Regional Cooperation Model

Dataset: Balkan Barometer 2025 Public Opinion Survey

Explained variable: Support to regional cooperation in the WB6

Factors under control: Global-regional, socio-economic and individual performance

Explanatory variables (15): economic and political situation, trust in institutions, demographics and individual characteristics of respondents

Method of estimation: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) cluster robust, Ordered probit model cluster robust check

Enhancing cooperation in the WB6:

Educated youth and good institutions lead the way

Modelling attitudes towards regional cooperation in the WB6 is challenging, as there is little existing theory to build on. Still, we can argue that demographic factors, human capital, political, economic and institutional conditions, as well as global influences, such as the EU, are all relevant. Our pioneering model includes all of these groups, and the results highlight that education, trust in government, EU integration, and certain demographic and domestic factors play a central role in shaping support for regional cooperation.

Institutional trust is essential driver of regional cooperation. Citizens who trust their local institutions are much more likely to support regional cooperation. This underlines the importance of credibility, transparency, and performance of public institutions. Where institutions are seen as effective and fair, citizens are more open to collaboration with neighbours. Interestingly, we find that institutional trust is even more important than general perceptions of political or economic environment.

Education is an important individual driver of cooperation. Among demographic characteristics, education is the most consistent and influential determinant. Individuals with secondary or university degrees are systematically more open to intraregional collaboration than those with only primary schooling. This shows that investment in education not only develops human capital but also strengthens the values and skills needed for constructive engagement beyond borders/boundaries.

Youth are strong supporters of cooperation. Younger respondents show more support for regional collaboration than older ones bringing optimistic signs to the future of regional cooperation in the WB6. Importantly, once support for EU membership or trust in EU institutions is included in the model, the age effect disappears. This indicates that young people see regional cooperation as a step towards EU integration; they view it as the mechanism which aligns with regional cooperation as well, something as the two sides of the same coin.

WB6 differences also matter. Respondents from Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, and Montenegro show higher support for regional cooperation, pointing to stronger pro-integration attitudes. This suggests that while some are ready to move quickly, others will require targeted efforts to build trust, reduce scepticism and highlight the benefits of cooperation.

Not all potential drivers that we have examined matter equally. Evaluations of whether the political or economic situation in the WB6 is good, neutral, or bad show no systematic effect on support for regional cooperation. Similarly, the urban–rural divide does not matter: respondents from cities are no more or less supportive of cooperation than those from rural areas. Gender also shows no significant effect, as men and women report similar levels of support across all models. These findings suggest that support for regional cooperation is not conditioned by short-term domestic circumstances or static demographic traits, but instead by deeper and more structural influences such as education, institutional trust, and orientation towards the EU.

Taken together, these findings suggest that efforts to promote regional cooperation in the WB6 and beyond should not be limited to diplomatic or intergovernmental strategies. They should also include building and maintaining institutional trust, promoting long-term investment in education and designing inclusive policies that speak to different generations and domestic contexts. By addressing these underlying social and institutional drivers, policymakers can strengthen the foundations for sustainable and widely supported regional cooperation. Above all, the youth perceive regional cooperation being part of the same (endogenous) system which is observed through the EU support – regional cooperation and the EU support go hand-in-hand. 

Some potential policy implications for better regional cooperation:

  • Strengthen institutional trust as the foundation of cooperation: Invest into structural policies that improve government and institutional efficiency, accountability, and service delivery at the local level. Citizens judge regional cooperation through the credibility of their own institutions; improving governance performance will therefore directly boost support for intraregional collaboration.
  • Leverage education as a long-term driver of openness: Expand investment in education and link it with regional academic exchange, joint curricula, and student mobility programmes, especially at the secondary and undergraduate levels. These policies not only develop skills but also nurture the values of cooperation and a shared regional identity.
  • Harness the energy of younger generations: Design youth-led initiatives, cultural exchanges, and digital platforms to channel the enthusiasm of young people, who are the strongest supporters of regional collaboration. Their higher openness offers a demographic advantage for sustaining cooperation into the future; they are a bright side of cooperation.
  • Tailor approaches to specific socio-economic contexts: Recognise and address disparities in support across the WB6. In societies with lower levels of cooperation, targeted campaigns and educational efforts should link domestic governance reforms with tangible benefits of regional collaboration, while in higher support contexts, policies can focus on deepening already positive attitudes.

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence