100.0%
	2023	17.8%	38.5%	25.9%	13.7%	3.7%	0.4%	100.0%
	2024	11.5%	30.0%	32.9%	21.8%	3.3%	0.6%	100.0%
	2025	18.8%	37.8%	31.1%	10.6%	1.2%	0.6%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2021	16.3%	22.3%	49.2%	10.9%	1.3%	0.0%	100.0%
	2022	4.3%	16.2%	31.4%	38.5%	9.6%	0.1%	100.0%
	2023	6.3%	18.3%	45.7%	25.0%	4.6%	0.1%	100.0%
	2024	6.3%	18.9%	40.3%	26.2%	8.3%	0.0%	100.0%
	2025	8.4%	27.1%	35.1%	26.5%	2.6%	0.2%	100.0%
Montenegro	2021	4.1%	8.2%	24.7%	49.5%	13.4%	0.2%	100.0%
	2022	15.8%	21.6%	29.2%	29.1%	2.7%	1.6%	100.0%
	2023	12.4%	28.2%	32.3%	23.2%	3.1%	0.8%	100.0%
	2024	12.4%	25.1%	32.7%	22.6%	4.5%	2.7%	100.0%
	2025	13.3%	23.9%	31.6%	23.3%	4.6%	3.3%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2021	33.9%	18.3%	30.1%	11.8%	5.4%	0.6%	100.0%
	2022	23.5%	26.0%	30.3%	18.9%	1.3%	0.1%	100.0%
	2023	23.0%	30.6%	28.5%	16.4%	1.4%	0.1%	100.0%
	2024	16.5%	30.6%	29.8%	19.9%	3.0%	0.3%	100.0%
	2025	18.8%	27.7%	27.1%	21.6%	3.7%	1.0%	100.0%
Serbia	2021	12.3%	16.6%	28.4%	33.0%	9.5%	0.2%	100.0%
	2022	9.5%	17.8%	28.6%	34.3%	9.6%	0.3%	100.0%
	2023	18.6%	28.8%	30.1%	16.7%	5.0%	0.7%	100.0%
	2024	13.5%	25.0%	27.5%	26.1%	5.2%	2.7%	100.0%
	2025	25.8%	26.4%	22.2%	19.3%	3.2%	3.0%	100.0%
WB6	2021	15.4%	20.6%	31.4%	25.8%	6.7%	0.2%	100.0%
	2022	17.7%	24.3%	27.6%	25.7%	4.2%	0.4%	100.0%
	2023	15.9%	28.5%	31.4%	20.2%	3.7%	0.3%	100.0%
	2024	12.5%	26.3%	31.5%	24.2%	4.4%	1.1%	100.0%
	2025	16.9%	28.6%	28.4%	21.6%	3.1%	1.4%	100.0%

Table 2. Security in the Western Balkans, by year and WB6

Q2. Do you agree that the Western Balkans is a secure region to live in?
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024 / N=5791 in 2023 / N=6041 in 2022 and N=6046 in 2021

		Totally disagree / Completely disagree	Tend to disagree / Mostly disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Tend to agree / Mostly agree	Totally agree / Completely agree	Don't know / Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2021	1.1%	26.5%		51.6%	5.1%	15.7%	100.0%
	2022	5.2%	35.2%		48.2%	2.6%	8.9%	100.0%
	2023	5.3%	20.7%		53.2%	15.2%	5.5%	100.0%
	2024	8.7%	31.1%	21.6%	31.7%	2.7%	4.2%	100.0%
	2025	4.2%	30.0%	19.5%	31.9%	10.6%	3.8%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2021	8.3%	32.9%		44.1%	12.1%	2.6%	100.0%
	2022	19.1%	39.3%		34.1%	3.5%	3.9%	100.0%
	2023	11.9%	35.7%		42.7%	7.2%	2.5%	100.0%
	2024	8.7%	21.9%	34.6%	29.7%	4.1%	1.1%	100.0%
	2025	12.8%	26.8%	34.1%	23.0%	2.1%	1.3%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2021	3.6%	29.2%		62.1%	4.4%	0.8%	100.0%
	2022	3.7%	14.5%		71.9%	8.7%	1.2%	100.0%
	2023	15.9%	39.0%		29.7%	14.7%	0.8%	100.0%
	2024	4.1%	17.3%	36.0%	34.0%	7.6%	1.0%	100.0%
	2025	4.2%	17.7%	33.3%	39.0%	4.0%	1.9%	100.0%
Montenegro	2021	1.0%	12.4%		68.3%	11.9%	6.4%	100.0%
	2022	11.9%	20.8%		52.3%	7.8%	7.1%	100.0%
	2023	12.0%	28.4%		49.9%	6.0%	3.7%	100.0%
	2024	8.5%	21.2%	25.8%	35.2%	6.1%	3.2%	100.0%
	2025	9.3%	19.6%	30.6%	32.1%	4.9%	3.5%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2021	16.1%	21.4%		42.9%	18.1%	1.5%	100.0%
	2022	12.8%	30.3%		48.9%	4.3%	3.6%	100.0%
	2023	16.3%	28.3%		43.1%	11.1%	1.2%	100.0%
	2024	7.5%	21.2%	26.0%	36.2%	7.0%	2.2%	100.0%
	2025	7.2%	21.5%	23.6%	38.7%	7.4%	1.6%	100.0%
Serbia	2021	6.6%	23.8%		54.8%	10.3%	4.6%	100.0%
	2022	4.9%	26.6%		52.7%	9.8%	6.0%	100.0%
	2023	13.2%	32.9%		44.5%	6.2%	3.3%	100.0%
	2024	8.3%	21.3%	25.1%	34.0%	8.1%	3.2%	100.0%
	2025	10.0%	23.1%	27.2%	30.1%	6.6%	3.0%	100.0%
WB6	2021	6.1%	24.4%		53.9%	10.3%	5.3%	100.0%
	2022	9.6%	27.8%		51.3%	6.1%	5.1%	100.0%
	2023	12.5%	30.9%		43.6%	10.2%	2.8%	100.0%
	2024	7.6%	22.3%	28.2%	33.5%	5.9%	2.5%	100.0%
	2025	7.9%	23.1%	28.0%	32.5%	5.9%	2.5%	100.0%

Table 3. Security in your economy, by year and WB6

Q3. Do you agree that your economy is a secure place to live in?
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024 / N=5791 in 2023 / N=6041 in 2022 and N=6046 in 2021

		Totally disagree	Tend to disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Tend to agree	Totally agree	Don't know / Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2021	2.3%	30.9%		59.9%	6.0%	0.9%	100.0%
	2022	9.5%	37.0%		50.8%	2.3%	0.5%	100.0%
	2023	7.6%	25.2%		46.2%	21.0%		100.0%
	2024	5.2%	27.2%	16.5%	39.9%	11.2%		100.0%
	2025	7.9%	25.6%	16.3%	34.5%	15.6%	0.1%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2021	12.5%	32.2%		39.3%	14.3%	1.6%	100.0%
	2022	20.0%	32.4%		38.9%	5.9%	2.9%	100.0%
	2023	12.4%	32.6%		42.9%	10.6%	1.4%	100.0%
	2024	6.4%	20.7%	31.2%	35.3%	5.4%	1.1%	100.0%
	2025	11.1%	22.8%	32.9%	29.4%	3.1%	0.8%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2021	4.1%	25.9%		63.2%	6.7%	0.1%	100.0%
	2022	3.8%	9.4%		68.1%	17.8%	0.9%	100.0%
	2023	6.4%	35.4%		41.5%	16.6%	0.1%	100.0%
	2024	4.3%	12.1%	26.3%	41.4%	15.7%	0.2%	100.0%
	2025	3.0%	13.8%	23.8%	50.0%	8.4%	1.0%	100.0%
Montenegro	2021	1.4%	7.3%		60.6%	28.9%	1.8%	100.0%
	2022	6.3%	16.3%		59.9%	12.6%	5.0%	100.0%
	2023	6.0%	20.7%		57.7%	13.4%	2.2%	100.0%
	2024	4.6%	15.0%	20.8%	42.1%	15.4%	2.1%	100.0%
	2025	6.3%	17.0%	19.8%	42.5%	12.4%	2.0%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2021	14.9%	20.4%		39.0%	25.4%	0.3%	100.0%
	2022	7.7%	24.1%		56.6%	10.3%	1.4%	100.0%
	2023	10.9%	23.8%		43.9%	21.3%	0.1%	100.0%
	2024	5.1%	15.5%	24.9%	42.4%	11.5%	0.7%	100.0%
	2025	6.3%	17.8%	21.1%	42.6%	11.9%	0.2%	100.0%
Serbia	2021	3.6%	18.4%		57.1%	19.3%	1.7%	100.0%
	2022	3.5%	16.5%		58.1%	19.4%	2.5%	100.0%
	2023	12.1%	31.1%		45.9%	9.1%	1.9%	100.0%
	2024	5.3%	16.6%	23.0%	39.9%	13.2%	2.1%	100.0%
	2025	11.5%	22.2%	23.2%	31.0%	10.2%	1.9%	100.0%
WB6	2021	6.5%	22.6%		53.2%	16.7%	1.1%	100.0%
	2022	8.5%	22.6%		55.4%	11.4%	2.2%	100.0%
	2023	9.4%	28.4%		45.9%	15.4%	0.9%	100.0%
	2024	5.1%	17.8%	23.8%	40.2%	12.1%	1.0%	100.0%
	2025	7.7%	19.9%	22.9%	38.3%	10.3%	1.0%	100.0%

Table 4. Future security in the Western Balkans, by year and WB6

Q4. If you consider all the current international and regional developments, in your opinion, what will the security situation in the Western Balkans be in the next 12 months? All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Completely negative	Mostly negative	Neither negative nor positive	Mostly positive	Completel y positive	Don't know/Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2024	2.3%	34.1%	29.3%	24.5%	0.8%	9.0%	100.0%
	2025	1.1%	25.6%	30.1%	32.3%	2.3%	8.6%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	5.7%	27.9%	41.1%	20.0%	2.4%	3.0%	100.0%
	2025	8.0%	33.2%	36.5%	18.3%	1.5%	2.6%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	3.1%	12.8%	44.3%	28.0%	6.5%	5.3%	100.0%
	2025	2.0%	13.6%	45.1%	32.9%	4.0%	2.4%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	4.5%	20.5%	29.4%	34.1%	6.3%	5.2%	100.0%
	2025	5.2%	22.2%	27.8%	30.5%	5.0%	9.4%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	5.3%	19.3%	34.9%	28.8%	4.0%	7.8%	100.0%
	2025	4.1%	20.8%	31.6%	30.4%	5.2%	7.8%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	5.4%	24.6%	35.0%	26.5%	5.1%	3.4%	100.0%
	2025	6.7%	30.4%	30.8%	22.1%	3.1%	6.9%	100.0%
WB6	2024	4.4%	23.2%	35.7%	27.0%	4.2%	5.6%	100.0%
	2025	4.5%	24.3%	33.6%	27.8%	3.5%	6.3%	100.0%

Table 5. Impact of international development on your economy's security, by year and WB6

Q5. How do you think the same international and regional developments will affect the security situation in your economy in the next 12 months? All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Completely negative	Mostly negative	Neither negative nor positive	Mostly positive	Completely positive	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2024	1.9%	23.7%	29.3%	36.1%	2.3%	6.7%	100.0%
	2025	1.3%	19.7%	31.6%	39.6%	4.5%	3.2%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	5.5%	35.8%	39.1%	13.0%	2.1%	4.6%	100.0%
	2025	6.6%	33.5%	41.8%	13.7%	1.7%	2.8%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	2.9%	13.4%	35.2%	37.7%	7.5%	3.3%	100.0%
	2025	2.5%	13.8%	36.6%	39.8%	5.2%	2.0%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	4.3%	21.3%	33.8%	27.9%	5.8%	6.9%	100.0%
	2025	5.2%	20.4%	37.9%	23.5%	4.1%	8.9%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	4.8%	21.7%	36.8%	24.8%	4.8%	7.2%	100.0%
	2025	4.1%	25.8%	32.4%	26.8%	4.6%	6.3%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	6.1%	33.6%	37.1%	15.0%	3.4%	4.8%	100.0%
	2025	6.4%	36.3%	32.6%	14.6%	2.4%	7.8%	100.0%
WB6	2024	4.2%	24.9%	35.2%	25.7%	4.3%	5.6%	100.0%
	2025	4.3%	24.9%	35.5%	26.3%	3.7%	5.2%	100.0%

Table 6. Degree of concern regarding a war involving their economy, by year and WB6

Q6.1. To what degree are you worried or not about a war involving your economy?
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Not at all	Not much	A good deal	Very much	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2024	35.9%	30.9%	23.3%	7.0%	2.9%	100.0%
	2025	37.2%	25.6%	26.0%	8.9%	2.4%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	10.0%	28.8%	38.3%	21.0%	2.0%	100.0%
	2025	10.1%	29.7%	35.8%	23.1%	1.4%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	35.7%	38.8%	18.1%	5.3%	2.1%	100.0%
	2025	37.3%	33.8%	21.0%	6.8%	1.2%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	19.0%	28.5%	27.2%	21.9%	3.4%	100.0%
	2025	20.7%	23.2%	30.5%	21.1%	4.6%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	16.3%	34.6%	27.8%	18.6%	2.8%	100.0%
	2025	20.7%	32.9%	29.7%	14.2%	2.5%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	12.7%	25.8%	35.3%	22.9%	3.3%	100.0%
	2025	12.9%	22.3%	35.3%	24.4%	5.1%	100.0%
WB6	2024	21.6%	31.2%	28.3%	16.1%	2.7%	100.0%
	2025	23.1%	27.9%	29.7%	16.4%	2.9%	100.0%

Table 7. Degree of concern regarding a war between the WB6, by year and WB6

Q6.2. To what degree are you worried or not about a war between the economies of the Western Balkans?
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004

		Not at all	Not much	A good deal	Very much	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2024	13.4%	29.7%	39.0%	14.6%	3.3%	100.0%
	2025	20.2%	29.8%	36.0%	8.5%	5.4%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	10.7%	28.8%	42.2%	15.6%	2.8%	100.0%
	2025	11.2%	31.9%	35.7%	18.5%	2.8%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	29.3%	40.2%	19.9%	4.6%	6.0%	100.0%
	2025	35.5%	37.0%	18.8%	3.9%	4.8%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	17.9%	26.4%	30.5%	19.6%	5.6%	100.0%
	2025	18.3%	23.8%	32.5%	18.3%	7.0%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	14.4%	34.6%	31.1%	15.1%	4.9%	100.0%
	2025	18.7%	33.1%	31.2%	12.7%	4.3%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	14.9%	24.6%	39.7%	16.7%	4.2%	100.0%
	2025	14.5%	25.8%	34.2%	19.6%	5.9%	100.0%
WB6	2024	16.8%	30.7%	33.7%	14.4%	4.5%	100.0%
	2025	19.7%	30.2%	31.4%	13.6%	5.0%	100.0%

Table 8. Degree of concern regarding a terrorist attack, by year and WB6

Q6.3. To what degree are you worried or not about a terrorist attack?
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Not at all	Not much	A good deal	Very much	Don't know/Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2024	29.4%	34.3%	23.3%	6.0%	7.0%	100.0%
	2025	36.8%	25.8%	24.3%	11.4%	1.8%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	18.0%	33.7%	32.4%	13.5%	2.5%	100.0%
	2025	15.4%	35.4%	30.2%	15.0%	4.1%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	31.9%	37.7%	20.9%	4.5%	5.0%	100.0%
	2025	46.9%	20.6%	23.8%	4.5%	4.2%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	20.0%	29.7%	28.3%	17.1%	4.9%	100.0%
	2025	20.0%	25.8%	28.8%	18.9%	6.4%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	17.1%	29.3%	30.0%	19.4%	4.3%	100.0%
	2025	19.4%	31.1%	29.9%	16.2%	3.4%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	20.8%	26.0%	33.5%	15.4%	4.3%	100.0%
	2025	14.7%	26.1%	34.2%	19.3%	5.7%	100.0%
WB6	2024	22.9%	31.8%	28.1%	12.6%	4.7%	100.0%
	2025	25.5%	27.5%	28.5%	14.2%	4.3%	100.0%

Table 9. Degree of concern regarding a civil war in their economy, by year and WB6

Q6.4. To what degree are you worried or not about a civil war in your economy
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Not at all	Not much	A good deal	Very much	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2024	42.5%	29.8%	15.5%	6.8%	5.4%	100.0%
	2025	50.6%	24.6%	16.1%	8.3%	0.4%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	14.2%	27.2%	36.3%	19.9%	2.5%	100.0%
	2025	13.1%	29.2%	33.2%	21.9%	2.7%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	45.6%	25.5%	20.1%	3.0%	5.8%	100.0%
	2025	44.1%	24.3%	24.3%	3.5%	3.9%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	22.1%	28.2%	24.5%	20.9%	4.3%	100.0%
	2025	27.1%	25.6%	23.2%	18.1%	5.9%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	18.6%	30.1%	27.6%	20.6%	3.2%	100.0%
	2025	23.9%	29.4%	28.3%	15.4%	3.0%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	24.0%	26.7%	28.9%	15.8%	4.6%	100.0%
	2025	15.3%	19.2%	31.1%	29.0%	5.4%	100.0%
WB6	2024	27.8%	27.9%	25.5%	14.5%	4.3%	100.0%
	2025	29.0%	25.4%	26.0%	16.0%	3.5%	100.0%

Table 10. Current sense of security, by year and WB6

Q7. Could you tell me how secure do you feel these days?
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		I do not feel secure at all	I do not feel very secure	I feel neither secure nor insecure	I feel quite secure	I feel very secure	Don't know/Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2024	2.8%	16.5%	30.0%	39.7%	10.8%	0.2%	100.0%
	2025	4.3%	22.3%	22.7%	39.4%	11.3%	0.0%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	3.2%	14.4%	33.4%	37.2%	10.8%	1.1%	100.0%
	2025	3.9%	13.5%	38.3%	34.7%	8.4%	1.3%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	2.4%	10.6%	21.7%	44.3%	20.8%	0.2%	100.0%
	2025	1.8%	13.2%	20.4%	49.9%	14.5%	0.3%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	3.3%	9.9%	19.4%	43.9%	21.8%	1.7%	100.0%
	2025	5.3%	13.8%	20.6%	44.9%	13.0%	2.3%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	2.2%	9.2%	23.4%	49.3%	15.5%	0.5%	100.0%
	2025	3.3%	14.7%	22.3%	46.1%	12.9%	0.6%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	4.5%	10.5%	25.6%	42.6%	14.8%	2.0%	100.0%
	2025	6.0%	17.7%	28.1%	36.7%	9.4%	2.1%	100.0%
WB6	2024	3.1%	11.8%	25.6%	42.8%	15.7%	1.0%	100.0%
	2025	4.1%	15.9%	25.4%	41.9%	11.6%	1.1%	100.0%

Table 11. Frequency of neighbourhood events in the WB6, by year and WB6

Q8. How frequently do you hear about or see the following things occur in your neighbourhood?
Respondents who answered "quite frequently" or "very frequently" about the situations mentioned in Q8
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Robberies	Alcohol consumption in the streets	Police or para-military forces interfere with people' s private life	Discriminatory behaviour or verbal harassment targeting my ethnic and religious identity or personal orientation	Drug sale in the streets	Street violence and fights	Sexual harassment	Domestic violence	People begging in the street
Albania	2025	12.9%	29.8%	9.5%	5.0%	22.5%	12.5%	14.1%	20.8%	60.6%
	2024	21.3%	29.4%	9.7%	7.2%	22.9%	11.5%	16.6%	22.7%	57.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2025	27.3%	55.7%	18.1%	21.7%	32.7%	34.7%	17.4%	37.5%	73.6%
	2024	27.0%	54.1%	22.9%	23.1%	28.5%	33.3%	18.1%	42.6%	74.2%
Kosovo*	2025	29.7%	20.6%	16.5%	22.0%	23.3%	24.8%	25.9%	31.1%	49.6%
	2024	19.8%	16.8%	12.5%	9.1%	16.3%	17.0%	13.4%	15.8%	53.8%
Montenegro	2025	27.2%	52.4%	22.3%	28.1%	37.9%	38.4%	25.0%	42.7%	61.7%
	2024	21.5%	46.7%	19.1%	22.3%	33.9%	36.3%	20.1%	33.3%	63.6%
North Macedonia	2025	32.4%	33.9%	17.1%	20.7%	29.6%	27.2%	16.7%	26.2%	49.6%
	2024	35.2%	44.8%	15.1%	20.8%	31.8%	31.5%	20.4%	29.9%	58.2%
Serbia	2025	22.8%	58.3%	24.5%	19.4%	30.2%	35.4%	21.3%	37.8%	57.7%
	2024	20.8%	55.0%	17.2%	17.4%	27.0%	31.6%	21.2%	34.5%	57.2%
WB6	2025	25.4%	41.8%	18.0%	19.5%	29.4%	28.8%	20.1%	32.7%	58.8%
	2024	24.3%	41.1%	16.1%	16.6%	26.7%	26.9%	18.3%	29.8%	60.7%

Table 12. Security measures taken by citizens, by year and WB6
Q9. Which of the following things have you done for reasons of security?
Respondents who answered "yes" regarding measures mentioned in Q9

		Didn't carry much money	Preferred not to go out at night	Carried a knife, gun, or other weapon	Installed video surveillance or a burglar alarm in your place of living	Disguising my ethnic, religious identity, or personal orientation
Albania	2025	60.9%	47.3%	0.9%	16.4%	3.4%
	2024	58.2%	43.5%	1.5%	12.8%	1.5%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2025	53.0%	38.7%	4.6%	21.0%	9.0%
	2024	56.0%	38.3%	6.5%	21.8%	7.8%
Kosovo*	2025	44.4%	35.7%	1.7%	19.4%	4.2%
	2024	44.3%	33.3%	3.0%	12.6%	7.2%
Montenegro	2025	48.6%	34.0%	3.2%	22.3%	8.7%
	2024	49.1%	32.0%	5.1%	15.8%	9.9%
North Macedonia	2025	60.4%	21.5%	5.2%	21.2%	6.4%
	2024	59.3%	20.1%	5.3%	19.8%	5.9%
Serbia	2025	59.3%	40.2%	3.8%	23.4%	6.8%
	2024	58.8%	40.5%	4.9%	22.0%	5.6%
WB6	2025	54.4%	36.2%	3.2%	20.6%	6.4%
	2024	54.3%	34.6%	4.4%	17.5%	6.3%

Table 13. Satisfaction with public security measures, by WB6

Q10. How satisfied or not are you with the following public security measures in your area? Base: All, N=6007

		Regular police patrols	Visibility of police in public spaces	Surveillance cameras in public areas	Street lighting	Response efficiency of emergency services
Albania	Dissatisfied	32.7%	31.9%	33.6%	18.6%	30.1%
	Neutral & DK	30.2%	30.7%	28.5%	24.7%	32.9%
	Satisfied	37.0%	37.5%	38.0%	56.7%	37.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Dissatisfied	24.9%	21.7%	18.7%	19.9%	19.4%
	Neutral & DK	38.9%	33.5%	31.8%	25.5%	32.2%
	Satisfied	36.3%	44.9%	49.6%	54.6%	48.5%
Kosovo*	Dissatisfied	18.1%	17.5%	23.3%	12.3%	22.7%
	Neutral & DK	36.8%	34.3%	33.7%	32.4%	28.3%
	Satisfied	45.1%	48.2%	42.9%	55.3%	49.0%
Montenegro	Dissatisfied	35.7%	37.2%	30.1%	30.7%	26.0%
	Neutral & DK	38.9%	32.2%	36.9%	24.2%	29.8%
	Satisfied	25.4%	30.6%	33.0%	45.1%	44.2%
North Macedonia	Dissatisfied	36.3%	31.9%	41.5%	24.5%	27.9%
	Neutral & DK	30.6%	30.5%	27.6%	25.1%	33.2%
	Satisfied	33.2%	37.6%	30.8%	50.4%	38.8%
Serbia	Dissatisfied	31.4%	28.3%	20.6%	27.3%	25.5%
	Neutral & DK	35.2%	33.3%	37.1%	20.7%	30.9%
	Satisfied	33.4%	38.4%	42.3%	51.9%	43.6%
WB6	Dissatisfied	29.8%	28.1%	28.0%	22.2%	25.3%
	Neutral & DK	35.1%	32.4%	32.6%	25.4%	31.2%
	Satisfied	35.1%	39.5%	39.4%	52.3%	43.5%

Table 14. Balancing between freedom and security, by year and WB6

Q12. Most people consider both freedom and security to be important, but if you had to choose between them, which one would you consider more important? All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Freedom	Security	Total
Albania	2024	43.3%	56.7%	100.0%
	2025	36.2%	63.8%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	51.5%	48.5%	100.0%
	2025	55.3%	44.7%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	54.6%	45.4%	100.0%
	2025	56.5%	43.5%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	60.4%	39.6%	100.0%
	2025	58.3%	41.7%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	46.8%	53.2%	100.0%
	2025	47.7%	52.3%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	65.3%	34.7%	100.0%
	2025	64.4%	35.6%	100.0%
WB6	2024	53.6%	46.4%	100.0%
	2025	53.1%	46.9%	100.0%

Table 15. Depicting our ethnic or religious identity as superior to other identities, by year and WB6

Q13. To what extent do you agree or disagree that the videos or other types of online visuals and materials with the following message "Depicting our ethnic or religious identity as superior to other identities" may radicalise your children and young relatives and their friends in the online sphere?
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		I completely disagree	I mostly disagree	I neither agree nor disagree	I mostly agree	I completely agree	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2024	12.9%	20.2%	15.5%	29.8%	12.1%	9.5%	100.0%
	2025	7.6%	19.3%	16.8%	33.1%	14.2%	9.0%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	12.7%	19.3%	34.4%	19.0%	11.3%	3.4%	100.0%
	2025	15.9%	15.6%	35.1%	17.6%	12.4%	3.5%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	12.8%	22.6%	30.8%	22.1%	6.3%	5.4%	100.0%
	2025	14.2%	17.1%	16.1%	30.8%	18.5%	3.3%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	14.2%	20.4%	29.5%	17.2%	11.6%	7.1%	100.0%
	2025	25.9%	10.4%	25.1%	20.7%	10.0%	8.0%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	17.4%	14.5%	27.4%	25.6%	8.5%	6.7%	100.0%
	2025	15.5%	14.3%	24.3%	29.4%	12.6%	4.0%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	16.3%	17.1%	25.6%	22.8%	13.1%	5.2%	100.0%
	2025	22.7%	16.6%	25.2%	17.7%	12.3%	5.5%	100.0%
WB6	2024	14.4%	19.0%	27.2%	22.7%	10.5%	6.2%	100.0%
	2025	17.0%	15.5%	23.8%	24.9%	13.3%	5.5%	100.0%

Table 16. Showing white people more law compliant than others such as Africans, Roma, or Middle Easterners, by year and WB6

Q13. To what extent do you agree or disagree that the videos or other types of online visuals and materials with the following message, "Showing white people more law compliant than others, such as Africans, Roma, or Middle Easterners", may radicalise your children and young relatives and their friends in the online sphere?
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		I completely disagree	I mostly disagree	I neither agree nor disagree	I mostly agree	I completely agree	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2024	12.9%	17.8%	16.4%	32.6%	11.5%	8.8%	100.0%
	2025	4.5%	10.9%	20.1%	36.0%	20.8%	7.6%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	13.7%	18.8%	29.8%	20.1%	13.7%	4.0%	100.0%
	2025	19.9%	17.5%	26.9%	16.7%	15.1%	4.0%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	13.6%	19.7%	37.7%	16.3%	6.1%	6.6%	100.0%
	2025	15.6%	19.2%	24.7%	25.5%	11.5%	3.5%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	13.8%	24.1%	28.4%	16.0%	9.9%	7.8%	100.0%
	2025	29.0%	11.3%	21.3%	18.7%	11.3%	8.4%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	16.9%	16.5%	24.4%	23.7%	10.7%	7.9%	100.0%
	2025	14.1%	16.0%	25.6%	23.5%	15.7%	5.1%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	19.7%	16.1%	24.5%	20.8%	12.5%	6.6%	100.0%
	2025	27.2%	14.9%	20.6%	17.2%	13.4%	6.7%	100.0%
WB6	2024	15.1%	18.8%	26.8%	21.6%	10.7%	6.9%	100.0%
	2025	18.4%	15.0%	23.2%	22.9%	14.6%	5.9%	100.0%

Table 17. Stereotyping Muslims as terrorists and blaming them as perpetrators of terrorist attacks against West, by year and WB6

Q13. To what extent do you agree or disagree that the videos or other types of online visuals and materials with the following message "Stereotyping Muslims as terrorists and blaming them as perpetrators of terrorist attacks against West" may radicalise your children and young relatives and their friends in the online sphere?
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		I completely disagree	I mostly disagree	I neither agree nor disagree	I mostly agree	I completely agree	Don't know/Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2024	11.6%	16.0%	16.2%	33.4%	18.1%	4.7%	100.0%
	2025	4.5%	11.7%	17.7%	35.1%	25.8%	5.3%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	15.3%	14.3%	30.3%	21.4%	15.0%	3.8%	100.0%
	2025	18.8%	15.8%	25.5%	17.2%	18.1%	4.7%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	14.4%	17.4%	33.2%	21.4%	6.6%	7.0%	100.0%
	2025	18.2%	10.2%	21.4%	33.5%	10.8%	5.9%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	14.2%	20.0%	30.0%	16.6%	11.1%	8.1%	100.0%
	2025	24.7%	13.2%	24.5%	15.6%	12.8%	9.3%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	13.4%	13.6%	23.9%	29.8%	12.8%	6.6%	100.0%
	2025	14.5%	11.3%	24.3%	25.5%	19.4%	4.9%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	14.4%	18.3%	27.1%	22.0%	11.2%	7.1%	100.0%
	2025	18.5%	17.2%	23.8%	18.9%	14.8%	7.0%	100.0%
WB6	2024	13.9%	16.6%	26.8%	24.1%	12.5%	6.2%	100.0%
	2025	16.5%	13.2%	22.9%	24.3%	16.9%	6.2%	100.0%

Table 18. Claiming superiority of the religion which I believe as the most peaceful and merciful religion compared to other religions and beliefs, by year and WB6

Q13. To what extent do you agree or disagree that the videos or other types of online visuals and materials with the following message "Claiming superiority of the religion which I believe as the most peaceful and merciful religion compared to other religions and beliefs" may radicalise your children and young relatives and their friends in the online sphere? All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		I completely disagree	I mostly disagree	I neither agree nor disagree	I mostly agree	I completely agree	Don't know/Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2024	11.9%	21.8%	20.1%	26.7%	11.0%	8.5%	100.0%
	2025	6.2%	17.2%	23.5%	26.9%	17.4%	8.9%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	8.4%	12.4%	37.1%	25.4%	12.1%	4.7%	100.0%
	2025	15.7%	15.7%	30.2%	19.2%	14.7%	4.6%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	18.9%	20.5%	28.5%	20.6%	5.2%	6.3%	100.0%
	2025	16.4%	15.8%	25.9%	25.9%	9.4%	6.5%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	11.1%	18.4%	30.8%	18.6%	14.1%	7.0%	100.0%
	2025	18.7%	11.3%	23.9%	21.1%	16.3%	8.7%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	15.4%	14.9%	30.1%	25.4%	7.3%	7.0%	100.0%
	2025	14.0%	16.0%	24.3%	24.0%	16.7%	4.9%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	12.7%	16.7%	28.6%	23.0%	13.0%	6.1%	100.0%
	2025	16.3%	14.1%	28.5%	20.5%	13.4%	7.3%	100.0%
WB6	2024	13.1%	17.4%	29.2%	23.3%	10.4%	6.6%	100.0%
	2025	14.6%	15.0%	26.1%	22.9%	14.6%	6.8%	100.0%

Table 19. Reports claiming the increase in crime rates in cities are connected with the influx of immigrants, by year and WB6

Q13. To what extent do you agree or disagree that the videos or other types of online visuals and materials with the following message "Reports claiming the increase in crime rates in cities are connected with the influx of immigrants" may radicalise your children and young relatives and their friends in the online sphere?
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		I completely disagree	I mostly disagree	I neither agree nor disagree	I mostly agree	I completely agree	Don't know/Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2024	11.4%	19.2%	21.4%	32.1%	8.4%	7.5%	100.0%
	2025	3.9%	14.2%	22.5%	34.7%	17.9%	6.8%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	8.0%	17.2%	35.5%	24.5%	10.3%	4.6%	100.0%
	2025	9.9%	17.2%	30.8%	23.2%	13.9%	5.1%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	16.3%	16.9%	35.6%	20.2%	3.6%	7.4%	100.0%
	2025	16.5%	18.0%	23.9%	27.5%	7.7%	6.4%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	7.8%	22.0%	31.1%	20.9%	10.7%	7.5%	100.0%
	2025	8.5%	11.3%	30.8%	27.9%	13.2%	8.4%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	14.0%	12.8%	28.7%	28.6%	9.2%	6.8%	100.0%
	2025	12.9%	14.7%	25.1%	27.0%	15.8%	4.5%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	8.3%	19.7%	28.8%	25.5%	11.4%	6.3%	100.0%
	2025	9.3%	11.7%	30.6%	27.3%	14.5%	6.7%	100.0%
WB6	2024	11.0%	18.0%	30.2%	25.3%	8.9%	6.7%	100.0%
	2025	10.2%	14.5%	27.3%	27.9%	13.8%	6.3%	100.0%

Table 20. Increase in unemployment and poverty due to the presence of foreign workers in my economy, by year and WB6

Q13. To what extent do you agree or disagree that the videos or other types of online visuals and materials with the following message “Increase in unemployment and poverty due to the presence of foreign workers in my economy” may radicalise your children and young relatives and their friends in the online sphere?
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		I completely disagree	I mostly disagree	I neither agree nor disagree	I mostly agree	I completely agree	Don’t know/Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2024	13.4%	19.9%	22.9%	27.2%	8.2%	8.4%	100.0%
	2025	6.5%	17.1%	20.4%	30.1%	18.7%	7.3%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	10.6%	22.6%	30.4%	22.2%	10.7%	3.6%	100.0%
	2025	11.6%	19.6%	33.1%	19.5%	11.5%	4.8%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	11.2%	24.2%	33.7%	19.6%	4.3%	7.0%	100.0%
	2025	15.7%	15.8%	26.2%	27.6%	8.9%	5.8%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	8.2%	22.8%	31.3%	20.4%	11.1%	6.2%	100.0%
	2025	9.0%	14.8%	28.3%	24.1%	15.1%	8.8%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	13.0%	14.6%	25.4%	29.6%	11.7%	5.8%	100.0%
	2025	14.1%	14.4%	22.3%	25.5%	19.4%	4.3%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	9.7%	23.1%	27.5%	21.8%	12.5%	5.5%	100.0%
	2025	10.6%	16.4%	25.3%	24.4%	16.5%	6.9%	100.0%
WB6	2024	11.0%	21.2%	28.5%	23.5%	9.7%	6.1%	100.0%
	2025	11.2%	16.3%	25.9%	25.2%	15.0%	6.3%	100.0%

Table 21. Praising the history of my economy and nation, despite all other nations' efforts to prevent, by year and WB6

Q13. To what extent do you agree or disagree that the videos or other types of online visuals and materials with the following message “Praising the history of my economy and nation despite all other nations' efforts to prevent” may radicalise your children and young relatives and their friends in the online sphere?
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		I completely disagree	I mostly disagree	I neither agree nor disagree	I mostly agree	I completely agree	Don’t know/ Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2024	12.9%	23.2%	22.2%	20.7%	5.1%	15.9%	100.0%
	2025	5.4%	14.8%	24.7%	28.3%	16.8%	9.9%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	7.4%	13.4%	43.6%	21.3%	9.6%	4.8%	100.0%
	2025	9.7%	15.6%	36.0%	21.2%	12.2%	5.4%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	15.0%	20.3%	28.1%	24.5%	5.0%	7.1%	100.0%
	2025	15.8%	16.3%	25.9%	27.3%	8.4%	6.3%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	9.0%	18.1%	35.7%	19.5%	8.8%	8.9%	100.0%
	2025	13.6%	11.7%	32.7%	20.0%	12.2%	9.9%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	15.1%	14.0%	29.4%	25.8%	9.2%	6.6%	100.0%
	2025	17.1%	14.5%	24.9%	20.7%	16.5%	6.3%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	9.1%	15.7%	30.5%	24.2%	13.3%	7.3%	100.0%
	2025	12.0%	13.0%	31.4%	22.3%	13.4%	8.0%	100.0%
WB6	2024	11.4%	17.4%	31.6%	22.7%	8.5%	8.4%	100.0%
	2025	12.3%	14.3%	29.3%	23.3%	13.2%	7.6%	100.0%

Table 22. Showing people who own guns or act like a member of mafia, by year and WB6

Q13. To what extent do you agree or disagree that the videos or other types of online visuals and materials with the following message "Showing people who own guns or act like a member of mafia" may radicalise your children and young relatives and their friends in the online sphere?
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		I completely disagree	I mostly disagree	I neither agree nor disagree	I mostly agree	I completely agree	Don't know/Refuse to answer
Albania	2024	10.7%	13.8%	15.2%	34.6%	16.1%	9.6%
	2025	3.2%	6.5%	15.1%	35.2%	34.5%	5.4%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	9.6%	12.2%	30.2%	25.6%	17.3%	5.2%
	2025	15.4%	13.7%	23.5%	20.8%	21.1%	5.6%
Kosovo*	2024	12.6%	14.6%	39.3%	20.7%	5.7%	7.1%
	2025	13.8%	15.7%	21.9%	28.9%	12.9%	6.9%
Montenegro	2024	10.7%	16.5%	30.1%	19.6%	13.9%	9.2%
	2025	15.4%	9.4%	25.4%	21.2%	18.4%	10.3%
North Macedonia	2024	14.1%	13.6%	25.7%	29.5%	10.4%	6.8%
	2025	14.5%	10.3%	20.3%	29.0%	20.9%	5.0%
Serbia	2024	14.6%	13.8%	23.7%	22.8%	18.0%	7.3%
	2025	19.4%	9.5%	19.1%	22.4%	21.6%	7.9%
WB6	2024	12.0%	14.1%	27.3%	25.4%	13.6%	7.5%
	2025	13.6%	10.8%	20.9%	26.2%	21.6%	6.8%

Table 23. Consideration for gun ownership, by year and WB6

Q14. Would you consider owning a gun? All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024 / N=5791 in 2023 / N=6041 in 2022 and N=6046 in 2021

	Year	Yes	No	I already have a gun	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2021	3.4%	95.1%	1.4%	0.1%	100.0%
	2022	3.7%	92.9%	1.9%	1.5%	100.0%
	2023	7.3%	91.4%	0.9%	0.4%	100.0%
	2024	8.4%	90.4%	0.9%	0.3%	100.0%
	2025	7.2%	91.1%	1.0%	0.7%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2021	3.9%	92.3%	2.7%	1.1%	100.0%
	2022	7.7%	80.8%	7.2%	4.3%	100.0%
	2023	18.5%	75.3%	3.3%	2.9%	100.0%
	2024	12.8%	81.0%	4.9%	1.3%	100.0%
	2025	11.7%	81.6%	4.4%	2.3%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2021	6.8%	92.8%	0.4%	0.0%	100.0%
	2022	38.9%	53.4%	6.1%	1.6%	100.0%
	2023	17.8%	76.8%	4.1%	1.3%	100.0%
	2024	4.8%	93.1%	1.0%	1.1%	100.0%
	2025	4.4%	94.0%	1.2%	0.4%	100.0%
Montenegro	2021	3.7%	90.2%	5.1%	1.0%	100.0%
	2022	7.5%	71.5%	8.4%	12.5%	100.0%
	2023	19.8%	72.3%	2.9%	5.0%	100.0%
	2024	16.7%	74.5%	4.8%	4.0%	100.0%
	2025	19.5%	71.7%	2.9%	5.9%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2021	13.8%	81.6%	4.3%	0.3%	100.0%
	2022	7.9%	86.3%	3.3%	2.6%	100.0%
	2023	7.5%	88.2%	1.7%	2.6%	100.0%
	2024	5.5%	88.8%	3.3%	2.4%	100.0%
	2025	3.3%	91.6%	2.7%	2.4%	100.0%
Serbia	2021	4.7%	91.3%	2.8%	1.2%	100.0%
	2022	4.7%	89.4%	2.9%	3.0%	100.0%
	2023	16.3%	77.3%	3.0%	3.4%	100.0%
	2024	10.1%	84.8%	2.7%	2.4%	100.0%
	2025	12.2%	80.9%	2.3%	4.7%	100.0%
WB6	2021	6.1%	90.6%	2.8%	0.6%	100.0%
	2022	11.7%	79.1%	5.0%	4.3%	100.0%
	2023	14.3%	80.5%	2.6%	2.5%	100.0%
	2024	9.7%	85.4%	2.9%	1.9%	100.0%
	2025	9.7%	85.1%	2.4%	2.7%	100.0%

Table 24. Reasons for gun ownership, by year and WB6

Q15. What would be / is the main reason for you to own a gun?
Responses only from people who consider owning a gun or already own a gun, N=728 in 2025 / N=759 in 2024 / N=983 in 2023 / N=1007 in 2022 / N=533 in 2021

		For personal protection/ security	Hunting and sport	Tradition	Inherited the gun/ family heirloom	As preparation for conflict or unrest	Inspires fear in others	Other	Total
Albania	2021	59.2%	26.5%	2.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	12.2%	100.0%
	2022	42.9%	44.6%	3.6%	0.0%	0.0%	7.1%	1.8%	100.0%
	2023	55.6%	39.5%	1.2%	0.0%	0.0%	2.5%	1.2%	100.0%
	2024	64.5%	26.9%	1.1%	0.0%	0.0%	3.2%	4.3%	100.0%
	2025	49.2%	35.8%	0.0%	10.3%	4.7%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2021	64.2%	19.4%	7.5%	0.0%	0.0%	9.0%	0.0%	100.0%
	2022	45.7%	23.2%	13.9%	0.0%	0.0%	15.9%	1.3%	100.0%
	2023	70.6%	20.6%	3.2%	0.0%	0.0%	4.6%	0.9%	100.0%
	2024	70.1%	15.3%	9.0%	0.0%	0.0%	5.6%	0.0%	100.0%
	2025	53.0%	24.9%	0.0%	12.9%	7.2%	0.0%	1.9%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2021	41.7%	34.7%	18.1%	0.0%	0.0%	5.6%	0.0%	100.0%
	2022	32.5%	33.2%	12.2%	0.0%	0.0%	21.8%	0.2%	100.0%
	2023	40.4%	43.6%	12.4%	0.0%	0.0%	3.7%	0.0%	100.0%
	2024	75.9%	12.1%	3.4%	0.0%	0.0%	1.7%	6.9%	100.0%
	2025	68.7%	2.0%	0.0%	17.7%	7.0%	0.0%	4.5%	100.0%
Montenegro	2021	5.7%	40.9%	48.9%	0.0%	0.0%	1.1%	3.4%	100.0%
	2022	37.9%	28.6%	21.1%	0.0%	0.0%	11.8%	0.6%	100.0%
	2023	63.5%	23.0%	10.1%	0.0%	0.0%	2.8%	0.6%	100.0%
	2024	60.5%	22.3%	12.1%	0.0%	0.0%	4.7%	0.5%	100.0%
	2025	50.9%	19.1%	0.0%	23.3%	6.0%	0.0%	0.7%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2021	56.0%	22.0%	6.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	15.4%	100.0%
	2022	53.1%	21.2%	11.5%	0.0%	0.0%	7.1%	7.1%	100.0%
	2023	64.1%	15.2%	15.2%	0.0%	0.0%	2.2%	3.3%	100.0%
	2024	60.2%	19.3%	13.6%	0.0%	0.0%	5.7%	1.1%	100.0%
	2025	52.3%	16.8%	0.0%	20.8%	7.1%	0.0%	2.9%	100.0%
Serbia	2021	61.3%	10.7%	17.3%	0.0%	0.0%	2.7%	8.0%	100.0%
	2022	48.0%	20.0%	12.0%	0.0%	0.0%	14.7%	5.3%	100.0%
	2023	68.9%	18.1%	6.7%	0.0%	0.0%	4.1%	2.1%	100.0%
	2024	62.5%	12.5%	14.8%	0.0%	0.0%	8.6%	1.6%	100.0%
	2025	50.1%	23.0%	0.0%	17.5%	7.8%	0.0%	1.7%	100.0%
WB6	2021	47.8%	25.3%	16.3%	0.0%	0.0%	2.4%	8.1%	100.0%
	2022	39.4%	29.3%	13.3%	0.0%	0.0%	16.3%	1.7%	100.0%
	2023	60.4%	26.7%	8.2%	0.0%	0.0%	3.6%	1.1%	100.0%
	2024	64.7%	18.4%	10.0%	0.0%	0.0%	5.3%	1.6%	100.0%
	2025	52.4%	21.5%	0.0%	17.8%	6.7%	0.0%	1.6%	100.0%

Table 25. Attitudes about immigration, comparison by WB6

Q18. From your point of view, how much do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the effects of immigration on the development of your economy? Base All, N=6007

		Immigrants help fill important job vacancies in our economy	Immigration contributes to cultural diversity and enriches society.	Immigration increases the crime rate.	Granting asylum to refugees is a humanitarian obligation.	Immigration increases the risk of terrorism.	Immigration gives people from poorer countries a chance at a better life.	Immigration leads to higher unemployment among locals.	Immigration contributes to social tensions and conflict.
Albania	Disagree	36.9%	42.5%	38.9%	9.8%	43.9%	10.9%	44.8%	32.5%
	Hard to say	10.3%	15.3%	14.4%	12.5%	16.3%	9.0%	13.8%	16.4%
	Agree	52.8%	42.2%	46.7%	77.7%	39.8%	80.1%	41.4%	51.1%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Disagree	54.9%	46.4%	27.3%	28.6%	29.2%	18.1%	42.2%	29.6%
	Hard to say	32.1%	27.7%	28.2%	29.2%	30.4%	26.7%	27.9%	31.7%
	Agree	13.0%	26.0%	44.6%	42.1%	40.4%	55.2%	30.0%	38.8%
Kosovo*	Disagree	36.2%	43.6%	32.1%	15.3%	31.7%	16.2%	26.0%	25.7%
	Hard to say	22.6%	25.3%	30.5%	31.7%	32.1%	29.5%	31.6%	33.1%
	Agree	41.2%	31.1%	37.3%	53.0%	36.2%	54.3%	42.5%	41.2%
Montenegro	Disagree	46.9%	41.9%	16.5%	24.4%	17.8%	17.2%	21.4%	22.9%
	Hard to say	40.9%	38.3%	40.7%	39.7%	39.3%	37.1%	38.8%	41.8%
	Agree	12.3%	19.8%	42.9%	35.9%	42.8%	45.7%	39.8%	35.3%
North Macedonia	Disagree	54.8%	53.4%	19.3%	35.9%	16.7%	19.0%	26.0%	20.2%
	Hard to say	26.7%	25.8%	32.6%	32.7%	35.8%	34.2%	27.0%	36.3%
	Agree	18.5%	20.8%	48.1%	31.3%	47.4%	46.7%	47.1%	43.4%
Serbia	Disagree	52.1%	44.5%	19.0%	29.0%	16.8%	16.6%	20.7%	21.2%
	Hard to say	36.7%	35.9%	39.8%	42.7%	39.4%	36.5%	34.7%	39.9%
	Agree	11.2%	19.6%	41.2%	28.3%	43.7%	47.0%	44.6%	38.9%
WB6	Disagree	47.0%	45.4%	25.5%	23.9%	26.0%	16.3%	30.2%	25.4%
	Hard to say	28.2%	28.1%	31.0%	31.4%	32.2%	28.9%	29.0%	33.2%
	Agree	24.8%	26.6%	43.5%	44.7%	41.7%	54.8%	40.9%	41.4%

Table 26. Preferred policy approach, comparison by WB6

Q19. Thinking about people from other countries coming to work in your economy, which of the following policy directions do you personally support? Base: All, N=6007

		Allow people to come work as long as there are jobs available	Place strict limits on the number of foreign workers	Prohibit people coming here from other countries except the Western Balkans Six and EU countries
Albania	Yes	76.9%	67.7%	41.6%
	No	21.5%	28.9%	51.8%
	Don't know	1.6%	3.4%	6.6%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Yes	61.9%	55.2%	24.7%
	No	26.0%	32.4%	59.1%
	Don't know	12.1%	12.4%	16.2%
Kosovo*	Yes	61.0%	65.6%	40.9%
	No	36.2%	30.1%	49.4%
	Don't know	2.8%	4.3%	9.7%
Montenegro	Yes	52.6%	58.1%	22.8%
	No	33.8%	26.8%	55.0%
	Don't know	13.6%	15.1%	22.1%
North Macedonia	Yes	43.3%	67.9%	37.6%
	No	46.3%	23.5%	43.6%
	Don't know	10.4%	8.6%	18.9%
Serbia	Yes	43.7%	61.4%	26.6%
	No	35.8%	20.8%	49.0%
	Don't know	20.5%	17.7%	24.4%
WB6	Yes	56.5%	62.6%	32.4%
	No	33.3%	27.1%	51.3%
	Don't know	10.2%	10.3%	16.3%

Table 27. Extended stays abroad among WB6 residents, by year and WB6

Q20. Have you so far stayed abroad for longer than 3 months?
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024 / N=5791 in 2023

		Yes	No	I don't know/refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2023	36.9%	63.0%	0.1%	100.0%
	2024	26.8%	73.2%	0.0%	100.0%
	2025	34.7%	65.3%	0.0%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2023	22.9%	76.5%	0.6%	100.0%
	2024	19.0%	80.2%	0.8%	100.0%
	2025	22.3%	76.4%	1.3%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2023	41.6%	55.3%	3.1%	100.0%
	2024	14.6%	84.0%	1.4%	100.0%
	2025	16.1%	83.5%	0.4%	100.0%
Montenegro	2023	21.5%	77.1%	1.4%	100.0%
	2024	23.9%	74.5%	1.6%	100.0%
	2025	24.3%	73.0%	2.7%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2023	16.7%	82.4%	1.0%	100.0%
	2024	17.2%	82.0%	0.8%	100.0%
	2025	19.8%	79.3%	0.9%	100.0%
Serbia	2023	20.2%	78.7%	1.1%	100.0%
	2024	21.7%	76.3%	2.0%	100.0%
	2025	20.2%	77.0%	2.8%	100.0%
WB6	2023	26.8%	72.0%	1.2%	100.0%
	2024	20.5%	78.4%	1.1%	100.0%
	2025	22.9%	75.7%	1.3%	100.0%

Table 28. Intention of moving abroad, by year and WB6

Q21. Do you intend to move abroad for living and working?
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024 / N=5791 in 2023

		I have a vague plan to move	I have already developed a plan for moving	I have a definite plan to move and have started taking actions for moving	I do not want to move	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2025	9.9%	11.8%	5.5%	69.9%	2.9%	100.0%
	2024	11.2%	11.1%	5.6%	66.6%	5.5%	100.0%
	2023	13.1%	12.8%	4.9%	64.3%	4.8%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2025	26.1%	3.8%	11.8%	54.8%	3.5%	100.0%
	2024	10.6%	3.9%	9.7%	72.8%	3.0%	100.0%
	2023	14.3%	4.1%	8.6%	69.4%	3.7%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2025	5.9%	5.6%	5.3%	80.5%	2.7%	100.0%
	2024	6.2%	6.2%	5.5%	76.0%	6.1%	100.0%
	2023	13.2%	13.8%	7.9%	63.7%	1.4%	100.0%
Montenegro	2025	21.9%	4.2%	5.5%	62.8%	5.6%	100.0%
	2024	13.8%	3.8%	4.6%	71.6%	6.2%	100.0%
	2023	11.4%	2.8%	5.1%	75.6%	5.1%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2025	13.3%	7.1%	5.9%	67.7%	6.0%	100.0%
	2024	12.6%	7.2%	5.6%	66.1%	8.5%	100.0%
	2023	15.0%	7.1%	7.5%	64.2%	6.3%	100.0%
Serbia	2025	12.9%	3.4%	4.0%	71.3%	8.5%	100.0%
	2024	13.0%	3.5%	6.1%	72.0%	5.5%	100.0%
	2023	15.9%	2.7%	4.8%	72.3%	4.4%	100.0%
WB6	2025	15.0%	6.0%	6.3%	67.8%	4.9%	100.0%
	2024	11.2%	5.9%	6.2%	70.9%	5.8%	100.0%
	2023	13.9%	7.4%	6.5%	68.0%	4.2%	100.0%

Table 29. Preferred destinations for migration, by year and WB6

Q22 Which of the following countries would you choose to move for living and working?
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Another economy in the Western Balkans	UK	Switzerland	Turkey	Germany – Austria	Slovenia – Croatia	Italy	Greece	Sweden	Other EU member states than the ones mentioned above
Albania	2025	1.8%	15.4%	4.8%	0.4%	23.5%	0.4%	14.7%	5.9%	2.6%	5.1%
	2024	0.0%	10.8%	4.7%	1.1%	30.1%	0.0%	15.1%	3.9%	3.9%	7.9%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2025	6.0%	4.1%	14.9%	3.1%	23.7%	6.5%	3.6%	1.2%	3.1%	3.4%
	2024	5.8%	3.3%	15.3%	3.7%	33.1%	5.0%	2.9%	0.8%	3.7%	2.9%
Kosovo*	2025	4.1%	0.0%	21.3%	0.6%	51.5%	2.4%	3.6%	0.0%	3.0%	4.1%
	2024	3.4%	0.6%	19.6%	0.6%	55.3%	2.2%	1.1%	0.0%	5.0%	6.1%
Montenegro	2025	7.3%	3.2%	12.7%	1.6%	7.3%	5.1%	7.6%	1.3%	6.0%	2.8%
	2024	9.9%	2.7%	14.4%	2.3%	18.0%	2.7%	2.3%	0.0%	5.0%	5.4%
North Macedonia	2025	0.4%	2.3%	24.2%	2.7%	37.9%	5.3%	2.3%	0.0%	5.7%	3.8%
	2024	1.2%	2.0%	19.7%	2.4%	33.1%	4.7%	6.3%	0.8%	3.5%	7.1%
Serbia	2025	4.9%	3.0%	16.7%	0.5%	21.7%	6.4%	4.4%	2.0%	5.9%	5.9%
	2024	9.3%	3.1%	17.3%	0.4%	21.2%	3.5%	4.9%	2.2%	6.2%	6.2%
WB6	2025	4.3%	4.9%	15.2%	1.7%	25.4%	4.6%	6.1%	1.8%	4.3%	4.0%
	2024	4.7%	4.1%	14.7%	1.8%	31.0%	3.0%	5.9%	1.4%	4.5%	6.0%

		USA	Canada – Australia – New Zealand	Russia	China	Gulf countries	Other	Don’ t know/ refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2025	17.6%	5.9%	0.0%	0.4%	0.0%	0.7%	0.7%	100.0%
	2024	16.1%	4.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.1%	1.1%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2025	8.2%	8.2%	0.7%	0.2%	0.7%	2.4%	10.1%	100.0%
	2024	12.0%	5.8%	1.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.5%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2025	6.5%	0.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.6%	1.8%	0.0%	100.0%
	2024	5.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.6%	100.0%
Montenegro	2025	18.4%	9.8%	1.6%	0.9%	1.3%	3.8%	9.5%	100.0%
	2024	20.3%	10.4%	2.7%	0.5%	1.4%	0.9%	1.4%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2025	8.0%	3.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.4%	1.5%	2.7%	100.0%
	2024	8.7%	6.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.4%	3.5%	100.0%
Serbia	2025	11.3%	7.4%	2.0%	1.5%	0.0%	4.4%	2.0%	100.0%
	2024	10.2%	10.6%	0.4%	0.0%	2.2%	0.9%	1.3%	100.0%
WB6	2025	11.9%	6.4%	0.7%	0.5%	0.5%	2.4%	5.2%	100.0%
	2024	12.3%	6.4%	0.7%	0.1%	0.6%	0.6%	2.1%	100.0%

Table 30. Capacity to face unexpected expenses, by year and WB6

Q23.1. The capacity to face an unexpected expense of approximately €1000 without borrowing or relying on others. All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Disagree	Hard to say	Agree	Total
Albania	2024	53.3%	19.7%	27.0%	100.0%
	2025	54.5%	14.1%	31.4%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	33.6%	19.5%	47.0%	100.0%
	2025	31.9%	32.8%	35.4%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	27.6%	34.2%	38.2%	100.0%
	2025	25.3%	24.6%	50.1%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	37.5%	23.7%	38.8%	100.0%
	2025	26.2%	41.9%	31.8%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	37.5%	28.4%	34.2%	100.0%
	2025	48.1%	27.4%	24.5%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	41.7%	23.3%	35.0%	100.0%
	2025	36.1%	38.7%	25.2%	100.0%
WB6	2024	38.5%	24.8%	36.7%	100.0%
	2025	37.0%	29.9%	33.1%	100.0%

Table 111. Average net salary

	Average net salary in domestic currency	Average net salary in euros	Period	Source
Albania	66215 ALL	662	Q1 2025	INSTAT
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1574 BAM	805	May 2025	Agency for Statistics34
Kosovo*		639	2024	Agency of Statistics35
Montenegro		1014	May 2025	MONSTAT3637
North Macedonia	45796 MKD	744	May 2025	Statistical Office38
Serbia	107705 dinars	920	May 2025	Statistical Office39

[34] Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Average monthly net and gross earnings of persons in employment, May 2025. https://bhas.gov.ba/?lang=en

[35] Kosovo* Agnecy of Statistics (ASK). "Paga mesatare mujore neto – maj 2025." Agjencia e Statistikave të Kosovës, 2025. https://ask.rks-gov.net/Releases/Details/8630

[36] Albania's Institute of Statistics (INSTAT). Wage Statistics Q1 - 2025. Tirana: INSTAT, 11 June 2025. https://www.instat.gov.al/en/themes/labour-market-and-education/wages/publications/2025/wage-statistics-q1-2025/

[37] Statistical Office of Montenegro (MONSTAT). "Prosječna neto zarada u Crnoj Gori za maj 2025. godine." MONSTAT, 30 June 2025. https://www.monstat.org/cg/novosti.php?id=4517

[38] Statistical Office of North Macedonia. "Просечна месечна исплатена нето плата по вработен – мај 2025 година." Accessed 19 August 2025. https://www.stat.mk/mk/stat/население-и-услови-за-живеење/пазар-на-трудот/просечна-месечна-исплатена-нето-плата-по-вработен/просечна-месечна-исплатена-нето-плата-по-вработен-мај-2025-година/

[39] Statistical Office of Serbia. "Zarade." Statistical Office of Serbia. Accessed 19 August 2025. https://www.stat.gov.rs/sr-latn/oblasti/trziste-rada/zarade

Table 32. The capacity to afford a one-week annual holiday away from home, by year and WB6

Q23.2. The capacity to afford paying for a one-week annual holiday away from home.
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Disagree	Hard to say	Agree	Total
Albania	2024	37.3%	11.5%	51.2%	100.0%
	2025	42.7%	13.0%	44.3%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	32.8%	15.0%	52.2%	100.0%
	2025	29.4%	28.4%	42.3%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	26.8%	31.3%	41.9%	100.0%
	2025	17.1%	28.9%	54.0%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	36.9%	17.9%	45.2%	100.0%
	2025	25.7%	39.4%	34.9%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	30.0%	21.0%	49.1%	100.0%
	2025	31.2%	22.8%	46.0%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	35.2%	17.1%	47.7%	100.0%
	2025	25.9%	31.8%	42.3%	100.0%
WB6	2024	33.2%	19.0%	47.9%	100.0%
	2025	28.7%	27.4%	43.9%	100.0%

Table 33. Capacity to be confronted with payment arrears, by year and WB6

Q23.3. Capacity to be confronted with payment arrears (on mortgage or rental payments, utility bills, hire purchase instalments, or other loan payments)
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Disagree	Hard to say	Agree	Total
Albania	2024	51.2%	20.7%	28.1%	100.0%
	2025	55.6%	15.7%	28.7%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	37.1%	15.0%	48.0%	100.0%
	2025	36.1%	31.5%	32.5%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	22.8%	30.7%	46.5%	100.0%
	2025	16.2%	31.6%	52.2%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	38.7%	18.7%	42.6%	100.0%
	2025	27.6%	42.8%	29.6%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	38.5%	25.1%	36.5%	100.0%
	2025	38.9%	29.6%	31.5%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	38.5%	19.5%	42.0%	100.0%
	2025	29.8%	37.4%	32.9%	100.0%
WB6	2024	37.8%	21.6%	40.6%	100.0%
	2025	34.0%	31.4%	34.6%	100.0%

Table 34. Capacity to afford a meal with meat, chicken, fish or vegetarian equivalent every second day, by year and WB6

Q23.4. Capacity to afford a meal with meat, chicken, fish or vegetarian equivalent every second day
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Disagree	Hard to say	Agree	Total
Albania	2024	21.4%	13.7%	64.9%	100.0%
	2025	24.6%	11.3%	64.1%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	19.9%	10.5%	69.6%	100.0%
	2025	16.4%	21.8%	61.8%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	20.5%	28.8%	50.7%	100.0%
	2025	16.3%	28.1%	55.6%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	18.4%	15.0%	66.6%	100.0%
	2025	16.9%	31.2%	51.9%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	18.6%	18.5%	62.9%	100.0%
	2025	21.1%	18.1%	60.8%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	24.4%	13.7%	62.0%	100.0%
	2025	17.5%	26.9%	55.6%	100.0%
WB6	2024	20.5%	16.7%	62.8%	100.0%
	2025	18.8%	22.9%	58.3%	100.0%

Table 35. Capacity to keep home adequately warm in winter and cool in summer, by year and WB6

Q23.5. Ability to keep home adequately warm in winter and cool in summer
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Disagree	Hard to say	Agree	Total
Albania	2024	28.1%	16.3%	55.6%	100.0%
	2025	30.0%	16.0%	54.0%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	15.6%	9.5%	74.9%	100.0%
	2025	12.5%	19.3%	68.2%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	16.7%	29.6%	53.7%	100.0%
	2025	11.4%	23.9%	64.7%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	14.6%	12.3%	73.1%	100.0%
	2025	11.8%	27.7%	60.5%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	13.8%	17.8%	68.4%	100.0%
	2025	13.0%	18.2%	68.8%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	17.9%	14.2%	68.0%	100.0%
	2025	13.7%	26.9%	59.4%	100.0%
WB6	2024	17.8%	16.6%	65.6%	100.0%
	2025	15.4%	22.0%	62.6%	100.0%

Table 36. Access to a car/van for personal use, by year and WB6

Q23.6. Access to a car/van for personal use
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Disagree	Hard to say	Agree	Total
Albania	2024	45.8%	8.4%	45.8%	100.0%
	2025	46.8%	4.3%	48.9%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	19.4%	9.9%	70.7%	100.0%
	2025	15.5%	18.3%	66.2%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	26.6%	26.3%	47.1%	100.0%
	2025	21.9%	27.0%	51.1%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	20.7%	13.5%	65.8%	100.0%
	2025	17.9%	26.0%	56.0%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	28.0%	16.8%	55.2%	100.0%
	2025	25.8%	17.3%	56.9%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	25.8%	14.8%	59.4%	100.0%
	2025	21.8%	25.4%	52.8%	100.0%
WB6	2024	27.7%	14.9%	57.3%	100.0%
	2025	24.9%	19.7%	55.3%	100.0%

Table 37. Capacity to replace worn-out furniture, by year and WB6

Q23.7. Replacing worn-out furniture
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Disagree	Hard to say	Agree	Total
Albania	2024	48.4%	23.4%	28.2%	100.0%
	2025	55.1%	12.3%	32.6%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	22.4%	14.4%	63.2%	100.0%
	2025	20.7%	29.9%	49.4%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	20.0%	36.8%	43.2%	100.0%
	2025	21.0%	31.7%	47.3%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	35.1%	17.4%	47.5%	100.0%
	2025	19.4%	40.3%	40.3%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	35.1%	28.3%	36.7%	100.0%
	2025	34.3%	29.5%	36.2%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	34.9%	20.9%	44.2%	100.0%
	2025	22.3%	41.1%	36.6%	100.0%
WB6	2024	32.6%	23.5%	43.8%	100.0%
	2025	28.8%	30.8%	40.4%	100.0%

Table 38. Having internet connection, by year and WB6

Q24.1. Having an internet connection
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Disagree	Hard to say	Agree	Total
Albania	2024	13.6%	5.7%	80.7%	100.0%
	2025	17.5%	2.4%	80.1%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	10.5%	5.9%	83.6%	100.0%
	2025	8.6%	8.7%	82.7%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	7.9%	14.4%	77.7%	100.0%
	2025	4.2%	11.3%	84.5%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	10.2%	8.2%	81.6%	100.0%
	2025	5.8%	13.4%	80.9%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	11.0%	6.2%	82.8%	100.0%
	2025	11.6%	7.7%	80.7%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	11.4%	8.8%	79.8%	100.0%
	2025	8.9%	9.9%	81.2%	100.0%
WB6	2024	10.8%	8.2%	81.0%	100.0%
	2025	9.4%	8.9%	81.7%	100.0%

Table 39. Replacing worn-out clothes, by year and WB6

Q24.2. Replacing worn-out clothes with some new ones
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Disagree	Hard to say	Agree	Total
Albania	2024	10.5%	11.6%	77.9%	100.0%
	2025	17.1%	6.9%	76.0%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	9.3%	7.5%	83.2%	100.0%
	2025	8.9%	14.4%	76.7%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	11.8%	21.7%	66.5%	100.0%
	2025	8.7%	17.3%	74.0%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	10.5%	11.7%	77.8%	100.0%
	2025	6.8%	20.7%	72.5%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	8.7%	11.8%	79.5%	100.0%
	2025	7.3%	12.4%	80.3%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	10.9%	11.6%	77.5%	100.0%
	2025	5.9%	22.0%	72.1%	100.0%
WB6	2024	10.3%	12.6%	77.1%	100.0%
	2025	9.1%	15.6%	75.3%	100.0%

Table 40. Having two pairs of properly fitting shoes, by year and WB6

Q24.3. Having two pairs of properly fitting shoes (including a pair of all-weather shoes)
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Disagree	Hard to say	Agree	Total
Albania	2024	15.8%	14.0%	70.2%	100.0%
	2025	17.3%	6.6%	76.1%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	10.3%	6.7%	83.0%	100.0%
	2025	8.3%	11.6%	80.1%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	8.4%	22.7%	68.9%	100.0%
	2025	5.7%	21.0%	73.3%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	10.6%	8.1%	81.3%	100.0%
	2025	7.7%	17.4%	74.9%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	9.9%	10.9%	79.2%	100.0%
	2025	9.1%	11.7%	79.2%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	10.6%	10.3%	79.1%	100.0%
	2025	9.2%	16.0%	74.9%	100.0%
WB6	2024	10.9%	12.1%	77.0%	100.0%
	2025	9.5%	14.1%	76.4%	100.0%

Table 41. Spending a small amount of money on oneself, by year and WB6

Q24.4. Spending a small amount of money each week on myself
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Disagree	Hard to say	Agree	Total
Albania	2024	34.5%	16.7%	48.8%	100.0%
	2025	40.5%	12.0%	47.5%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	29.2%	10.4%	60.4%	100.0%
	2025	19.7%	20.6%	59.7%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	10.7%	27.1%	62.2%	100.0%
	2025	8.3%	25.1%	66.6%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	24.8%	13.0%	62.2%	100.0%
	2025	20.0%	28.7%	51.2%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	19.1%	19.5%	61.4%	100.0%
	2025	20.5%	19.6%	59.9%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	25.0%	15.0%	60.1%	100.0%
	2025	16.8%	31.2%	51.9%	100.0%
WB6	2024	23.9%	16.9%	59.2%	100.0%
	2025	21.0%	22.9%	56.2%	100.0%

Table 42. Having regular leisure activities, by year and WB6

Q24.5. Having regular leisure activities. All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Disagree	Hard to say	Agree	Total
Albania	2024	53.3%	20.7%	26.0%	100.0%
	2025	59.7%	13.7%	26.6%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	26.6%	10.2%	63.2%	100.0%
	2025	25.6%	21.5%	52.9%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	13.7%	26.8%	59.5%	100.0%
	2025	10.5%	29.7%	59.8%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	22.8%	12.9%	64.3%	100.0%
	2025	20.5%	28.0%	51.4%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	21.5%	21.0%	57.5%	100.0%
	2025	21.3%	23.2%	55.5%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	22.5%	16.8%	60.8%	100.0%
	2025	16.4%	32.5%	51.1%	100.0%
WB6	2024	26.7%	18.1%	55.2%	100.0%
	2025	25.7%	24.8%	49.6%	100.0%

Table 43. Regular outings with friends for a drink/meal at least once a month, by year and WB6

Q24.6. Getting together with friends/family for a drink/meal at least once a month
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Disagree	Hard to say	Agree	Total
Albania	2024	23.9%	16.1%	60.0%	100.0%
	2025	33.5%	8.8%	57.7%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	17.2%	8.0%	74.8%	100.0%
	2025	14.8%	16.6%	68.6%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	11.8%	22.1%	66.1%	100.0%
	2025	9.7%	27.7%	62.6%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	18.9%	11.1%	70.0%	100.0%
	2025	11.6%	19.1%	69.3%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	16.0%	16.8%	67.2%	100.0%
	2025	14.2%	17.8%	68.0%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	18.3%	12.9%	68.9%	100.0%
	2025	16.7%	23.2%	60.1%	100.0%
WB6	2024	17.7%	14.5%	67.8%	100.0%
	2025	16.7%	18.9%	64.4%	100.0%

Table 44. Satisfaction with public services, by year and WB6

26.1. Health services
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024 / N=5791 in 2023

		Completely dissatisfied	Mostly dissatisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Mostly satisfied	Completely satisfied	Don't know/I cannot estimate	Total
Albania	2023	12.2%	29.0%	30.1%	27.3%	0.7%	0.8%	100.0%
	2024	17.5%	31.4%	29.3%	19.3%	1.3%	1.2%	100.0%
	2025	16.5%	30.0%	27.1%	22.1%	3.7%	0.6%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2023	15.6%	30.4%	30.0%	20.3%	3.0%	0.7%	100.0%
	2024	13.9%	26.6%	30.6%	24.9%	3.3%	0.8%	100.0%
	2025	13.6%	26.8%	33.4%	20.7%	4.4%	1.2%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2023	12.5%	27.8%	28.1%	24.4%	7.1%	0.2%	100.0%
	2024	12.0%	20.4%	32.7%	28.8%	5.9%	0.2%	100.0%
	2025	7.9%	21.8%	33.5%	26.6%	10.2%	0.0%	100.0%
Montenegro	2023	17.2%	29.0%	24.3%	24.0%	3.7%	1.8%	100.0%
	2024	15.8%	28.0%	23.4%	24.5%	6.3%	2.0%	100.0%
	2025	15.3%	24.2%	25.7%	26.1%	5.8%	2.9%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2023	25.6%	33.1%	22.3%	15.7%	2.9%	0.4%	100.0%
	2024	19.1%	31.5%	25.3%	20.0%	3.8%	0.4%	100.0%
	2025	12.0%	26.0%	29.9%	29.2%	2.2%	0.7%	100.0%
Serbia	2023	17.3%	28.1%	22.7%	28.1%	2.8%	1.0%	100.0%
	2024	15.5%	25.0%	25.6%	26.7%	4.2%	3.0%	100.0%
	2025	17.1%	24.4%	25.4%	26.0%	3.9%	3.1%	100.0%
WB6	2023	16.7%	29.6%	26.3%	23.2%	3.3%	0.8%	100.0%
	2024	15.6%	27.1%	27.8%	24.0%	4.1%	1.3%	100.0%
	2025	13.7%	25.5%	29.2%	25.1%	5.0%	1.4%	100.0%

Table 45. Satisfaction with education, by year and WB6

26.2. Education
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024 / N=5791 in 2023

		Completely dissatisfied	Mostly dissatisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Mostly satisfied	Completely satisfied	Don't know/ I cannot estimate	Total
Albania	2023	7.1%	23.6%	30.9%	24.1%	1.3%	12.9%	100.0%
	2024	8.9%	25.0%	32.0%	22.5%	1.5%	10.1%	100.0%
	2025	8.2%	23.9%	29.4%	24.0%	3.6%	10.8%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2023	9.8%	21.4%	29.7%	29.6%	8.5%	1.2%	100.0%
	2024	6.6%	17.6%	31.4%	33.9%	8.3%	2.3%	100.0%
	2025	9.3%	19.0%	32.9%	28.2%	6.7%	3.9%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2023	15.6%	11.8%	47.8%	22.3%	2.4%	0.1%	100.0%
	2024	3.7%	14.8%	38.5%	38.3%	4.3%	0.4%	100.0%
	2025	4.2%	16.3%	35.6%	35.7%	8.0%	0.3%	100.0%
Montenegro	2023	13.7%	28.4%	24.6%	24.6%	5.0%	3.8%	100.0%
	2024	12.9%	18.7%	27.7%	30.3%	7.0%	3.4%	100.0%
	2025	10.7%	22.1%	27.9%	27.8%	7.3%	4.3%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2023	20.2%	27.5%	26.1%	17.7%	4.7%	3.7%	100.0%
	2024	13.9%	25.2%	26.1%	24.4%	4.6%	5.9%	100.0%
	2025	8.0%	19.0%	30.1%	31.7%	5.6%	5.6%	100.0%
Serbia	2023	10.7%	23.7%	22.4%	33.0%	7.7%	2.6%	100.0%
	2024	9.3%	21.1%	23.4%	34.1%	7.3%	4.9%	100.0%
	2025	12.7%	17.3%	27.8%	28.4%	8.7%	5.1%	100.0%
WB6	2023	12.8%	22.5%	30.4%	25.3%	4.9%	4.1%	100.0%
	2024	9.2%	20.4%	29.8%	30.6%	5.5%	4.5%	100.0%
	2025	8.8%	19.6%	30.6%	29.3%	6.6%	5.0%	100.0%

Table 46. Satisfaction with childcare services, by year and WB6

26.3. Childcare
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024 / N=5791 in 2023

		Completely dissatisfied	Mostly dissatisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Mostly satisfied	Completely satisfied	Don't know/I cannot estimate	Total
Albania	2024	7.0%	18.2%	37.2%	22.9%	1.6%	13.1%	100.0%
	2025	5.3%	18.9%	31.5%	28.7%	4.7%	11.0%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	5.5%	17.8%	28.4%	38.1%	7.1%	3.2%	100.0%
	2025	6.4%	21.2%	33.8%	29.2%	4.9%	4.6%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	5.0%	11.6%	35.9%	43.9%	3.5%	0.1%	100.0%
	2025	1.8%	18.4%	34.4%	38.5%	6.4%	0.5%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	8.1%	16.9%	26.2%	35.2%	9.1%	4.5%	100.0%
	2025	7.0%	17.8%	27.4%	34.0%	8.0%	5.9%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	10.2%	19.9%	28.6%	28.1%	3.7%	9.6%	100.0%
	2025	8.5%	15.4%	25.3%	36.3%	4.4%	10.1%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	9.1%	20.3%	23.5%	34.8%	7.7%	4.7%	100.0%
	2025	10.4%	16.6%	26.5%	30.9%	9.5%	6.2%	100.0%
WB6	2024	7.5%	17.4%	29.9%	33.8%	5.4%	5.9%	100.0%
	2025	6.6%	18.0%	29.8%	32.9%	6.3%	6.4%	100.0%

Table 47. Satisfaction with elderly care, by year and WB6

26.4. Elderly care.
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024 / N=5791 in 2023

		Completely dissatisfied	Mostly dissatisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Mostly satisfied	Completely satisfied	Don't know/I cannot estimate	Total
Albania	2024	35.2%	38.5%	17.6%	3.4%	0.0%	5.3%	100.0%
	2025	38.8%	27.1%	20.0%	8.6%	2.2%	3.4%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	10.0%	24.0%	31.4%	27.6%	4.9%	2.2%	100.0%
	2025	12.8%	28.2%	29.7%	20.5%	5.7%	3.2%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	9.8%	29.4%	36.5%	22.3%	1.6%	0.4%	100.0%
	2025	4.7%	23.5%	41.5%	25.8%	4.1%	0.4%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	12.3%	22.9%	25.2%	28.2%	6.5%	4.9%	100.0%
	2025	10.6%	23.8%	30.3%	22.6%	7.2%	5.6%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	23.8%	28.5%	20.7%	17.4%	3.0%	6.7%	100.0%
	2025	26.7%	25.6%	18.9%	19.4%	2.8%	6.6%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	12.7%	27.4%	25.2%	25.5%	4.5%	4.6%	100.0%
	2025	15.2%	24.9%	28.0%	21.1%	5.1%	5.7%	100.0%
WB6	2024	17.3%	28.4%	26.1%	20.7%	3.4%	4.0%	100.0%
	2025	18.1%	25.5%	28.1%	19.7%	4.5%	4.1%	100.0%

Table 48. Satisfaction with air quality and pollution, by year and WB6

26.5. Air quality and pollution in my city/town. All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024 / N=5791 in 2023

		Completely dissatisfied	Mostly dissatisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Mostly satisfied	Completely satisfied	Don't know/I cannot estimate	Total
Albania	2023	19.0%	29.7%	18.5%	22.3%	10.4%	0.0%	100.0%
	2024	26.6%	31.4%	19.5%	18.6%	3.9%	0.0%	100.0%
	2025	15.9%	21.7%	22.7%	28.4%	11.3%	0.0%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2023	16.2%	20.7%	22.2%	28.2%	11.6%	1.1%	100.0%
	2024	13.0%	25.0%	18.7%	30.1%	11.2%	2.1%	100.0%
	2025	14.8%	24.1%	26.2%	20.9%	11.6%	2.5%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2023	11.6%	10.9%	46.2%	27.1%	4.1%	0.0%	100.0%
	2024	8.3%	17.7%	31.8%	32.8%	9.3%	0.1%	100.0%
	2025	2.7%	20.9%	31.6%	34.3%	10.4%	0.1%	100.0%
Montenegro	2023	16.0%	19.7%	18.0%	33.6%	10.2%	2.6%	100.0%
	2024	16.1%	21.5%	22.4%	26.0%	9.7%	4.3%	100.0%
	2025	12.5%	20.0%	22.2%	29.5%	11.0%	4.9%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2023	27.3%	22.9%	18.9%	22.8%	7.8%	0.4%	100.0%
	2024	22.6%	21.4%	20.5%	27.5%	7.6%	0.5%	100.0%
	2025	21.3%	20.5%	21.1%	26.5%	10.0%	0.6%	100.0%
Serbia	2023	26.3%	23.6%	18.2%	23.1%	7.5%	1.4%	100.0%
	2024	24.2%	28.2%	17.8%	20.1%	5.6%	4.2%	100.0%
	2025	25.0%	26.6%	20.0%	16.5%	6.8%	5.1%	100.0%
WB6	2023	19.6%	21.3%	23.9%	25.9%	8.5%	0.8%	100.0%
	2024	18.5%	24.2%	21.8%	25.8%	7.9%	1.9%	100.0%
	2025	15.4%	22.3%	24.0%	26.0%	10.2%	2.2%	100.0%

Table 49. Satisfaction with clean and affordable drinking water, by year and WB6

26.6. Clean and affordable drinking water at my place. Base: All N=6007 in 2025 /N=6004 in 2024/ N=5791 in 2023

		Completely dissatisfied	Mostly dissatisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Mostly satisfied	Completely satisfied	Don't know/I cannot estimate	Total
Albania	2023	25.6%	29.3%	21.9%	18.7%	4.6%	0.0%	100.0%
	2024	35.0%	39.0%	15.0%	6.7%	4.3%	0.0%	100.0%
	2025	29.5%	25.6%	17.9%	19.2%	7.6%	0.1%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2023	7.9%	12.4%	16.0%	40.5%	21.9%	1.3%	100.0%
	2024	4.9%	11.0%	19.7%	39.7%	23.0%	1.8%	100.0%
	2025	7.6%	12.1%	21.6%	35.1%	21.0%	2.7%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2023	2.5%	10.1%	42.2%	40.4%	4.6%	0.2%	100.0%
	2024	9.1%	19.3%	32.1%	31.4%	7.9%	0.2%	100.0%
	2025	2.1%	16.1%	30.5%	40.0%	11.0%	0.3%	100.0%
Montenegro	2023	11.3%	12.4%	13.6%	38.7%	22.1%	1.9%	100.0%
	2024	6.9%	11.5%	17.6%	38.6%	22.2%	3.2%	100.0%
	2025	7.4%	13.9%	16.4%	38.0%	21.0%	3.4%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2023	18.3%	17.7%	19.9%	33.6%	10.3%	0.2%	100.0%
	2024	9.5%	15.3%	22.1%	40.9%	11.6%	0.7%	100.0%
	2025	9.6%	9.5%	21.0%	42.1%	17.1%	0.8%	100.0%
Serbia	2023	12.0%	15.9%	17.7%	37.9%	14.7%	1.7%	100.0%
	2024	14.8%	15.2%	18.5%	35.3%	12.7%	3.6%	100.0%
	2025	11.9%	16.7%	19.1%	34.2%	14.8%	3.3%	100.0%
WB6	2023	13.0%	16.5%	22.2%	34.8%	12.7%	0.8%	100.0%
	2024	13.4%	18.5%	20.8%	32.1%	13.6%	1.6%	100.0%
	2025	11.3%	15.6%	21.1%	34.8%	15.4%	1.8%	100.0%

Table 50. Satisfaction with the availability and affordability of housing and rents, by year and WB6

26.7. Availability and affordability of housing and rents.
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024 / N=5791 in 2023

		Completely dissatisfied	Mostly dissatisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Mostly satisfied	Completely satisfied	Don't know/I cannot estimate	Total
Albania	2023	38.9%	24.2%	11.7%	2.7%	2.0%	20.4%	100.0%
	2024	47.8%	25.6%	10.5%	1.5%	0.1%	14.5%	100.0%
	2025	39.3%	23.4%	16.0%	5.1%	1.2%	14.9%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2023	23.9%	26.6%	23.1%	14.8%	5.2%	6.4%	100.0%
	2024	11.3%	25.7%	27.2%	26.4%	6.4%	3.1%	100.0%
	2025	10.9%	21.5%	28.2%	21.7%	9.4%	8.3%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2023	30.8%	20.1%	35.0%	10.3%	3.2%	0.6%	100.0%
	2024	12.2%	25.5%	35.7%	22.8%	3.5%	0.3%	100.0%
	2025	8.1%	21.7%	32.5%	23.6%	6.6%	7.4%	100.0%
Montenegro	2023	33.7%	29.1%	16.7%	10.9%	1.5%	8.0%	100.0%
	2024	18.7%	23.0%	27.4%	18.7%	5.5%	6.7%	100.0%
	2025	18.5%	21.3%	23.9%	22.4%	5.4%	8.4%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2023	47.4%	21.2%	13.6%	6.8%	3.8%	7.2%	100.0%
	2024	37.6%	24.3%	18.2%	9.3%	2.3%	8.4%	100.0%
	2025	36.4%	19.5%	20.2%	13.2%	2.1%	8.7%	100.0%
Serbia	2023	32.7%	23.9%	22.9%	10.4%	3.0%	7.2%	100.0%
	2024	15.1%	21.1%	26.3%	22.2%	7.0%	8.4%	100.0%
	2025	13.9%	20.2%	23.7%	24.3%	8.3%	9.6%	100.0%
WB6	2023	34.6%	24.0%	20.7%	9.3%	3.2%	8.3%	100.0%
	2024	23.8%	24.2%	24.2%	16.8%	4.1%	6.9%	100.0%
	2025	21.2%	21.3%	24.1%	18.4%	5.5%	9.5%	100.0%

Table 51. Satisfaction with the quality of transport infrastructure, by year and WB6

26.8. Quality of transport infrastructure. All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024 / N=5791 in 2023

		Completely dissatisfied	Mostly dissatisfied	Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	Mostly satisfied	Completely satisfied	Don't know/I cannot estimate	Total
Albania	2023	16.6%	32.8%	31.0%	17.5%	2.1%	0.0%	100.0%
	2024	13.5%	30.1%	33.8%	18.8%	3.7%	0.1%	100.0%
	2025	7.3%	25.6%	31.2%	29.3%	6.5%	0.1%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2023	25.0%	33.7%	23.3%	13.8%	2.5%	1.7%	100.0%
	2024	22.2%	33.3%	26.7%	13.1%	3.1%	1.7%	100.0%
	2025	16.5%	32.2%	33.6%	12.2%	3.2%	2.4%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2023	22.3%	23.3%	32.5%	16.2%	5.7%	0.0%	100.0%
	2024	11.3%	21.7%	35.0%	25.3%	6.3%	0.4%	100.0%
	2025	4.2%	24.8%	37.6%	24.8%	8.4%	0.2%	100.0%
Montenegro	2023	23.3%	29.4%	23.8%	18.0%	2.3%	3.2%	100.0%
	2024	21.1%	26.6%	26.7%	18.0%	3.9%	3.7%	100.0%
	2025	18.7%	27.6%	25.8%	20.0%	4.3%	3.5%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2023	34.3%	25.6%	24.0%	12.4%	3.0%	0.7%	100.0%
	2024	23.8%	29.1%	23.0%	19.6%	3.4%	1.2%	100.0%
	2025	23.4%	27.5%	25.7%	18.6%	3.8%	1.0%	100.0%
Serbia	2023	22.8%	26.5%	22.2%	19.2%	7.7%	1.7%	100.0%
	2024	13.8%	24.1%	25.8%	25.4%	7.1%	3.8%	100.0%
	2025	17.8%	24.8%	22.7%	23.6%	7.3%	3.7%	100.0%
WB6	2023	24.1%	28.5%	26.2%	16.1%	3.9%	1.1%	100.0%
	2024	17.6%	27.5%	28.5%	20.0%	4.6%	1.8%	100.0%
	2025	14.7%	27.1%	29.4%	21.4%	5.6%	1.8%	100.0%

Table 52. Public concern over the ability to afford routine healthcare and medication, by year and WB6

Q28.1. For routine healthcare and medication. All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Very worried	Somewhat worried	Not too worried	Not worried at all	Don't know/I cannot estimate	Total
Albania	2024	24.2%	29.9%	36.6%	8.6%	0.7%	100.0%
	2025	24.4%	32.3%	35.9%	7.3%	0.1%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	15.9%	37.7%	32.5%	12.2%	1.8%	100.0%
	2025	14.0%	37.9%	29.4%	14.4%	4.4%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	9.8%	38.8%	39.4%	11.9%	0.1%	100.0%
	2025	10.8%	44.7%	37.3%	6.6%	0.5%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	20.5%	34.1%	28.0%	12.3%	5.1%	100.0%
	2025	20.5%	37.9%	25.5%	10.7%	5.4%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	16.0%	31.5%	36.1%	15.2%	1.3%	100.0%
	2025	12.6%	28.0%	36.5%	21.7%	1.3%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	20.2%	35.7%	27.1%	12.8%	4.2%	100.0%
	2025	23.8%	35.5%	23.8%	11.2%	5.7%	100.0%
WB6	2024	17.8%	34.6%	33.3%	12.2%	2.2%	100.0%
	2025	17.7%	36.1%	31.4%	12.0%	2.9%	100.0%

Table 53. Public concern over the ability to afford healthcare and medication in the event of a serious illness or accident, by year and WB6

Q28.2. For healthcare and medication in the event of a serious illness or accident
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Very worried	Somewhat worried	Not too worried	Not worried at all	Don't know/ I cannot estimate	Total
Albania	2024	64.4%	22.5%	9.9%	2.3%	0.9%	100.0%
	2025	63.3%	25.1%	9.5%	1.3%	0.8%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	32.3%	36.9%	20.7%	7.1%	3.1%	100.0%
	2025	34.1%	35.8%	19.6%	5.9%	4.7%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	36.7%	42.9%	17.5%	2.8%	0.1%	100.0%
	2025	27.5%	50.6%	19.2%	2.2%	0.5%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	34.9%	37.0%	15.8%	7.0%	5.3%	100.0%
	2025	38.2%	35.3%	14.4%	6.0%	6.1%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	40.4%	34.2%	16.4%	7.2%	1.9%	100.0%
	2025	49.2%	28.0%	15.0%	5.1%	2.7%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	42.0%	32.2%	15.5%	5.5%	4.8%	100.0%
	2025	44.7%	31.6%	12.6%	5.3%	5.9%	100.0%
WB6	2024	41.8%	34.3%	16.0%	5.3%	2.7%	100.0%
	2025	42.8%	34.4%	15.0%	4.3%	3.4%	100.0%

Table 54. Trust in family, by year and WB6

Q32.1. Could you tell me for each whether you trust people from your family completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all? All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Do not trust at all	Do not trust very much	Somewhat trust	Trust completely	Don't know/I cannot estimate	Total
Albania	2024	0.0%	0.3%	4.1%	95.6%	0.0%	100.0%
	2025	0.0%	0.7%	7.3%	91.9%	0.1%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	4.0%	7.0%	18.5%	69.6%	0.9%	100.0%
	2025	4.7%	8.7%	18.3%	65.6%	2.7%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	0.0%	1.8%	11.0%	87.0%	0.2%	100.0%
	2025	0.1%	1.4%	9.5%	88.9%	0.1%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	4.4%	5.0%	16.9%	70.2%	3.5%	100.0%
	2025	4.1%	7.9%	14.9%	69.0%	4.1%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	1.3%	3.1%	19.1%	75.6%	0.9%	100.0%
	2025	1.3%	3.8%	14.7%	79.8%	0.4%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	5.2%	8.7%	17.4%	65.2%	3.6%	100.0%
	2025	3.8%	6.1%	17.6%	68.1%	4.5%	100.0%
WB6	2024	2.5%	4.3%	14.5%	77.2%	1.5%	100.0%
	2025	2.3%	4.8%	13.7%	77.2%	2.0%	100.0%

Table 55. Trust in neighbours, by year and WB6

Q32.2. Would you tell me for each whether you trust people from your neighbourhood completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all? All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Do not trust at all	Do not trust very much	Somewhat trust	Trust completely	Don't know/I cannot estimate	Total
Albania	2024	17.2%	42.3%	32.8%	6.7%	1.0%	100.0%
	2025	21.1%	39.3%	32.7%	5.8%	1.2%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	5.2%	22.0%	54.8%	15.5%	2.5%	100.0%
	2025	3.6%	17.8%	57.8%	16.7%	4.1%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	2.6%	18.5%	46.9%	31.5%	0.5%	100.0%
	2025	4.7%	30.4%	39.4%	25.2%	0.2%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	6.1%	26.0%	43.7%	18.9%	5.3%	100.0%
	2025	3.9%	18.6%	50.0%	20.5%	7.0%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	6.9%	23.9%	55.1%	11.9%	2.2%	100.0%
	2025	4.7%	26.7%	54.1%	12.8%	1.7%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	7.1%	20.5%	51.2%	16.3%	5.0%	100.0%
	2025	5.4%	18.7%	54.0%	15.1%	6.9%	100.0%
WB6	2024	7.5%	25.5%	47.4%	16.8%	2.7%	100.0%
	2025	7.2%	25.2%	48.0%	16.0%	3.5%	100.0%

Table 56. Trust in personal acquaintances, by year and WB6

Q32.3. Would you tell me for each whether you trust people you know personally completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all? All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Do not trust at all	Do not trust very much	Somewhat trust	Trust completely	Don't know/I cannot estimate	Total
Albania	2024	7.9%	22.4%	60.5%	8.8%	0.4%	100.0%
	2025	8.0%	22.1%	56.4%	13.5%		100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	2.3%	20.6%	53.0%	22.2%	1.9%	100.0%
	2025	3.1%	18.0%	57.2%	16.3%	5.4%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	4.0%	20.0%	51.9%	23.6%	0.5%	100.0%
	2025	5.2%	20.1%	53.5%	20.9%	0.3%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	3.5%	14.1%	48.4%	29.3%	4.7%	100.0%
	2025	3.1%	16.7%	55.0%	18.6%	6.6%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	5.2%	22.3%	60.3%	11.0%	1.2%	100.0%
	2025	6.1%	25.4%	58.5%	8.1%	1.9%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	3.0%	12.9%	53.3%	26.7%	4.1%	100.0%
	2025	3.8%	16.2%	56.9%	17.1%	6.0%	100.0%
WB6	2024	4.3%	18.7%	54.6%	20.3%	2.1%	100.0%
	2025	4.9%	19.7%	56.3%	15.8%	3.4%	100.0%

Table 57. Trust in administrative workers, by year and WB6

Q32.4. Would you tell me for each whether you trust administrative workers completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all? All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Do not trust at all	Do not trust very much	Somewhat trust	Trust completely	Don't know/I cannot estimate	Total
Albania	2024	22.2%	41.9%	28.1%	0.8%	7.0%	100.0%
	2025	27.2%	34.5%	33.8%	2.9%	1.6%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	14.4%	38.7%	36.8%	4.8%	5.4%	100.0%
	2025	11.6%	40.3%	36.5%	5.7%	6.0%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	8.3%	46.0%	40.9%	3.8%	1.0%	100.0%
	2025	12.0%	40.1%	39.6%	7.3%	1.0%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	14.9%	32.8%	36.5%	7.0%	8.8%	100.0%
	2025	11.5%	34.0%	37.1%	8.2%	9.3%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	15.8%	41.7%	34.5%	3.9%	4.2%	100.0%
	2025	12.6%	43.4%	37.6%	3.2%	3.2%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	12.4%	36.5%	38.5%	6.6%	6.0%	100.0%
	2025	18.8%	36.3%	30.3%	5.5%	9.1%	100.0%
WB6	2024	14.7%	39.6%	35.9%	4.5%	5.4%	100.0%
	2025	15.6%	38.1%	35.8%	5.5%	5.0%	100.0%

Table 58. Trust in strangers, by year and WB6

Q32.5. Would you tell me for each whether you trust strangers completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all? All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Do not trust at all	Do not trust very much	Somewhat trust	Trust completely	Don't know/I cannot estimate	Total
Albania	2024	44.2%	44.4%	7.0%	0.1%	4.3%	100.0%
	2025	55.3%	35.6%	7.9%	0.5%	0.7%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	28.0%	43.1%	22.2%	2.5%	4.3%	100.0%
	2025	23.7%	41.4%	24.9%	4.0%	6.1%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	21.6%	47.0%	27.0%	1.2%	3.2%	100.0%
	2025	27.8%	39.3%	27.1%	5.3%	0.5%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	28.6%	35.9%	22.2%	5.4%	7.9%	100.0%
	2025	24.9%	37.3%	22.8%	5.3%	9.8%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	28.3%	44.8%	18.9%	4.1%	4.0%	100.0%
	2025	26.2%	43.9%	23.1%	3.2%	3.6%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	24.9%	39.4%	25.9%	3.5%	6.3%	100.0%
	2025	20.0%	41.3%	25.9%	2.6%	10.2%	100.0%
WB6	2024	29.2%	42.4%	20.5%	2.8%	5.0%	100.0%
	2025	29.6%	39.8%	22.0%	3.5%	5.1%	100.0%

Table 59. Trust in people of other religions, by year and WB6

Q32.6. Would you tell me for each whether you trust people of other religions completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all? All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Do not trust at all	Do not trust very much	Somewhat trust	Trust completely	Don't know/I cannot estimate	Total
Albania	2024	12.6%	21.8%	49.2%	10.7%	5.7%	100.0%
	2025	20.3%	25.7%	38.1%	12.7%	3.2%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	6.7%	25.3%	53.3%	8.2%	6.5%	100.0%
	2025	5.4%	23.5%	54.7%	10.3%	6.1%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	18.3%	38.2%	35.6%	6.1%	1.8%	100.0%
	2025	21.8%	38.3%	33.9%	4.8%	1.2%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	7.7%	18.7%	50.5%	11.0%	12.1%	100.0%
	2025	5.9%	17.5%	49.5%	10.9%	16.3%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	17.4%	42.9%	29.9%	4.0%	5.9%	100.0%
	2025	17.2%	41.3%	33.0%	3.5%	4.9%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	8.1%	23.9%	48.6%	8.2%	11.3%	100.0%
	2025	7.8%	18.2%	48.2%	8.3%	17.5%	100.0%
Western Balkans	2024	11.8%	28.4%	44.5%	8.0%	7.2%	100.0%
	2025	13.1%	27.4%	42.9%	8.4%	8.2%	100.0%

Table 60. Trust in people of other nationalities, by year and WB6

Q32.7. Would you tell me for each whether you trust people of other nationalities completely, somewhat, not very much or not at all? All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Do not trust at all	Do not trust very much	Somewhat trust	Trust completely	Don't know/I cannot estimate	Total
Albania	2024	21.8%	30.1%	30.8%	5.3%	12.0%	100.0%
	2025	35.0%	27.3%	24.9%	5.8%	7.0%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	6.7%	23.9%	55.1%	7.9%	6.4%	100.0%
	2025	4.9%	23.7%	53.5%	11.3%	6.6%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	19.2%	38.8%	32.6%	5.4%	4.0%	100.0%
	2025	24.2%	37.9%	31.2%	4.9%	1.7%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	8.1%	17.3%	51.1%	11.0%	12.5%	100.0%
	2025	6.3%	17.5%	49.0%	11.3%	15.9%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	16.9%	40.8%	32.7%	4.4%	5.3%	100.0%
	2025	17.3%	41.9%	34.4%	2.4%	4.0%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	7.3%	23.5%	48.9%	8.6%	11.8%	100.0%
	2025	6.9%	18.7%	49.0%	7.9%	17.5%	100.0%
WB6	2024	13.3%	29.0%	41.9%	7.1%	8.7%	100.0%
	2025	15.7%	27.8%	40.4%	7.3%	8.8%	100.0%

Table 61. Trust in public security and justice institutions, by year and WB6

Q33. I am going to name several institutions/organisations, and means of communication. For each one, could you tell how much confidence you have or not? All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		The armed forces		The police		The courts	
		Trust (Quite a lot, great deal)	Distrust (None at all, not very much)	Trust (Quite a lot, great deal)	Distrust (None at all, not very much)	Trust (Quite a lot, great deal)	Distrust (None at all, not very much)
Albania	2024	63.0%	30.4%	56.9%	42.9%	22.0%	68.3%
	2025	51.3%	41.3%	53.0%	46.8%	21.4%	67.5%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	48.1%	46.6%	53.4%	42.8%	30.2%	65.0%
	2025	44.7%	48.9%	51.9%	43.0%	29.8%	64.2%
Kosovo*	2024	67.9%	31.8%	70.5%	29.2%	34.6%	59.6%
	2025	74.6%	25.3%	70.6%	29.4%	36.9%	61.2%
Montenegro	2024	41.0%	49.0%	46.0%	48.2%	39.2%	55.2%
	2025	50.4%	39.3%	44.4%	46.2%	30.9%	59.0%
North Macedonia	2024	66.8%	27.6%	52.1%	45.3%	19.9%	75.7%
	2025	67.7%	25.8%	49.9%	48.3%	20.7%	75.4%
Serbia	2024	44.4%	46.2%	44.6%	49.1%	31.4%	62.0%
	2025	59.0%	30.9%	44.7%	47.4%	27.3%	63.1%
WB6	2024	55.2%	38.6%	53.9%	42.9%	29.5%	64.3%
	2025	57.9%	35.3%	52.4%	43.5%	27.8%	65.1%

Table 62. Trust in core government institutions, by year and WB6

Q33. I am going to name several institutions/organisations, and means of communication. For each one, could you tell how much confidence you have or not. All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		The government		Political parties		Parliament		The civil service	
		Trust (Quite a lot, great deal)	Distrust (None at all, not very much)	Trust (Quite a lot, great deal)	Distrust (None at all, not very much)	Trust (Quite a lot, great deal)	Distrust (None at all, not very much)	Trust (Quite a lot, great deal)	Distrust (None at all, not very much)
Albania	2024	36.5%	63.1%	6.4%	92.4%	14.7%	84.6%	42.4%	51.5%
	2025	47.2%	52.4%	15.4%	84.2%	28.5%	71.3%	46.4%	49.7%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	23.7%	71.5%	11.6%	83.5%	18.6%	76.0%	26.2%	68.5%
	2025	18.2%	75.6%	10.8%	83.4%	14.2%	78.9%	19.7%	73.7%
Kosovo*	2024	45.5%	53.8%	24.6%	74.3%	32.2%	66.8%	47.1%	51.5%
	2025	51.9%	46.7%	29.7%	69.3%	35.2%	64.6%	48.8%	50.6%
Montenegro	2024	29.7%	62.5%	16.5%	76.2%	24.9%	67.3%	32.4%	59.8%
	2025	30.1%	58.1%	15.5%	74.5%	24.3%	65.5%	30.3%	59.4%
North Macedonia	2024	26.4%	66.9%	20.8%	74.8%	25.8%	69.2%	39.6%	56.5%
	2025	32.1%	62.5%	23.2%	71.4%	29.2%	65.6%	40.0%	56.5%
Serbia	2024	33.3%	60.3%	15.1%	77.9%	24.1%	68.9%	31.6%	61.0%
	2025	27.7%	61.9%	13.5%	76.6%	20.6%	68.8%	25.5%	65.8%
WB6	2024	32.5%	63.0%	15.8%	79.9%	23.4%	72.1%	36.5%	58.1%
	2025	34.6%	59.5%	18.0%	76.6%	25.3%	69.1%	35.1%	59.3%

Table 63. Trust in oversight and integrity institutions, by year and WB6

33. I am going to name a number of institutions/organisations and means of communication. For each one, could you tell how much confidence you have or not. All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Election commission		Public procurement authorities	
		Trust (Quite a lot, great deal)	Distrust (None at all, not very much)	Trust (Quite a lot, great deal)	Distrust (None at all, not very much)
Albania	2024	24.7%	66.9%	0.0%	0.0%
	2025	37.4%	57.7%	25.6%	56.6%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	18.1%	77.2%	0.0%	0.0%
	2025	17.5%	76.0%	14.2%	76.1%
Kosovo*	2024	41.8%	53.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	2025	43.8%	53.1%	37.7%	55.9%
Montenegro	2024	25.5%	64.7%	0.0%	0.0%
	2025	26.4%	61.3%	20.2%	63.6%
North Macedonia	2024	34.0%	59.5%	0.0%	0.0%
	2025	37.3%	54.9%	24.3%	63.6%
Serbia	2024	30.0%	61.7%	0.0%	0.0%
	2025	23.6%	63.8%	16.7%	69.1%
WB6	2024	29.0%	63.8%	0.0%	0.0%
	2025	31.0%	61.1%	23.1%	64.1%

Table 64. Trust in knowledge and educational institutions, by year and WB6

33. I am going to name a number of institutions/organisations and means of communication. For each one, could you tell how much confidence you have or not. All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Universities	
		Trust (Quite a lot, great deal)	Distrust (None at all, not very much)
Albania	2024	46.6%	30.9%
	2025	43.6%	37.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	48.8%	44.6%
	2025	49.9%	41.1%
Kosovo*	2024	69.6%	27.5%
	2025	73.1%	23.7%
Montenegro	2024	48.8%	41.4%
	2025	48.5%	39.7%
North Macedonia	2024	49.5%	38.7%
	2025	55.2%	34.8%
Serbia	2024	54.3%	36.7%
	2025	50.0%	36.7%
WB6	2024	52.9%	36.6%
	2025	53.4%	35.5%

Table 65. Trust in media, by year and WB6

Q33. I am going to name a number of institutions/organisations and means of communication. For each one, could you tell how much confidence you have or not. All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		TV		Social media	
		Trust (Quite a lot, great deal)	Distrust (None at all, not very much)	Trust (Quite a lot, great deal)	Distrust (None at all, not very much)
Albania	2024	31.5%	68.2%	9.5%	84.6%
	2025	24.9%	74.9%	10.9%	84.4%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	22.7%	73.6%	14.9%	80.0%
	2025	18.4%	76.2%	11.8%	77.6%
Kosovo*	2024	46.1%	53.3%	22.4%	74.9%
	2025	49.0%	50.5%	31.7%	64.2%
Montenegro	2024	25.6%	68.4%	17.2%	75.2%
	2025	26.9%	64.8%	18.7%	68.5%
North Macedonia	2024	42.8%	53.6%	28.2%	61.4%
	2025	38.9%	58.3%	22.7%	67.3%
Serbia	2024	18.1%	75.9%	12.8%	77.6%
	2025	18.7%	73.8%	19.1%	66.3%
WB6	2024	31.1%	65.5%	17.5%	75.6%
	2025	29.5%	66.4%	19.2%	71.4%

Table 66. Trust in religious organisations, by year and WB6

Q33. I am going to name a number of institutions/organisations and means of communication. For each one, could you tell how much confidence you have or not. All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Religious organisations	
		Trust (Quite a lot, great deal)	Distrust (None at all, not very much)
Albania	2024	51.5%	44.5%
	2025	58.8%	39.7%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	54.9%	41.3%
	2025	53.1%	42.7%
Kosovo*	2024	86.7%	11.4%
	2025	89.2%	7.4%
Montenegro	2024	53.3%	40.5%
	2025	52.6%	38.1%
North Macedonia	2024	67.0%	30.3%
	2025	72.1%	25.3%
Serbia	2024	48.8%	44.4%
	2025	46.2%	43.7%
WB6	2024	60.4%	35.4%
	2025	62.0%	32.8%

Table 67. Trust in international organisations, by year and WB6

Q33. I am going to name a number of institutions/organisations and means of communication. For each one, could you tell how much confidence you have or not. All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		EU		NATO	
		Trust (Quite a lot, great deal)	Distrust (None at all, not very much)	Trust (Quite a lot, great deal)	Distrust (None at all, not very much)
Albania	2024	85.9%	13.9%	93.4%	4.4%
	2025	81.5%	18.2%	87.8%	10.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	42.8%	52.7%	40.7%	53.9%
	2025	35.2%	57.8%	30.4%	63.2%
Kosovo*	2024	73.4%	26.1%	91.4%	7.9%
	2025	71.0%	28.5%	90.8%	8.9%
Montenegro	2024	49.3%	42.9%	37.2%	54.6%
	2025	46.8%	42.3%	36.5%	51.9%
North Macedonia	2024	54.6%	40.7%	52.8%	42.4%
	2025	59.5%	36.9%	59.5%	36.7%
Serbia	2024	21.0%	71.1%	8.5%	84.3%
	2025	18.8%	68.6%	7.2%	81.8%
WB6	2024	54.5%	41.2%	54.0%	41.3%
	2025	52.1%	42.1%	52.0%	42.1%

Table 68. Civic engagement through voting, by year and WB6

Q35. Did you vote in the last local or general elections? All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Yes	No	I was not eligible to vote	Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2024	76.5%	20.2%	2.5%	0.8%	100.0%
	2025	88.4%	10.7%	0.1%	0.8%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	76.3%	21.2%	1.4%	1.1%	100.0%
	2025	75.1%	19.0%	2.8%	3.1%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	79.9%	16.8%	2.4%	0.9%	100.0%
	2025	76.2%	21.3%	1.9%	0.6%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	71.8%	22.1%	2.4%	3.7%	100.0%
	2025	69.0%	22.4%	3.6%	5.0%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	73.9%	20.1%	2.4%	3.6%	100.0%
	2025	77.0%	18.0%	3.4%	1.6%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	70.2%	24.0%	1.7%	4.2%	100.0%
	2025	74.0%	18.7%	1.3%	6.0%	100.0%
WB6	2024	74.8%	20.7%	2.1%	2.4%	100.0%
	2025	76.6%	18.4%	2.2%	2.8%	100.0%

Table 69. Ideological orientation, by year and WB6

Q36. In general, how would you describe your political views? All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Socialist	Social democrat	Centre	Liberal democrat	Nationalist	Other	Don't know/Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2024	40.5%	10.6%	11.6%	11.1%	1.1%	14.3%	10.8%	100.0%
	2025	46.1%	4.1%	9.9%	28.4%	1.0%	2.8%	7.7%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	10.0%	26.8%	7.4%	16.0%	9.4%	1.1%	29.4%	100.0%
	2025	10.4%	25.9%	7.3%	12.4%	10.9%	1.1%	32.1%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	5.2%	15.1%	15.6%	36.0%	4.4%	0.5%	23.2%	100.0%
	2025	7.2%	18.9%	25.9%	25.7%	4.7%	0.1%	17.5%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	16.4%	19.6%	7.2%	13.4%	10.8%	1.3%	31.3%	100.0%
	2025	13.6%	15.9%	6.6%	17.7%	9.1%	1.1%	36.0%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	5.3%	13.2%	15.0%	9.4%	12.4%	3.7%	41.1%	100.0%
	2025	4.6%	14.9%	17.0%	9.2%	14.0%	2.1%	38.1%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	12.6%	13.7%	13.1%	13.4%	9.4%	3.3%	34.6%	100.0%
	2025	7.6%	13.2%	10.5%	12.8%	7.3%	2.3%	46.5%	100.0%
WB6	2024	15.0%	16.5%	11.6%	16.5%	7.9%	4.0%	28.4%	100.0%
	2025	14.9%	15.5%	12.9%	17.7%	7.8%	1.6%	29.6%	100.0%

Table 70. Perceptions of good leadership, by year and WB6

Q37. In your opinion, a good leader of your economy is someone who…
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Always stands up for my economy's independence	Seeks the best for the economy through international cooperation	Neither of the mentioned	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2024	33.2%	58.7%	7.5%	0.6%	100.0%
	2025	24.8%	62.5%	11.5%	1.2%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	19.8%	50.3%	19.5%	10.4%	100.0%
	2025	24.8%	49.4%	17.8%	8.1%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	29.2%	60.2%	8.3%	2.3%	100.0%
	2025	31.0%	61.3%	5.5%	2.2%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	22.9%	51.9%	14.9%	10.3%	100.0%
	2025	25.3%	44.1%	15.6%	15.0%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	25.8%	46.8%	20.0%	7.5%	100.0%
	2025	29.3%	47.1%	15.6%	8.0%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	30.3%	43.1%	15.7%	10.9%	100.0%
	2025	25.0%	44.6%	15.5%	15.0%	100.0%
WB6	2024	26.9%	51.8%	14.3%	7.0%	100.0%
	2025	26.7%	51.5%	13.6%	8.2%	100.0%

Table 71. Perceived prevalence of corruption in respondents' economies, by year and WB6

Q38. How widespread do you think the problem of corruption is in your economy?
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024 / N=5791 in 2023

		Very widespread	Fairly widespread	Fairly rare	Very rare	There is no corruption	Don't know/Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2023	25.9%	60.9%	10.8%	1.5%	0.1%	0.8%	100.0%
	2024	32.7%	58.5%	7.5%	0.6%	0.0%	0.7%	100.0%
	2025	28.3%	58.3%	12.1%	0.9%	0.3%	0.1%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2023	55.6%	29.0%	8.3%	3.8%	0.8%	2.5%	100.0%
	2024	44.3%	38.5%	11.8%	1.9%	0.5%	3.1%	100.0%
	2025	48.7%	34.9%	9.1%	2.6%	0.4%	4.4%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2023	59.2%	20.7%	10.0%	5.1%	3.5%	1.5%	100.0%
	2024	23.6%	60.1%	7.8%	4.6%	0.2%	3.7%	100.0%
	2025	24.2%	56.8%	12.1%	4.9%	0.4%	1.6%	100.0%
Montenegro	2023	48.6%	35.4%	7.8%	2.4%	0.1%	5.6%	100.0%
	2024	45.1%	32.9%	9.7%	3.7%	0.6%	8.0%	100.0%
	2025	39.5%	34.9%	10.7%	3.2%	0.8%	11.0%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2023	49.2%	36.9%	7.9%	3.3%	0.3%	2.4%	100.0%
	2024	43.8%	38.5%	10.7%	3.5%	0.6%	3.0%	100.0%
	2025	44.3%	34.1%	14.4%	5.3%	0.0%	2.0%	100.0%
Serbia	2023	60.3%	30.5%	4.6%	1.5%	0.2%	2.9%	100.0%
	2024	42.2%	36.7%	9.9%	3.2%	1.0%	7.0%	100.0%
	2025	53.4%	29.2%	6.3%	2.6%	1.0%	7.5%	100.0%
WB6	2023	49.8%	35.6%	8.3%	3.0%	0.9%	2.5%	100.0%
	2024	38.6%	44.2%	9.6%	2.9%	0.5%	4.2%	100.0%
	2025	39.7%	41.3%	10.8%	3.2%	0.5%	4.4%	100.0%

Table 72. Perceived change in the level of corruption over the past three years, by year and WB6

Q39. In the past three (3) years, would you say that the level of corruption in your economy has…?
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024 / N=5791 in 2023

		Increased a lot	Increased a little	Stayed the same	Decreased a little	Decreased a lot	There is no corruption in my economy	Don’t know/ Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2023	22.3%	25.5%	31.5%	16.4%	1.8%	0.0%	2.4%	100.0%
	2024	35.6%	23.9%	23.7%	12.9%	2.7%	0.0%	1.2%	100.0%
	2025	25.9%	14.2%	29.6%	24.1%	5.9%	0.2%	0.1%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2023	39.3%	29.0%	20.6%	6.1%	0.7%	0.9%	3.4%	100.0%
	2024	33.9%	28.9%	26.2%	6.4%	0.7%	0.1%	3.9%	100.0%
	2025	34.2%	20.4%	29.3%	9.5%	1.4%	0.2%	5.0%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2023	19.0%	27.6%	33.7%	9.4%	7.1%	0.4%	2.9%	100.0%
	2024	10.6%	26.8%	38.1%	12.5%	7.6%	0.3%	4.1%	100.0%
	2025	13.9%	20.4%	40.0%	18.7%	3.1%	0.1%	3.7%	100.0%
Montenegro	2023	20.2%	22.7%	34.6%	13.3%	3.2%	0.3%	5.7%	100.0%
	2024	18.5%	20.0%	32.5%	17.7%	2.7%	0.8%	7.8%	100.0%
	2025	19.5%	13.8%	33.9%	17.0%	3.9%	0.5%	11.4%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2023	40.0%	24.1%	24.0%	4.7%	1.7%	0.4%	5.1%	100.0%
	2024	42.8%	24.0%	20.7%	3.7%	2.0%	0.2%	6.7%	100.0%
	2025	28.6%	20.7%	32.7%	11.3%	2.2%	0.4%	4.1%	100.0%
Serbia	2023	39.4%	21.6%	22.2%	10.1%	2.3%	0.8%	3.6%	100.0%
	2024	30.4%	24.4%	26.0%	9.4%	2.1%	1.2%	6.5%	100.0%
	2025	42.1%	19.2%	20.8%	7.4%	1.9%	0.5%	8.1%	100.0%
WB6	2023	30.4%	25.2%	27.5%	9.9%	2.8%	0.5%	3.8%	100.0%
	2024	28.6%	24.7%	27.9%	10.4%	3.0%	0.4%	5.0%	100.0%
	2025	27.4%	18.1%	31.0%	14.7%	3.1%	0.3%	5.4%	100.0%

Table 73. Share of respondents reporting corruption experiences in public institutions involved in law enforcement (Yes responses only), by economy and WB6

Q40. In your contact or contacts with the following public institutions, did you or anyone living in your household have to give an extra payment or a valuable gift, or make a donation to the following public institutions in the past 3 years? All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024 / N=5791 in 2023

		Police	The courts (tribunals)	Public prosecution service	Officials awarding public tenders	Officials issuing building permits	Officials issuing business permits	Inspectors
Albania	2023	21.3%	17.3%	11.1%	9.5%	18.6%	9.5%	18.2%
	2024	16.5%	14.6%	4.9%	3.2%	9.0%	2.8%	16.2%
	2025	25.6%	21.6%	12.1%	7.7%	19.0%	9.7%	18.8%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2023	18.4%	4.7%	3.3%	5.4%	9.0%	6.9%	8.4%
	2024	17.9%	7.8%	4.7%	8.0%	9.1%	8.4%	12.0%
	2025	16.4%	6.9%	4.8%	5.2%	8.5%	7.3%	11.9%
Kosovo*	2023	30.2%	13.9%	9.2%	5.3%	13.4%	4.5%	7.4%
	2024	2.6%	5.1%	4.5%	4.8%	4.9%	5.6%	4.6%
	2025	2.1%	3.1%	2.9%	3.3%	4.3%	2.3%	1.9%
Montenegro	2023	12.9%	6.0%	4.7%	5.4%	10.2%	9.2%	11.8%
	2024	16.8%	6.5%	5.3%	5.7%	7.9%	8.3%	9.5%
	2025	10.0%	4.6%	4.0%	4.6%	7.6%	6.1%	9.9%
North Macedonia	2023	8.3%	9.3%	6.0%	6.4%	8.0%	7.4%	8.4%
	2024	6.3%	6.8%	4.2%	4.4%	5.9%	5.3%	6.2%
	2025	11.1%	9.6%	6.3%	5.5%	6.7%	6.9%	6.9%
Serbia	2023	17.6%	8.5%	5.5%	7.4%	11.2%	8.1%	15.8%
	2024	16.1%	9.0%	6.3%	9.0%	10.9%	9.4%	11.7%
	2025	13.3%	7.1%	4.8%	5.8%	8.3%	6.8%	10.0%
WB6	2023	18.3%	10.1%	6.7%	6.6%	11.8%	7.5%	11.6%
	2024	12.7%	8.3%	5.0%	5.8%	7.9%	6.6%	10.0%
	2025	13.1%	8.8%	5.8%	5.3%	9.1%	6.5%	9.9%

Table 74. Share of respondents reporting corruption experiences in public institutions (Yes responses only), by year and WB6

Q40. In your contact or contacts with the following public institutions, did you or anyone living in your household have to give an extra payment or a valuable gift, or make a donation to the following public institutions in the past 3 years? All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024 / N=5791 in 2023

		The health care system	Social security and welfare authorities	The education sector	Politicians at the national, regional, or local level	Political parties	Private companies	Banks and financial institutions	Customs	Tax authorities
Albania	2023	48.5%	10.3%	17.9%	11.3%	4.6%	4.8%	3.3%	8.6%	10.3%
	2024	47.5%	7.1%	13.0%	2.2%	0.6%	5.2%	4.3%	2.1%	7.0%
	2025	62.2%	12.7%	23.6%	11.8%	5.0%	6.4%	4.4%	10.5%	15.1%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2023	25.8%	4.4%	8.6%	7.5%	7.0%	8.1%	4.9%	7.4%	6.9%
	2024	29.0%	7.6%	12.1%	8.8%	8.7%	7.5%	7.8%	9.1%	10.2%
	2025	22.1%	8.3%	11.1%	7.4%	6.1%	9.0%	8.9%	10.9%	7.7%
Kosovo*	2023	33.1%	11.6%	14.4%	4.4%	3.9%	6.1%	8.0%	7.4%	12.6%
	2024	23.5%	3.9%	2.9%	5.4%	5.4%	4.7%	2.9%	3.7%	4.2%
	2025	16.5%	3.1%	2.4%	2.9%	3.3%	4.1%	1.9%	3.1%	3.3%
Montenegro	2023	27.3%	7.2%	10.9%	6.1%	6.8%	11.6%	6.5%	8.8%	7.5%
	2024	22.1%	7.1%	10.9%	7.1%	7.1%	7.7%	7.1%	13.1%	10.8%
	2025	20.2%	6.1%	8.9%	5.1%	4.2%	8.1%	8.1%	7.8%	10.4%
North Macedonia	2023	18.3%	6.5%	8.5%	7.5%	7.3%	6.2%	5.0%	8.5%	6.0%
	2024	17.2%	5.8%	6.6%	5.5%	6.8%	3.6%	3.6%	4.7%	4.9%
	2025	18.0%	5.7%	6.0%	8.1%	7.4%	3.9%	4.2%	7.4%	6.4%
Serbia	2023	35.1%	9.8%	14.6%	11.0%	11.0%	11.4%	10.0%	6.6%	10.2%
	2024	27.1%	9.8%	12.4%	9.4%	9.1%	9.4%	9.5%	10.7%	10.1%
	2025	27.3%	8.0%	10.0%	7.6%	7.2%	7.9%	9.3%	8.1%	8.7%
WB6	2023	31.5%	8.3%	12.5%	8.0%	6.8%	7.9%	6.3%	7.8%	9.0%
	2024	27.7%	6.9%	9.6%	6.4%	6.3%	6.3%	5.9%	7.2%	7.9%
	2025	27.7%	7.3%	10.3%	7.1%	5.5%	6.6%	6.1%	8.0%	8.6%

Table 75. Impact of the war in the Middle East on the security situation in the Western Balkans, by year and WB6

Q41. How does the start of the war in the Middle East affect the security situation in your life?
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Completely negative	Mostly negative	Neither negative nor positive	Mostly positive	Completely positive	Don't know/ Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2024	7.9%	42.4%	40.2%	5.1%	0.0%	4.4%	100.0%
	2025	8.9%	40.5%	45.3%	1.4%	0.1%	3.9%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	8.3%	27.7%	56.1%	2.7%	1.1%	4.1%	100.0%
	2025	9.9%	30.4%	50.3%	2.8%	0.9%	5.7%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	17.2%	31.5%	43.0%	3.9%	0.4%	4.0%	100.0%
	2025	22.2%	32.3%	36.1%	7.1%	0.2%	2.1%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	13.0%	22.8%	50.4%	4.2%	0.5%	9.1%	100.0%
	2025	10.8%	20.6%	51.2%	2.4%	2.9%	12.1%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	7.6%	27.9%	53.3%	2.9%	1.7%	6.6%	100.0%
	2025	10.9%	27.9%	52.3%	2.6%	1.2%	5.1%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	11.8%	21.8%	55.7%	2.0%	0.9%	7.9%	100.0%
	2025	7.7%	23.2%	53.1%	2.3%	0.9%	12.8%	100.0%
WB6	2024	11.0%	29.0%	49.8%	3.5%	0.8%	6.0%	100.0%
	2025	11.7%	29.1%	48.1%	3.1%	1.0%	6.9%	100.0%

Table 76. Impact of the war in Ukraine on the security situation in the Western Balkans, by year and WB6

Q42 How does the continuation of the war in Ukraine affect the security situation in your life? All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Completely negative	Mostly negative	Neither negative nor positive	Mostly positive	Completely positive	Don't know/Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2024	10.4%	44.3%	37.7%	6.8%	0.0%	0.8%	100.0%
	2025	13.8%	50.4%	34.2%	1.0%	0.1%	0.5%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	7.8%	26.4%	57.4%	3.7%	1.0%	3.7%	100.0%
	2025	8.2%	29.7%	51.4%	4.6%	0.9%	5.2%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	19.3%	33.5%	37.9%	5.3%	0.3%	3.7%	100.0%
	2025	30.7%	27.5%	32.6%	6.4%	0.2%	2.5%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	11.5%	26.3%	47.4%	5.2%	1.1%	8.5%	100.0%
	2025	9.6%	25.6%	47.6%	3.7%	3.1%	10.5%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	7.9%	33.4%	47.9%	3.5%	1.7%	5.7%	100.0%
	2025	11.3%	31.3%	47.9%	4.0%	0.9%	4.6%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	10.6%	28.3%	50.0%	2.4%	1.0%	7.7%	100.0%
	2025	9.3%	28.8%	47.3%	2.8%	0.9%	10.9%	100.0%
WB6	2024	11.2%	32.0%	46.4%	4.5%	0.8%	5.0%	100.0%
	2025	13.8%	32.2%	43.5%	3.7%	1.0%	5.7%	100.0%

Table 77. Preferences for security cooperation, by year and WB6

Q43. Which security cooperation mechanism do you think is the most important for addressing the current security challenges of your economy? All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		NATO	EU	Military alliance with some other countries outside the EU and NATO	Regional cooperation (between neighbouring economies)	Full neutrality and non-alignment	Don't know / Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2024	64.6%	20.6%	5.9%	4.9%	1.1%	2.9%	100.0%
	2025	52.7%	36.4%	2.4%	5.6%	1.0%	1.9%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	23.1%	18.6%	7.9%	24.1%	14.7%	11.7%	100.0%
	2025	19.0%	19.1%	7.8%	24.1%	14.8%	15.2%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	55.0%	16.5%	14.7%	9.9%	1.0%	2.9%	100.0%
	2025	48.8%	15.4%	24.2%	6.7%	3.0%	1.9%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	16.6%	27.0%	7.1%	20.2%	14.2%	14.9%	100.0%
	2025	20.8%	21.9%	6.2%	20.0%	14.8%	16.2%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	22.1%	25.3%	10.5%	18.3%	11.8%	12.1%	100.0%
	2025	34.1%	20.7%	8.6%	17.2%	8.9%	10.6%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	5.1%	14.8%	12.4%	24.9%	25.5%	17.4%	100.0%
	2025	3.6%	15.3%	7.7%	23.7%	27.2%	22.5%	100.0%
WB6	2024	31.1%	20.5%	9.7%	17.0%	11.4%	10.3%	100.0%
	2025	29.8%	21.5%	9.5%	16.2%	11.6%	11.4%	100.0%

Table 78. AI and new technologies, by year and WB6

Q44. These days, there are machines or robots that can think and make decisions on their own, often known as artificial intelligence. Do you think AI will mostly help or mostly harm people in your economy in the next 20 years? All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Mostly harm	Neither harm nor help	Mostly help	Don't know / Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2024	46.4%	17.2%	23.6%	12.8%	100.0%
	2025	38.2%	16.3%	36.4%	9.0%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	44.5%	38.8%	8.5%	8.3%	100.0%
	2025	40.6%	36.3%	14.3%	8.8%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	25.9%	42.0%	22.4%	9.7%	100.0%
	2025	25.2%	40.7%	24.1%	10.0%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	43.0%	29.5%	17.9%	9.6%	100.0%
	2025	41.0%	30.1%	14.8%	14.1%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	35.6%	28.5%	21.3%	14.7%	100.0%
	2025	33.2%	27.1%	26.5%	13.2%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	45.3%	27.4%	14.6%	12.7%	100.0%
	2025	43.8%	24.0%	16.7%	15.4%	100.0%
WB6	2024	40.1%	30.6%	18.0%	11.3%	100.0%
	2025	37.0%	29.1%	22.1%	11.8%	100.0%

Table 79. Concerns about personal information theft online, by year and WB6

Q45. When you use the internet or social media, how worried or not are you that the following things could happen to your personal information? – Personal information theft
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Very worried	Somewhat worried	Not worried	Don't know / Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2024	51.1%	34.1%	13.3%	1.5%	100.0%
	2025	47.5%	31.1%	19.3%	2.1%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	26.8%	48.7%	20.1%	4.5%	100.0%
	2025	21.6%	49.9%	22.4%	6.2%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	20.6%	55.0%	21.6%	2.8%	100.0%
	2025	23.5%	59.1%	15.1%	2.3%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	31.5%	44.6%	16.1%	7.8%	100.0%
	2025	24.5%	47.9%	18.4%	9.2%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	31.3%	43.0%	18.8%	7.0%	100.0%
	2025	30.1%	47.6%	17.7%	4.7%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	30.3%	42.1%	19.6%	8.0%	100.0%
	2025	27.2%	44.0%	18.6%	10.2%	100.0%
WB6	2024	31.9%	44.6%	18.2%	5.3%	100.0%
	2025	29.1%	46.6%	18.6%	5.8%	100.0%

Table 80. Concerns about personal information being used by the government, by year and WB6

Q45. When you use the internet or social media, how worried or not are you that the following things could happen to your personal information? – Personal information being used by government
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Very worried	Somewhat worried	Not worried	Don't know / Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2024	46.3%	28.7%	20.1%	4.9%	100.0%
	2025	44.1%	27.5%	24.4%	4.0%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	28.9%	40.9%	24.0%	6.3%	100.0%
	2025	22.3%	42.1%	28.4%	7.3%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	22.7%	51.2%	23.3%	2.8%	100.0%
	2025	26.7%	51.2%	19.7%	2.4%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	29.7%	39.7%	21.6%	9.0%	100.0%
	2025	23.1%	40.3%	25.0%	11.6%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	32.7%	36.5%	23.3%	7.6%	100.0%
	2025	29.0%	44.1%	20.9%	6.1%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	31.7%	36.1%	23.1%	9.1%	100.0%
	2025	33.4%	35.3%	20.1%	11.2%	100.0%
WB6	2024	32.0%	38.8%	22.6%	6.6%	100.0%
	2025	29.8%	40.1%	23.1%	7.1%	100.0%

Table 81. Concerns about personal information being used by foreign countries, by year and WB6

Q45. When you use the internet or social media, how worried or not are you that the following things could happen to your personal information? – Personal information being used by foreign countries
All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Very worried	Somewhat worried	Not worried	Don't know / Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2024	46.0%	29.8%	16.3%	7.9%	100.0%
	2025	48.4%	26.7%	17.9%	6.9%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	29.4%	40.1%	25.2%	5.4%	100.0%
	2025	22.1%	42.6%	27.9%	7.5%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	21.6%	53.4%	22.0%	3.0%	100.0%
	2025	24.8%	53.7%	18.2%	3.3%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	30.9%	37.0%	22.6%	9.5%	100.0%
	2025	25.6%	36.9%	26.0%	11.6%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	31.6%	38.8%	22.4%	7.3%	100.0%
	2025	29.4%	44.7%	19.8%	6.1%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	34.0%	34.8%	22.0%	9.2%	100.0%
	2025	28.1%	36.7%	23.8%	11.4%	100.0%
WB6	2024	32.2%	39.0%	21.7%	7.0%	100.0%
	2025	29.7%	40.2%	22.3%	7.8%	100.0%

Table 82. Perceptions about misinformation from local TV channels and traditional news media, by year and WB6

Q46. Misinformation can be defined as stories that are made up or cannot be verified as accurate but are presented to people as if they are accurate. Whereas biased information is referring to the stories prejudiced for or against someone or something. Do you believe the following news resources are the source of misinformation or bias? All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Misinformation	Biased	Neutral	Don't know / Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2024	20.7%	64.1%	13.6%	1.6%	100.0%
	2025	24.0%	60.9%	14.5%	0.6%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	31.8%	45.3%	18.5%	4.5%	100.0%
	2025	33.8%	44.8%	14.3%	7.2%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	8.8%	47.8%	40.9%	2.5%	100.0%
	2025	13.8%	46.8%	37.6%	1.8%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	29.6%	38.6%	20.6%	11.2%	100.0%
	2025	25.9%	38.6%	18.4%	17.1%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	20.2%	51.8%	21.0%	7.0%	100.0%
	2025	13.8%	63.6%	16.8%	5.8%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	31.0%	40.8%	18.7%	9.5%	100.0%
	2025	32.5%	40.8%	14.6%	12.1%	100.0%
WB6	2024	23.7%	48.1%	22.2%	6.0%	100.0%
	2025	24.0%	49.2%	19.4%	7.4%	100.0%

Table 83. Perceptions about misinformation from online anonymous social networks, by year and WB6

Q46. Misinformation can be defined as stories that are made up or cannot be verified as accurate but are presented to people as if they are accurate. Whereas biased information is referring to the stories prejudiced for or against someone or something. Do you believe the following news resources are the source of misinformation or bias? All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Misinformation	Biased	Neutral	Don't know / Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2024	70.2%	13.4%	8.1%	8.3%	100.0%
	2025	77.2%	9.6%	5.5%	7.7%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	48.1%	26.8%	17.5%	7.7%	100.0%
	2025	48.4%	26.5%	15.2%	10.0%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	22.7%	53.6%	18.4%	5.3%	100.0%
	2025	29.4%	45.4%	20.9%	4.2%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	37.7%	33.6%	14.9%	13.8%	100.0%
	2025	44.4%	22.7%	11.7%	21.3%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	38.0%	35.8%	11.5%	14.8%	100.0%
	2025	38.2%	37.3%	10.5%	13.9%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	40.6%	23.7%	21.2%	14.6%	100.0%
	2025	34.3%	24.8%	22.5%	18.3%	100.0%
WB6	2024	42.9%	31.1%	15.3%	10.7%	100.0%
	2025	45.3%	27.7%	14.4%	12.6%	100.0%

Table 84. Perceptions about misinformation from international TV channels or other traditional news media, by year and WB6

Q46. Misinformation can be defined as stories that are made up or cannot be verified as accurate but are presented to people as if they are accurate. Whereas biased information is referring to the stories prejudiced for or against someone or something. Do you believe the following news resources are the source of misinformation or bias? All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Misinformation	Biased	Neutral	Don't know / Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2024	12.4%	41.1%	31.4%	15.1%	100.0%
	2025	8.3%	38.2%	37.1%	16.4%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	28.6%	35.0%	28.3%	8.2%	100.0%
	2025	26.2%	36.7%	25.0%	12.1%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	10.5%	45.5%	40.7%	3.3%	100.0%
	2025	15.1%	44.6%	36.0%	4.3%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	24.2%	36.3%	26.2%	13.3%	100.0%
	2025	21.1%	32.3%	25.1%	21.5%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	16.6%	48.7%	25.0%	9.8%	100.0%
	2025	15.4%	47.3%	25.7%	11.7%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	30.7%	32.5%	24.4%	12.4%	100.0%
	2025	24.2%	34.7%	22.3%	18.9%	100.0%
WB6	2024	20.5%	39.8%	29.3%	10.3%	100.0%
	2025	18.4%	39.0%	28.5%	14.1%	100.0%

Table 85. Perceptions about misinformation from foreign countries' social media accounts, by year and WB6

Q46. Misinformation can be defined as stories that are made up or cannot be verified as accurate, but are presented to people as if they are accurate. At the same time, biased information refers to stories that are prejudiced for or against someone or something. Do you believe the following news resources are the source of misinformation or bias? All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Misinformation	Biased	Neutral	Don't know / Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2024	38.8%	20.1%	16.7%	24.4%	100.0%
	2025	43.0%	16.2%	19.6%	21.3%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	29.8%	32.6%	27.6%	10.1%	100.0%
	2025	30.0%	32.1%	22.5%	15.4%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	16.1%	51.7%	25.3%	6.9%	100.0%
	2025	19.5%	49.3%	21.5%	9.6%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	29.9%	34.6%	19.7%	15.8%	100.0%
	2025	28.7%	26.8%	19.8%	24.7%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	26.8%	42.2%	13.3%	17.8%	100.0%
	2025	23.3%	41.7%	17.1%	17.8%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	32.0%	28.7%	22.8%	16.5%	100.0%
	2025	23.7%	30.9%	18.9%	26.4%	100.0%
WB6	2024	28.9%	35.0%	20.9%	15.2%	100.0%
	2025	28.0%	32.8%	19.9%	19.2%	100.0%

Table 86. Perceptions about misinformation from social media influencers, by year and WB6

Q46. Misinformation can be defined as stories that are made up or cannot be verified as accurate but are presented to people as if they are accurate. Whereas biased information refers to stories that are prejudiced for or against someone or something. Do you believe the following news resources are the source of misinformation or bias? All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Misinformation	Biased	Neutral	Don't know / Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2024	57.4%	22.9%	9.6%	10.1%	100.0%
	2025	46.7%	26.0%	12.0%	15.3%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	36.0%	33.7%	19.6%	10.8%	100.0%
	2025	38.4%	28.8%	17.7%	15.2%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	17.8%	55.5%	19.6%	7.1%	100.0%
	2025	24.1%	49.4%	16.4%	10.1%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	36.1%	33.9%	15.3%	14.7%	100.0%
	2025	34.3%	27.3%	15.6%	22.8%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	27.8%	47.6%	11.3%	13.4%	100.0%
	2025	30.5%	43.6%	12.1%	13.8%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	32.0%	27.0%	22.3%	18.7%	100.0%
	2025	25.0%	31.9%	16.8%	26.3%	100.0%
WB6	2024	34.5%	36.8%	16.3%	12.5%	100.0%
	2025	33.1%	34.5%	15.1%	17.3%	100.0%

Table 87. Perceptions about misinformation from politicians, by year and WB6

Q46. Misinformation can be defined as stories that are made up or cannot be verified as accurate, but are presented to people as if they are accurate. Whereas biased information refers to stories that are prejudiced for or against someone or something. Do you believe the following news resources are the source of misinformation or bias? All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Misinformation	Biased	Neutral	Don't know / Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2024	32.3%	63.3%	3.4%	1.0%	100.0%
	2025	34.0%	63.4%	2.2%	0.4%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	37.1%	44.5%	11.9%	6.6%	100.0%
	2025	43.0%	36.0%	12.5%	8.5%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	16.4%	61.5%	19.2%	2.9%	100.0%
	2025	25.4%	54.7%	16.8%	3.1%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	36.1%	41.9%	11.2%	10.8%	100.0%
	2025	33.7%	35.5%	11.8%	19.0%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	31.2%	53.8%	9.2%	5.8%	100.0%
	2025	25.9%	60.3%	7.8%	6.0%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	34.9%	38.6%	15.3%	11.2%	100.0%
	2025	36.1%	38.3%	11.2%	14.4%	100.0%
WB6	2024	31.3%	50.6%	11.7%	6.4%	100.0%
	2025	33.0%	48.0%	10.4%	8.6%	100.0%

Table 88. Perceptions about misinformation from independent journalists, by year and WB6

Q46. Misinformation can be defined as stories that are made up or cannot be verified as accurate, but are presented to people as if they are accurate. Whereas biased information refers to stories that are prejudiced for or against someone or something. Do you believe the following news resources are the source of misinformation or bias? All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Misinformation	Biased	Neutral	Don't know / Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2024	20.6%	46.4%	30.4%	2.6%	100.0%
	2025	22.3%	44.4%	31.9%	1.4%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	25.0%	31.0%	37.0%	7.1%	100.0%
	2025	24.0%	28.3%	36.7%	11.1%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	13.8%	49.9%	33.2%	3.1%	100.0%
	2025	15.4%	52.5%	28.3%	3.8%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	25.8%	32.2%	30.7%	11.3%	100.0%
	2025	22.2%	28.5%	29.1%	20.2%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	14.4%	44.9%	33.4%	7.4%	100.0%
	2025	13.3%	45.4%	31.2%	10.1%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	22.5%	30.1%	34.4%	13.0%	100.0%
	2025	19.5%	27.1%	35.4%	18.0%	100.0%
WB6	2024	20.3%	39.1%	33.2%	7.4%	100.0%
	2025	19.4%	37.7%	32.1%	10.8%	100.0%

Table 89. Perceptions about misinformation from political parties, by year and WB6

Q46. Misinformation can be defined as stories that are made up or cannot be verified as accurate, but are presented to people as if they are accurate. Whereas biased information refers to stories that are prejudiced for or against someone or something. Do you believe the following news resources are the source of misinformation or bias? All respondents N=6007 in 2025 / N=6004 in 2024

		Misinformation	Biased	Neutral	Don't know / Refuse to answer	Total
Albania	2024	27.7%	69.1%	2.4%	0.8%	100.0%
	2025	27.7%	69.8%	2.2%	0.3%	100.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2024	36.9%	44.4%	12.2%	6.6%	100.0%
	2025	43.8%	37.8%	10.8%	7.7%	100.0%
Kosovo*	2024	13.7%	63.3%	19.9%	3.1%	100.0%
	2025	20.2%	58.8%	17.8%	3.2%	100.0%
Montenegro	2024	36.2%	42.7%	11.2%	9.9%	100.0%
	2025	33.3%	38.1%	10.6%	18.0%	100.0%
North Macedonia	2024	28.4%	57.1%	8.8%	5.7%	100.0%
	2025	25.5%	60.7%	7.2%	6.6%	100.0%
Serbia	2024	33.5%	41.7%	13.6%	11.2%	100.0%
	2025	32.8%	44.1%	9.7%	13.5%	100.0%
WB6	2024	29.4%	53.0%	11.3%	6.2%	100.0%
	2025	30.5%	51.5%	9.7%	8.2%	100.0%